Looking at the stats, it seems fairly ordinary for late
WWI fighters, but it's always described as dominating the skys
over the Western Front.
--
--Matthew Saroff
Rules to live by:
1) To thine own self be true
2) Don't let your mouth write no checks that your butt can't cash
3) Interference in the time stream is forbidden, do not meddle in causality
Check http://www.pobox.com/~msaroff, including The Bad Hair Web Page

"Matthew G. Saroff" > wrote in message
...
> Looking at the stats, it seems fairly ordinary for late
> WWI fighters, but it's always described as dominating the skys
> over the Western Front.

It seems to have been widely regarded as the best German
fighter of WW1 and some regarded it as the best fighter
while others preferred the SE-5

Undoubtedly it was a good aircraft but by the time it was
introduced the sheer numerical superiority of the
allies counted strongly against it.

Keith

"Matthew G. Saroff" wrote:

> Looking at the stats, it seems fairly ordinary for late
> WWI fighters, but it's always described as dominating the skys
> over the Western Front.

It's performance was at least adequate in all areas and it was sturdy and
reliable, but mainly it had no nasty vices, which meant that the typical
inexperienced pilot could get in it, not kill themselves, and be effective in a
reasonable period of time. Very different from, say, a Camel.

Guy

It was the work of Ludwig Prandtl, and was the culmination of WWI
design. It had long, narrow wings for a superior lift-to-drag ratio.
The wings had blunt leading edges, which generated more lift (other
Prandtl designs also used this feature) especially a high angles of
attack, so it was less likely to stall out. The thicker airfoil also
allowed interior bracing, so the D VIII needed no struts or wires. (It
was given one, for psychological reasons, but was still much cleaner
than the other aircraft of the time.)

The Armistice document listed the war material that Germany was
required to turn over. Only one aircraft was named, the Fokker D VIII.

This from a new book by Stephen Budiansky, called Air Power. Very much
worth reading. See my review on the (free) Wall Street Journal site,
http://www.opinionjournal.com/la/?id=110004946 "A Long Way to Bombs
Away"


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

I read your review on the WSJ of "A Long Way to Bombs Away".

It's true as far as it goes to say that, for a time, 63% of B-17 crew failed to
complete their tours. It's true that the USAAF largely joined the RAF in terror
bombing in 1945.

It is also true:

That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far worse than
the RAF did.

That during 1944 over 1/3 of 8th AF bombs hit within 1,000 feet of the aiming
point using visual means.

That B-17's made made up a very important part of a "strike package" to which
the Germans could find no answer.

That the Germans denuded other fronts of day fighters to combat the unescorted
B-17's, when the 8th AF was only sending a few dozen on any given raid.

That on three days during May 1944, the USAAF reduced German synthetic oil
production by 50%. By September, largely due to raids by USAAF heavy bombers,
the Luftwaffe was receiving 1/15th of its required fuel allocation.

That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber Command could
not have operated over Germany at all.

That B-17's are offically credited with shooting down more German aircraft than
all other USAAF aircraft types COMBINED (including fighter types). Though B-17
gunner claims were wildly inflated, they were still very deadly and dangerous.
At least two high scoring German aces were killed in combat with B-17's. A
high scoring night fighter ace, whose aircraft had not been touch in months in
combat with the RAF, was killed in his first combat with B-24's.

Without a fleet of B-17's in place in England at the start of 1944, no invasion
of Europe would have been possible. This because the Germans showed they would
only fight for the type of targets that could only be struck by B-17's, and her
stablemate, the B-24.

As Dr. Russell Weigley notes in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants", during the spring
and summer of 1944 the Allies held victory through air power in their grasp,
but did not persevere for the kill.

But that is no fault of the B-17/B-24's or their crews.

Walt

Cub Driver > writes:

> It was the work of Ludwig Prandtl, and was the culmination of WWI
> design. It had long, narrow wings for a superior lift-to-drag ratio.
> The wings had blunt leading edges, which generated more lift (other
> Prandtl designs also used this feature) especially a high angles of
> attack, so it was less likely to stall out. The thicker airfoil also
> allowed interior bracing, so the D VIII needed no struts or wires. (It
> was given one, for psychological reasons, but was still much cleaner
> than the other aircraft of the time.)
>
> The Armistice document listed the war material that Germany was
> required to turn over. Only one aircraft was named, the Fokker D VIII.

Dan, I don't have the background to decide whether you made a typing
error or not. The original poster asked about the biplane Fokker
D.VII, not the monoplane D.VIII.

--
G Hassenpflug * IJN & JMSDF equipment/history fan

(WalterM140) wrote in message >...
>
> That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber Command could
> not have operated over Germany at all.

??? What's the connection? The German defences against night bombers
were not the same as those used against day bombers. The RAF was
operating over Germany long before the USAAF started to have an
effect.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

> It was the work of Ludwig Prandtl, and was the culmination of WWI
> design. It had long, narrow wings for a superior lift-to-drag ratio.
> The wings had blunt leading edges, which generated more lift (other
> Prandtl designs also used this feature) especially a high angles of
> attack, so it was less likely to stall out. The thicker airfoil also
> allowed interior bracing, so the D VIII needed no struts or wires. (It
> was given one, for psychological reasons, but was still much cleaner
> than the other aircraft of the time.)
>
> The Armistice document listed the war material that Germany was
> required to turn over. Only one aircraft was named, the Fokker D VIII.

You're confusing the D VII (biplane, probably the best all-around fighter of
the war) with the D VIII (parasol monoplane with rotary engine, not as well
regarded).

R / John

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message >...
> "Matthew G. Saroff" > wrote in message
> ...
> > Looking at the stats, it seems fairly ordinary for late
> > WWI fighters, but it's always described as dominating the skys
> > over the Western Front.
>
> It seems to have been widely regarded as the best German
> fighter of WW1 and some regarded it as the best fighter
> while others preferred the SE-5

Even though the Fokker D.VII was the best German fighter of WW1 it was
actually the Albatros D.V and D.Vas that bore the brunt of battle in
the 1918 air offensive. The easiest explanation of superiority is that
the Albatros was not a bad fighter (having been flown by Von
Richtofen, Goering, and other German aces) but was prone to a
continuing wing spar problems that discouraged lesser German pilots
from attempting complicated dog-fight aerial engagements that would
present more danger to themselves than to the enemy. The Fokker D.VII
by comparison had no such worries and better performance too.
>
> Undoubtedly it was a good aircraft but by the time it was
> introduced the sheer numerical superiority of the
> allies counted strongly against it.

Strange that you can understand that in WW1, but fail to in WW2 when
the Luftwaffe in the end was outnumbered in the sky by up to 11-to-1!
>
> Keith

Rob

"robert arndt" > wrote in message
om...
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
>...
> > "Matthew G. Saroff" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > Looking at the stats, it seems fairly ordinary for late
> > > WWI fighters, but it's always described as dominating the skys
> > > over the Western Front.
> >
> > It seems to have been widely regarded as the best German
> > fighter of WW1 and some regarded it as the best fighter
> > while others preferred the SE-5
>
> Even though the Fokker D.VII was the best German fighter of WW1 it was
> actually the Albatros D.V and D.Vas that bore the brunt of battle in
> the 1918 air offensive. The easiest explanation of superiority is that
> the Albatros was not a bad fighter (having been flown by Von
> Richtofen, Goering, and other German aces) but was prone to a
> continuing wing spar problems that discouraged lesser German pilots
> from attempting complicated dog-fight aerial engagements that would
> present more danger to themselves than to the enemy. The Fokker D.VII
> by comparison had no such worries and better performance too.
> >
> > Undoubtedly it was a good aircraft but by the time it was
> > introduced the sheer numerical superiority of the
> > allies counted strongly against it.
>
> Strange that you can understand that in WW1, but fail to in WW2 when
> the Luftwaffe in the end was outnumbered in the sky by up to 11-to-1!

Strange that you think that ocurred by accident !

Keith

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 21:37:43 +0900, Gernot Hassenpflug >
wrote:

>Dan, I don't have the background to decide whether you made a typing
>error or not. The original poster asked about the biplane Fokker
>D.VII, not the monoplane D.VIII.

Arggh!

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

On 14 Apr 2004 10:27:56 GMT, (WalterM140) wrote:

>That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far worse than
>the RAF did.

The point I was making was that the "Fortress" was unable to protect
its crews as the USAAC (and other air forces) had fondly believed
before the war, and that aerial bombardment in WWII by and large
failed to live up to the hopes and fears of the generals, at least
until Little Boy made accuracy irrelevant.

By the way, the WSJ online page got an email from a reader who picked
up on my mention of bombing the wrong country. He said he was one of
18 crews who bombed a Swiss factory instead of a German one--in a
B-26! First I ever heard of that one.

The review is now posted on my own website:
www.wardbirdforum.com/airpower.htm


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

Rule 4: Integrity is not negotiable!

"Matthew G. Saroff" > wrote in message
...
> Looking at the stats, it seems fairly ordinary for late
> WWI fighters, but it's always described as dominating the skys
> over the Western Front.
> --
> --Matthew Saroff
> Rules to live by:
> 1) To thine own self be true
> 2) Don't let your mouth write no checks that your butt can't cash
> 3) Interference in the time stream is forbidden, do not meddle in
causality
> Check http://www.pobox.com/~msaroff, including The Bad Hair Web Page

>??? What's the connection? The German defences against night bombers
>were not the same as those used against day bombers.

Night fighters need fuel. Night fighter pilots need training. It was the USAAF
that largely deprived the GAF of fuel.

Walt

>
>The point I was making was that the "Fortress" was unable to protect
>its crews as the USAAC (and other air forces) had fondly believed
>before the war, and that aerial bombardment in WWII by and large
>failed to live up to the hopes and fears of the generals, at least until
Little Boy made accuracy irrelevant.

Anyone who relied solely on your review would not have a very good picture of
what USAAF bombers actually accomplished over Europe.

Walt

>The point I was making was that the "Fortress" was unable to protect
>its crews as the USAAC (and other air forces) had fondly believed
>before the war.....

I don't think anyone could possibly dispute that!

> and that aerial bombardment in WWII by and large
>failed to live up to the hopes and fears of the generals

The "Strategic Bombing Survey" conducted after the war came to the
same conclusion. German production actually increased during the war.

It appears the most valuable service provided by the 8th Air Force was
not in damaging German war production, but by shooting down LW
fighters in preparation for the invasion. Without air superiority, the
Allied ground forces would have had a much tougher time, if indeed the
invasion could have succeeded at all.

That may even have been the real intent of the raids. On one
occasion, Doolittle walked into a bombing unit ready room, saw a sign
saying "The job of the fighters is to bring the bombers safely home."
(Or words to that effect.)

Doolittle shouted, "Take that goddam sign down! The job of the
fighters is to destroy the Luftwaffe!"

vince norris

WalterM140 wrote in message >...

>Night fighters need fuel. Night fighter pilots need training. It was the USAAF
>that largely deprived the GAF of fuel.

I suggest people actually look up the Speer oil reports, they
show the credit for the reduction in avgas production was
much more evenly shared between RAF and USAAF raids
than Walter prefers.

Also any effects on pilot training happened in the third quarter
of 1944 and ignores the way pilot training took a year. The
lack of avgas did little to nightfighter pilot strength, in one of the
counter effects of the fuel reductions (and the jamming) meant
a bias towards sending up the better crews, an average increase
in quality.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>I read your review on the WSJ of "A Long Way to Bombs Away".
>
>It's true as far as it goes to say that, for a time, 63% of B-17 crew failed to
>complete their tours. It's true that the USAAF largely joined the RAF in terror
>bombing in 1945.

Incorrect, once the USAAF adopted radar as a method for dropping
bombs their accuracy became comparable with the night bombers
on those raids. The USAAF started using radar in late 1943, initially
with less accuracy than the Butt reports figures for night bombers in
1941, the sort of expected result as the new idea was tried.

As for terror raids the answer is up to the individual, the bombers
hit things and people.

>It is also true:
>
>That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far
>worse than the RAF did.

Walter has a careful selection of quotes from a few Germans to "prove"
this.

>That during 1944 over 1/3 of 8th AF bombs hit within 1,000 feet of the aiming
>point using visual means.

Walter likes to highlight what he perceives as the best USAAF results,
if this means ignoring the problems or using non typical raids so be it.

Percentage of bombs dropped by the 8th Air force using visual sighting,

1943 56.5
1944 41.2
1945 41.5
overall 42.1

In good visibility according to the USSBS, 8.5% of bombs dropped over
3 miles from the target in the period September to December 1944.

>That B-17's made made up a very important part of a "strike package" to which
>the Germans could find no answer.

In 1943 the Germans found the answer, the USAAF response in 1944
inflicted a defeat on the Luftwaffe day fighters, in 1945 the Luftwaffe
response was really beginning to worry the USAAF, the Me262.

>That the Germans denuded other fronts of day fighters to combat the unescorted
>B-17's, when the 8th AF was only sending a few dozen on any given raid.

Walter likes to run this line, last time he tried to do this he simply
counted the Luftwaffe training units in Germany as proof of the
concentration of fighters.

The first 8th Air force raid on Germany sent 72 bombers, apparently
6 is "few", the next was 91 bombers sent, both in January 1943, so
the claim is the Luftwaffe "denuded" the "other fronts" around January
1943.

>That on three days during May 1944, the USAAF reduced German synthetic oil
>production by 50%.

Walter does not like to actually look at the Speer reports that
shows the first group of USAAF synthetic oil raids cut avgas
production from around 5,850 tons/day to around 4,850 tons/day.

The second group of strikes cut production from around 5,550
tons/day to around 2,800 tons/day.

This is avgas, all not synthetic oil. Walter likes to simply ignore the
difference.

>By September, largely due to raids by USAAF heavy bombers,
>the Luftwaffe was receiving 1/15th of its required fuel allocation.

The Speer reports reproduced in the RAF history give the daily
avgas output for May, June, July and September 1944. They
show production drops after RAF and USAAF raids, for example
after the RAF attack of 12 June avgas production drops from
around 2,100 tons/day to 1,100 tons/day, the RAF raids of 22 June
dropped production from around 1,250 tons.day to 600 tons/day.

And so on for the various raids, the drop in production to 120 tons/day
in late July 1944 was after a group of USAAF and RAF raids.

>That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber
>Command could not have operated over Germany at all.

Walter ignores the reality RAF Bomber Command was operating
over Germany long before the USAAF appeared. He has a careful
selection of quotes that tries to "prove" his claim.

Arthur Harris' despatch on operations has a graph of missing rate
for heavy bombers sorties against targets in Germany. The war peak
is in June 1944, there is a dramatic drop in mid July, after the capture
of a night fighter showing the latest Luftwaffe radar and radar homing
devices, and another dramatic drop as the coastal radar network
and associated western airfields were lost in September 1944.

>That B-17's are offically credited with shooting down more German aircraft than
>all other USAAF aircraft types COMBINED (including fighter types). Though B-17
>gunner claims were wildly inflated, they were still very deadly and dangerous.

When I ran a basic back of the envelope calculation it looked
like in 1943 the Luftwaffe lost 2 fighters shot down by the bombers
per 3 B-17/24 it shot down. In early 1944 the ratio was 1 to 2.

>At least two high scoring German aces were killed in combat with B-17's. A
>high scoring night fighter ace, whose aircraft had not been touch in months in
>combat with the RAF, was killed in his first combat with B-24's.

Apparently this is all the justification to claim the USAAF bombers
were really heavy fighters in disguise.

>Without a fleet of B-17's in place in England at the start of 1944, no invasion
>of Europe would have been possible. This because the Germans showed
>they would only fight for the type of targets that could only be struck by B-17's,
>and her stablemate, the B-24.

Walter likes to have the B-17 in the spotlight alone if he can. He simply
ignores the reality that either the Luftwaffe fought for control of French
airspace in early 1944 or it would not be able to intervene effectively
against the invasion. Unless it could keep the allied air forces away
from its airbases it could not conduct effective operations. So either
the Luftwaffe does not fight, and the result is basically as per history,
or it does fight, and therefore loses more quickly because more allied
fighters could make it to France than Germany.

>As Dr. Russell Weigley notes in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants", during the spring
>and summer of 1944 the Allies held victory through air power in their grasp,
>but did not persevere for the kill.

This gives an idea of Walter's search for quote, Weigley wrote a history
about the land campaign, but it is such a nice quote Walter will keep
repeating it.

>But that is no fault of the B-17/B-24's or their crews.

However later on Walter will attempt to denigrate the crews by over
claiming their successes, rather than accurately recording what they
did or could do.

Back in December 2003

a) Walter managed to write the words "Err Staff" instead of air staff.
b) accused me of writing them
c) decided someone who wrote such a word invalidated themselves
as a source on the air war in question.

The fun thing about it is

a) Walter is at best either completely confused about what he says or
at worst is into rewriting history, and too foolish enough to realise how
he keeps presenting the evidence against himself.
b) Unable to correct the record when shown to be wrong,
c) Is manufacturing the most trivial excuses to try and avoid coping
with the gap between reality and his preferred fiction. Think about it,
a totally trivial complaint, after all Err will pass through a spell
checker.

http://groups.google.com/groups?dq=&hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&threadm=400b1ea1.3858
47%40news.pacific.net.au&prev=/groups%3Fsafe%3Dimages%26
ie%3DISO-8859-1%26as_ugroup%3Dsoc.history.war.world-war-ii%26lr%3D%26hl%3Den

It is message 133 in the "Oil campaign against Germany" thread.

The actual paragraph written by Walter,

"I don't know that these city strikes were launched on bad weather days.
You don't either. What I do know is that the Err Staff thought Harris was not
properly applying his force, and they -did- know the weather day by day."

By the way the Air Staff complaint was in January 1944, Walter was
trying to prove it related to the third quarter of 1944.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >??? What's the connection? The German defences against night bombers
> >were not the same as those used against day bombers.
>
> Night fighters need fuel. Night fighter pilots need training. It was the
USAAF
> that largely deprived the GAF of fuel.
>

The destruction of the oil plants was a joint effort prosecuted by
both the USAAF and the RAF

Keith

(WalterM140) wrote in message >...
> >??? What's the connection? The German defences against night bombers
> >were not the same as those used against day bombers.
>
> Night fighters need fuel. Night fighter pilots need training. It was the USAAF
> that largely deprived the GAF of fuel.


Well, the night-fighter force remained active to the end of the war so
they evidently weren't stopped. Fuel shortages didn't curtail
Luftwaffe defensive operations until late in the war, by which time
Bomber Command had been bombing Germany for four years or so, with
increasing accuracy and effectiveness. To say that they couldn't have
done so if it weren't for the daylight bombing is a gross
exaggeration.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

>> and that aerial bombardment in WWII by and large
>>failed to live up to the hopes and fears of the generals
>
>The "Strategic Bombing Survey" conducted after the war came to the
>same conclusion. German production actually increased during the war.

And note that the purpose of "USBUS" was to prove that strategic
bombing worked, and that therefore the U.S. Air Force should be
created as a third branch of the military forces.
>
>It appears the most valuable service provided by the 8th Air Force was
>not in damaging German war production, but by shooting down LW
>fighters in preparation for the invasion. Without air superiority, the
>Allied ground forces would have had a much tougher time, if indeed the
>invasion could have succeeded at all.

"A War To Be Won" notes that the Germans had more 88 mm flak guns at
home, aimed at the USAAF and the RAF, than it had on the eastern front
defending from Russian tanks.

Along the same line (and same source): the life of a German fighter
pilot over the homeland was as endangered as that of a footsoldier on
the eastern front. And the life of an American airman over Germany was
as brief as that of a marine in the Pacific.

It was a bloody, bloody campaign. I forget how many fatalities the 8th
AF suffered over Germany, but it was whole divisions!


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

In message >, vincent p.
norris > writes
>>The point I was making was that the "Fortress" was unable to protect
>>its crews as the USAAC (and other air forces) had fondly believed
>>before the war.....
>
>I don't think anyone could possibly dispute that!
>
>> and that aerial bombardment in WWII by and large
>>failed to live up to the hopes and fears of the generals
>
>The "Strategic Bombing Survey" conducted after the war came to the
>same conclusion. German production actually increased during the war.

German production increased after about '43 because they drafted women
into the factories and also put most of the factories on a 3-shift 24
hour day.

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

>German production increased after about '43 because they drafted women
>into the factories and also put most of the factories on a 3-shift 24
>hour day.

Ah, but there were still factories! That's the point. We couldn't
destroy them.

vince norris

> I forget how many fatalities the 8th AF suffered over Germany...

I seem to recall the nunber 28,000, but I wouldn't bet on it.

vince norris

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: vincent p. norris
>Date: 4/16/04 6:56 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>German production increased after about '43 because they drafted women
>>into the factories and also put most of the factories on a 3-shift 24
>>hour day.
>
>Ah, but there were still factories! That's the point. We couldn't
>destroy them.
>
>vince norris


Sure we could. But why bother? Just destroy the oil and no matter what the
factory turns out it isn't going anywhere.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>
>>Night fighters need fuel. Night fighter pilots need training. It was the
>USAAF
>>that largely deprived the GAF of fuel.
>
>I suggest people actually look up the Speer oil reports, they
>show the credit for the reduction in avgas production was
>much more evenly shared between RAF and USAAF raids
>than Walter prefers.

I suggest that the people check what the leader of the RAF said:

"But for the favorable air situation created by the Americans, said
Portal, "it
is possible that the night blitzing of cities, would have by now have
been too
costly to sustain upon a heavy scale.' Here was a remarkable
admission from
the British Air Chief of Staff--that it was only the success of
American air
policy which had spared Britain from visible and humiliating defeat.
Not
surprisingly, Harris totally rejected Portal's criticism of the area
campaign.
He now asserted flatly that he had no faith in selective bombing, 'and
none
whatever in the this present oil policy'.

--"Bomber Command" P. 380-384 by Max Hastings

Bomber Command was defeated over Germany in the spring of 1944. It was the
Oil Campaign, largely pursued by the Americans that deprived the GAF of fuel
and that allowed the RAF back over Germay with any chance of not being shot to
pieces.

Bomber Command's Harris had to be ordered to bomb oil targets and sloughed that
off whenever he could.

Walt

>> Night fighters need fuel. Night fighter pilots need training. It was the
>USAAF
>> that largely deprived the GAF of fuel.
>>
>
>The destruction of the oil plants was a joint effort prosecuted by
>both the USAAF and the RAF
>

In the crucial period it was largely pursued by the Americans. Look at what
the leader of the RAF said:

"But for the favorable air situation created by the Americans, said
Portal, "it
is possible that the night blitzing of cities, would have by now have
been too
costly to sustain upon a heavy scale.' Here was a remarkable
admission from
the British Air Chief of Staff--that it was only the success of
American air
policy which had spared Britain from visible and humiliating defeat.
Not
surprisingly, Harris totally rejected Portal's criticism of the area
campaign.
He now asserted flatly that he had no faith in selective bombing, 'and
none
whatever in the this present oil policy'.

--"Bomber Command" P. 380-384 by Max Hastings

Harris, for his part, sloughed off bombing oil targets as much as he dared,
although all the key players except him saw it as the most important target
class by far.

He continued to send German cities to his "bonfires" and detracted, perhaps
decisively, from Bomber Command's considerable potential to help the war
effort.

Returning to the main point, the review of "A Long Way to Bombs Away" that
appeared in the WSJ did a disservice to the memory of U.S. fliers and U.S. air
power in Europe during WWII.

Walt

I wrote:

>>I read your review on the WSJ of "A Long Way to Bombs Away".
>>
>>It's true as far as it goes to say that, for a time, 63% of B-17 crew failed
>to
>>complete their tours. It's true that the USAAF largely joined the RAF in
>terror
>>bombing in 1945.
>
>Incorrect, once the USAAF adopted radar as a method for dropping
>bombs their accuracy became comparable with the night bombers
>on those raids.

I didn't say anything about that (at least in my post that you quote). What are
you talking about?

This review in the WSJ was a serious over-simplification of what really
happened.
As you show below, you have little of substance to add.

The USAAF started using radar in late 1943, initially
>with less accuracy than the Butt reports figures for night bombers in
>1941, the sort of expected result as the new idea was tried.
>
>As for terror raids the answer is up to the individual, the bombers
>hit things and people.

So you don't disagree with what I said.

>
>>It is also true:
>>
>>That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far
>>worse than the RAF did.
>
>Walter has a careful selection of quotes from a few Germans to "prove"
>this.
>

So you don't disagree with what I said.

>>That during 1944 over 1/3 of 8th AF bombs hit within 1,000 feet of the
>aiming
>>point using visual means.
>
>Walter likes to highlight what he perceives as the best USAAF results,
>if this means ignoring the problems or using non typical raids so be it.

So you don't disagree with what I said.

>
>Percentage of bombs dropped by the 8th Air force using visual sighting,
>
>1943 56.5
>1944 41.2
>1945 41.5
>overall 42.1
>

So you don't disagree with what I said.

100% of the bombs dropped by visual means were dropped by visual means.

And over 1/3 of those bombs landed within 1,000 feet of the aiming point during
1944. The USAAF was capable of some pretty fair accuracy for the time. Again,
this review in the WSJ gave a poor and false impression of what happened.

>In good visibility according to the USSBS, 8.5% of bombs dropped over
>3 miles from the target in the period September to December 1944.

And for the year 1944, over 1/3 did land within 1,000 feet of the aiming point.

So you don't disagree with what I said.

>
>>That B-17's made made up a very important part of a "strike package" to
>which
>>the Germans could find no answer.
>
>In 1943 the Germans found the answer, the USAAF response in 1944
>inflicted a defeat on the Luftwaffe day fighters, in 1945 the Luftwaffe
>response was really beginning to worry the USAAF, the Me262.

So you don't disagree with what I said.

>
>>That the Germans denuded other fronts of day fighters to combat the
>unescorted
>>B-17's, when the 8th AF was only sending a few dozen on any given raid.
>
>Walter likes to run this line, last time he tried to do this he simply
>counted the Luftwaffe training units in Germany as proof of the
>concentration of fighters.
>

So you don't disagree with what I said.

>The first 8th Air force raid on Germany sent 72 bombers, apparently
>6 is "few", the next was 91 bombers sent, both in January 1943, so
>the claim is the Luftwaffe "denuded" the "other fronts" around January
>1943.
>

Ninety-one bombers are a few dozen, last I checked.

The March 18, 1943 raid to Vegesack included IIRC, 73 B-17's and 24 B-24s.

I'd say that's a few dozen. The fact is that the Germans began returning their
day fighters to Germany when USAAF raids consisted of just a few dozen heavy
bombers.

"In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense shifted more
and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even though numerically the
British were still stronger than the Americans and were undoubtedly a great
trial for for the civilian population, the American precision raids were of
greater consequence to the war industry. They received priority attention
over the British raids on our towns."

"The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland

So you don't disagree with what I said.


>>That on three days during May 1944, the USAAF reduced German synthetic oil
>>production by 50%.
>
>Walter does not like to actually look at the Speer reports that
>shows the first group of USAAF synthetic oil raids cut avgas
>production from around 5,850 tons/day to around 4,850 tons/day.

I don't see a source for that.

My source says the -Americans- knocked out 90% of German aviation fuel
production, and produced a 50% reduction in --three days--.

"But now in May 1944 all that changed. Eighth Air Force's attacks against the
synthetic oil industry in the Reich complemented raids by the Fifteenth Air
Force out of Foggia in Italy against Romanian refineries and production
facilities. The first strike from Britain came on 12 May; 935 bombers sortied
against the synthetic oil plants at Zwickau, Merseburg-Leuna, Brux,
Lutzkendorg, Bohlen, Zeitz, and Chemnitz.
Allied bombers and escorting
fighters encountered severe resistance. The results, while encouraging, were
not decisive. The great Leuna plant, though damaged, lost only 18 percent of
its capacity. Speer was, nevertheless enormously worried.

....After feverish
efforts, production had come close to regaining preattack levels by the end of
May. On the 28th, Eighth returned to attack oil targets throughout Germany.
Over a two day period, it lost 84 bombers, but this time it badly damaged the
petroleum industry. Combined with fifteenth Air Force's raids on Ploesti,
American attacks cut petroleum production in half.

[exactly as I said]

The impact of the raids was apparent almost immediately...May's attacks were a
prelude to punishing raids over the succeeding months. After a two-week pause,
during which Allied bombers supported the invasion, the Americans staged a
series of new attacks that knocked out 90 percent of aviation fuel production,
so that by the end of the month total production had sunk to a miniscule 632
tons."

-"A War to be Won" p. 328-29 by Murray and Millett



Even if what you said were true (instead of being a lot of blue smoke and
mirrors) it shows that the USAAF was capable of very great accuracy. I mean
--three days-- of raids for the reduction you suggest? That would be fabulous.
Especially when you consider what the various bombing surveys found after the
war for the effects of five and half years British bombing -- that the
British bombing of Germany was useless.

In any case, this review in the WSJ gave a very skewed view of what was
actually accomplished.

>
>The second group of strikes cut production from around 5,550
>tons/day to around 2,800 tons/day.
>
>This is avgas, all not synthetic oil. Walter likes to simply ignore the
>difference.

So you don't disagree with what I said.

>
>>By September, largely due to raids by USAAF heavy bombers,
>>the Luftwaffe was receiving 1/15th of its required fuel allocation.
>
>The Speer reports reproduced in the RAF history give the daily
>avgas output for May, June, July and September 1944. They
>show production drops after RAF and USAAF raids, for example
>after the RAF attack of 12 June avgas production drops from
>around 2,100 tons/day to 1,100 tons/day, the RAF raids of 22 June
>dropped production from around 1,250 tons.day to 600 tons/day.
>
>And so on for the various raids, the drop in production to 120 tons/day
>in late July 1944 was after a group of USAAF and RAF raids.

So you don't disagree with what I said.

>
>>That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber
>>Command could not have operated over Germany at all.
>
>Walter ignores the reality RAF Bomber Command was operating
>over Germany long before the USAAF appeared.

So you don't disagree with what I said.

He has a careful
>selection of quotes that tries to "prove" his claim.

So you don't disagree with what I said.

>
>Arthur Harris' despatch on operations has a graph of missing rate
>for heavy bombers sorties against targets in Germany. The war peak
>is in June 1944, there is a dramatic drop in mid July, after the capture
>of a night fighter showing the latest Luftwaffe radar and radar homing
>devices, and another dramatic drop as the coastal radar network
>and associated western airfields were lost in September 1944.

So you don't disagree with what I said.

>
>>That B-17's are offically credited with shooting down more German aircraft
>than
>>all other USAAF aircraft types COMBINED (including fighter types). Though
>B-17
>>gunner claims were wildly inflated, they were still very deadly and
>dangerous.
>
>When I ran a basic back of the envelope calculation it looked
>like in 1943 the Luftwaffe lost 2 fighters shot down by the bombers
>per 3 B-17/24 it shot down. In early 1944 the ratio was 1 to 2.

So you don't disagree with what I said.

>
>>At least two high scoring German aces were killed in combat with B-17's. A
>>high scoring night fighter ace, whose aircraft had not been touch in months
>in
>>combat with the RAF, was killed in his first combat with B-24's.
>
>Apparently this is all the justification to claim the USAAF bombers
>were really heavy fighters in disguise.

So you don't disagree with what I said.

>
>>Without a fleet of B-17's in place in England at the start of 1944, no
>invasion
>>of Europe would have been possible. This because the Germans showed
>>they would only fight for the type of targets that could only be struck by
>B-17's,
>>and her stablemate, the B-24.
>
>Walter likes to have the B-17 in the spotlight alone if he can. He simply
>ignores the reality that either the Luftwaffe fought for control of French
>airspace in early 1944 or it would not be able to intervene effectively
>against the invasion.

The Germans did not generally fight over France in early 1944. They fought
with, were engaged by, and were defeated over German targets by "strike
packages" that included B-17's and B-24's.


Unless it could keep the allied air forces away
>from its airbases it could not conduct effective operations. So either
>the Luftwaffe does not fight, and the result is basically as per history,
>or it does fight, and therefore loses more quickly because more allied
>fighters could make it to France than Germany.

In the event British fighters played a limited role in this because they simply
didn't have the range to get to areas the Germans were determined to defend.

>
>>As Dr. Russell Weigley notes in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants", during the
>spring
>>and summer of 1944 the Allies held victory through air power in their grasp,
>>but did not persevere for the kill.
>
>This gives an idea of Walter's search for quote, Weigley wrote a history
>about the land campaign, but it is such a nice quote Walter will keep
>repeating it.

See, Sinclair, this is when your bias and lies are most easily exposed. Dr.
Weigley (who recented passed away) didn't write an account of the "land
campaign", he wote an account about Eisenhower's --lieuttenants--. This
included Spaatz and Doolittle, and also Montgomery, Tedder, Leigh Mallory, and
for a time Harris also.

Dr. Weigley may have meant to evoke with that title the mamouth work of Douglas
Southall Freeman, "Lee's Lieutenants".

But you are trying to denigrate Dr. Weigley's work as a history of the land
campaign. Too bad that any fair minded person can see that the Allies -did-
hold the key to victory to airpower in their hands. And a big part of that key
squatted on hardstands in East Anglia while the crews slept in underheated
Quonset huts in East Anglia. That was the B-17/B-24 force.

Max Hastings suggested much the same thing as Dr. Weigley.

>
>>But that is no fault of the B-17/B-24's or their crews.
>
>However later on Walter will attempt to denigrate the crews by over
>claiming their successes, rather than accurately recording what they
>did or could do.

I have shown what they can do. The Germans knew:

"The Americans' attacks,
which
followed a definite system of assault on industrial targets, were by
far the
most dangerous.

It was in fact these attacks which caused the
breakdown of the
German armaments industry. The attacks on the chemical industry would
have
sufficed, without the impact of purely military events to render
Germany
defenseless.--Albert Speer"

--"Luftwaffe War Diaries" p. 355 by Cajus Bekker.


>
>Back in December 2003
>
>a) Walter managed to write the words "Err Staff" instead of air staff.
>b) accused me of writing them
>c) decided someone who wrote such a word invalidated themselves
>as a source on the air war in question.

I don't recall ever using the term "err staff". I Thought you did. You don't
much like what they said, since they were critical of the sainted Arthur
Harris. If you didn't first use that tem, I wont make that point any more.

>
>The fun thing about it is
>
>a) Walter is at best either completely confused about what he says or
>at worst is into rewriting history, and too foolish enough to realise how
>he keeps presenting the evidence against himself.

So you don't disagree with what I said. Or rather, you can't gainsay what I
said.

>b) Unable to correct the record when shown to be wrong,
>c) Is manufacturing the most trivial excuses to try and avoid coping
>with the gap between reality and his preferred fiction. Think about it,
>a totally trivial complaint, after all Err will pass through a spell
>checker.

So you don't disagree with what I said. Or rather, you can't gainsay what I
said.

>"I don't know that these city strikes were launched on bad weather days.
>You don't either. What I do know is that the Err Staff thought Harris was
>not
>properly applying his force, and they -did- know the weather day by day."
>
>By the way the Air Staff complaint was in January 1944, Walter was
>trying to prove it related to the third quarter of 1944.

I couldn't find the post that would show that you used this term first. I do
know that the moderator of the WWII group who is from Australia has a serious
hard-on over me. He sent me a very nasty e-mail. Maybe he made that note of
yours disappear, the way so many of the notes I sent just disappeared.

Well, this is not the moderated WWII group.

And as I suggest above, you can't gainsay anything I said. You've only made a
fool of yourself.

Walt

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >WalterM140 wrote in message
>...
> >

>
> I suggest that the people check what the leader of the RAF said:
>
> "But for the favorable air situation created by the Americans, said
> Portal, "it
> is possible that the night blitzing of cities, would have by now have
> been too
> costly to sustain upon a heavy scale.' Here was a remarkable
> admission from
> the British Air Chief of Staff--that it was only the success of
> American air
> policy which had spared Britain from visible and humiliating defeat.

Of course at no point did he say anything of the sort.

He never used the word defeat and was careful to refer
to possibilities.

> Not
> surprisingly, Harris totally rejected Portal's criticism of the area
> campaign.
> He now asserted flatly that he had no faith in selective bombing, 'and
> none
> whatever in the this present oil policy'.
>
> --"Bomber Command" P. 380-384 by Max Hastings
>
> Bomber Command was defeated over Germany in the spring of 1944. It was
the
> Oil Campaign, largely pursued by the Americans that deprived the GAF of
fuel
> and that allowed the RAF back over Germay with any chance of not being
shot to
> pieces.
>

Given that the oil campaign didnt happen until late summer 1944 that's a
remarkable claim.

> Bomber Command's Harris had to be ordered to bomb oil targets and sloughed
that
> off whenever he could.
>

Indeed but he did so when ordered and the RAF played a major part
in the oil campaign.

Keith

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >> Night fighters need fuel. Night fighter pilots need training. It was
the
> >USAAF
> >> that largely deprived the GAF of fuel.
> >>
> >
> >The destruction of the oil plants was a joint effort prosecuted by
> >both the USAAF and the RAF
> >
>
> In the crucial period it was largely pursued by the Americans. Look at
what
> the leader of the RAF said:
>

Context please

Keith

>Given that the oil campaign didnt happen until late summer 1944 that's a
>remarkable claim.

The 15th AF hit Ploesti repeatedly in April.

The 8th AF reduced German avgas production by 50% in May -- with just three
days of raids.

Look what Galland said:

"As early as June, 1944, the month the invasion started, we felt very badly the
effects of the consolidated offensive. Fuel production suddenly sank so low
that it could no longer satisfy the urgent demands. Speer, when interrogated
by the Allies stated that from June on, it had been impossible to get enough
aviation fuel. While it was possible with the greatest effort to keep up at
least a minimum production of motor and diesel fuel, the repair work on the
plants where normal fuel was converted to octane constituted difficulties which
were impossible to overcome. The enemy soon found out how much time we needed
for reconstruction and for resuming production. Shortly before this date was
reached under tremendous strain came the next devastating raid."

-- "The First and the Last" p. 210 by Adof Galland

If not for the USAAF operating by day, it would have been impossible for the
RAF to operate by night over Germany after the invasion. Bomber Command was
defeated by the Germans in the Spring of 1944. It was only the situation
created by "American Air Policy", that allowed Bomber Command to return to "the
night blitzing of cities."

All this occured before the RAF dropped any bombs at all on Oil targets as part
of the "Oil Campaign".

Again, to return to the WSJ review of "A Long Way to Bombs Away", -- that
review didn't show what really happened. Maybe the book was as badly flawed.
I haven't seen it and don't plan to.



Walt

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >Given that the oil campaign didnt happen until late summer 1944 that's a
> >remarkable claim.
>
> The 15th AF hit Ploesti repeatedly in April.
>

By which point Ploesti was far less important than the
German synthetic plants

> The 8th AF reduced German avgas production by 50% in May -- with just
three
> days of raids.
>

Yet even before that date the RAF were fully operational
In April 1944 Bomber command flew 9700 sorties with
a loss rate of 2.7%. In fact far from facing destruction in
the spring of 1944 the RAF was flying almost twice as
many sorties as it had in spring 43 and seeing lower loss
rates.

The so called 'Battle of Berlin' was indeed a costly failure for
the RAF and clearly it should have been curtailed earlier
but to describe the RAF as defeated at this point is a
grave error as the German in Normandy would find as
bomber command turned its attention to transportation and
troop targets.

During 1944 of around 525,000 sorties flown by the RAF
180,000 were against industrial towns, 93,000 against troop
concentrations, 100,000 against transportation targets and
around 48,000 against oil targets


> Look what Galland said:
>
> "As early as June, 1944, the month the invasion started, we felt very
badly the
> effects of the consolidated offensive. Fuel production suddenly sank so
low
> that it could no longer satisfy the urgent demands. Speer, when
interrogated
> by the Allies stated that from June on, it had been impossible to get
enough
> aviation fuel. While it was possible with the greatest effort to keep up
at
> least a minimum production of motor and diesel fuel, the repair work on
the
> plants where normal fuel was converted to octane constituted difficulties
which
> were impossible to overcome. The enemy soon found out how much time we
needed
> for reconstruction and for resuming production. Shortly before this date
was
> reached under tremendous strain came the next devastating raid."
>
> -- "The First and the Last" p. 210 by Adof Galland
>
> If not for the USAAF operating by day, it would have been impossible for
the
> RAF to operate by night over Germany after the invasion. Bomber Command
was
> defeated by the Germans in the Spring of 1944. It was only the situation
> created by "American Air Policy", that allowed Bomber Command to return to
"the
> night blitzing of cities."
>
> All this occured before the RAF dropped any bombs at all on Oil targets as
part
> of the "Oil Campaign".
>

The RAF conducted its first raids on German oil targets
as early as 1941. This however is not the point. The
German night fighters were NOT grounded by lack of
fuel, indeed they continued to fly well into 1945.

Their real problem was that by late 1944 there were
more Mosquito NF's hunting Luftwaffe planes than
the Germans out in the skies over the Reich

> Again, to return to the WSJ review of "A Long Way to Bombs Away", -- that
> review didn't show what really happened. Maybe the book was as badly
flawed.
> I haven't seen it and don't plan to.

So you are criticisng something you
havent seen, hmmm.

Keith

>but to describe the RAF as defeated at this point is a
>grave error as the German in Normandy would find as
>bomber command turned its attention to transportation and
>troop targets.

Last I heard, France wasn't Germany.

It sort of, at this point, comes down to your word or the word of Charles
Portal.

Walt

>The point I was making was that the "Fortress" was unable to protect
>its crews as the USAAC (and other air forces) had fondly believed
>before the war, and that aerial bombardment in WWII by and large failed to
live up to the hopes and fears of the generals, at least
>until Little Boy made accuracy irrelevant.

When noting that at one point 63% of bomber crews failed to complete their
tours, you could have added that towards the end of the campaign -many-
completed their tours and never even saw a German fighter.

But you didn't do that.

Walt

>Sure we could. But why bother? Just destroy the oil and no matter what the
>factory turns out it isn't going anywhere.
>

Bomber Command leadership never did figure that out, Art.

Walt

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: (WalterM140)
>Date: 4/17/04 1:34 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>Sure we could. But why bother? Just destroy the oil and no matter what the
>>factory turns out it isn't going anywhere.
>>
>
>Bomber Command leadership never did figure that out, Art.
>
>Walt


I think they were too focused on hitting cities to break the Gerrnan will to
fight



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>And over 1/3 of those bombs landed within 1,000 feet of the aiming point during
>1944. The USAAF was capable of some pretty fair accuracy for the time

Gosh, Walt, that's *terrible* accuracy! So two-thirds landed a mile or
fifty miles away, or in another country altogether?


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

>When noting that at one point 63% of bomber crews failed to complete their
>tours, you could have added that towards the end of the campaign -many-
>completed their tours and never even saw a German fighter.

But what did this have to do with the Fortress's ability to protect
itself? Toward the end of the campaign, that job was done by fighter
pilots in P-51 Mustangs.

Actually, I didn't say that of one sample, 63 percent failed to
complete their tours. I said that 63 percent of the men were killed or
captured before completing 25 missions. Crikey, we might as well have
sent them to war in yellow school busses.

You also seem to misunderstand the purpose of a book review. I
reviewed the book that was written. If you write a different one, and
if it is as good as Air Power, maybe I'll be given the assignment to
review it.

www.warbirdforum.com/airpower.htm


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

>>When noting that at one point 63% of bomber crews failed to complete their
>>tours, you could have added that towards the end of the campaign -many-
>>completed their tours and never even saw a German fighter.
>

>But what did this have to do with the Fortress's ability to protect
>itself?

Wow.

I thought you were a lot more knowledgeable than that.

After a period in which the B-17 formations stumped the Germans to a degree,
the Germans adapted and were pretty much able to pierce, break up and destroy
the bomber boxes at will. The self defending bomber idea was broken.

To do this, the Germans heavily modified their single engine fighters to have
more punch and more protection. They added the twin engine ME-110's into the
mix. They adopted new tactics; especially the head on attack was adopted and
the attacks from the tail was discouraged. The ME-110's used heavy cannon and
rockets and stayed beyond the range of the .50 cal MG's of the bombers.

Perhaps providentially, just as the Germans perfected these additions to the
equation, the P-51B's began to arrive in numbers. The equation changed again.

Starting in about January, 1944, the heavily armed German single and twin
engine fighters were more and more overmatched by Mustangs (and also the
Thunderbolt).

Here's the thing: If the Germans up-armed and up-armored to kill B-17's, they
were dead meat for the escorts. if they slimmed down to deal with the escorts
they were basically back where they started -- too lightly armed to kill B-17's
at a favorable ratio. A B-17 bomber box was a pretty damned tough and
dangerous opponent.

The Germans never solved that conundrum -- it was built on two pillars -- 1)
the very tough structure of the B-17 and its heavy, punshing armament and 2)
the high technical achievements of the US fighters.

That, and a lot of guts by both bomber and fighter crewmen.

I'm very surprised that you seem unfamiliar with this pretty much common and
undisputable interpretation.

Walt

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >but to describe the RAF as defeated at this point is a
> >grave error as the German in Normandy would find as
> >bomber command turned its attention to transportation and
> >troop targets.
>
> Last I heard, France wasn't Germany.
>

I guess nobody ever told you the Germans
were in control of France at the time. Perhaps
you should read a little history.

> It sort of, at this point, comes down to your word or the word of Charles
> Portal.
>

No sir it does not.

Keith

>>And over 1/3 of those bombs landed within 1,000 feet of the aiming point during
>>1944.

>Gosh, Walt, that's *terrible* accuracy! So two-thirds landed a mile or
>fifty miles away

Geez, back in the days when I went deer hunting, I could put ALMOST
ALL my shots within only ten FEET of the deer!

vince norris

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: (WalterM140)
>Date: 4/17/04 3:11 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>>When noting that at one point 63% of bomber crews failed to complete their
>>>tours, you could have added that towards the end of the campaign -many-
>>>completed their tours and never even saw a German fighter.
>>
>
>>But what did this have to do with the Fortress's ability to protect
>>itself?
>
>Wow.
>
> I thought you were a lot more knowledgeable than that.
>
>After a period in which the B-17 formations stumped the Germans to a degree,
>the Germans adapted and were pretty much able to pierce, break up and destroy
>the bomber boxes at will. The self defending bomber idea was broken.
>
>To do this, the Germans heavily modified their single engine fighters to have
>more punch and more protection. They added the twin engine ME-110's into the
>mix. They adopted new tactics; especially the head on attack was adopted and
>the attacks from the tail was discouraged. The ME-110's used heavy cannon and
>rockets and stayed beyond the range of the .50 cal MG's of the bombers.
>
>Perhaps providentially, just as the Germans perfected these additions to the
>equation, the P-51B's began to arrive in numbers. The equation changed again.
>
>
>Starting in about January, 1944, the heavily armed German single and twin
>engine fighters were more and more overmatched by Mustangs (and also the
>Thunderbolt).
>
> Here's the thing: If the Germans up-armed and up-armored to kill B-17's,
>they
>were dead meat for the escorts. if they slimmed down to deal with the
>escorts
>they were basically back where they started -- too lightly armed to kill
>B-17's
>at a favorable ratio. A B-17 bomber box was a pretty damned tough and
>dangerous opponent.
>
> The Germans never solved that conundrum -- it was built on two pillars --
>1)
>the very tough structure of the B-17 and its heavy, punshing armament and 2)
>the high technical achievements of the US fighters.
>
>That, and a lot of guts by both bomber and fighter crewmen.
>
>I'm very surprised that you seem unfamiliar with this pretty much common and
>undisputable interpretation.
>
>Walt

Those who talk of the innacuracy of our bombing have never seen Germany in
1945. We left damn little standing.




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>Those who talk of the innacuracy of our bombing have never seen Germany in
>1945. We left damn little standing.
>

Not according to Dan Ford.

Walt

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: (WalterM140)
>Date: 4/17/04 7:09 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>Those who talk of the innacuracy of our bombing have never seen Germany in
>>1945. We left damn little standing.
>>
>
>Not according to Dan Ford.
>
>Walt
>

I don't think he was there.
Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: (WalterM140)
>Date: 4/17/04 7:09 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>Those who talk of the innacuracy of our bombing have never seen Germany in
>>1945. We left damn little standing.
>>
>
>Not according to Dan Ford.
>
>Walt


Visit my website and download the bomb strike photos for an example of
accuracy.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

This will probably appear in the wrong spot thanks to a buggy news server.

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>>Night fighters need fuel. Night fighter pilots need training. It was the
>>>USAAF that largely deprived the GAF of fuel.
>>
>>I suggest people actually look up the Speer oil reports, they
>>show the credit for the reduction in avgas production was
>>much more evenly shared between RAF and USAAF raids
>>than Walter prefers.
>
>I suggest that the people check what the leader of the RAF said:

Before going on to note the holes in one of Walter's pet quotes, you
can see his preferences. Speers day by day reports of the effects
on avgas production of the allied raids are to be ignored, they are
facts, they show the combined offensive working, and giving credit
to the RAF for some effective raids from June 1944 on. Instead we
switch to the RAF's chief of air staff, during wartime stating an
opinion, a possibility.

Walter prefers the opinions and possibilities, if they fit his fiction,

>"But for the favorable air situation created by the Americans, said
>Portal, "it
>is possible that the night blitzing of cities, would have by now have
>been too
>costly to sustain upon a heavy scale.'

This quote is run through the Walter translator, so "it is possible"
becomes "it is certain", and "heavy scale" becomes "any scale"

>Here was a remarkable admission from
>the British Air Chief of Staff--that it was only the success of
>American air
>policy which had spared Britain from visible and humiliating defeat.
>Not
>surprisingly, Harris totally rejected Portal's criticism of the area
>campaign.
>He now asserted flatly that he had no faith in selective bombing, 'and
>none
>whatever in the this present oil policy'.
>
>--"Bomber Command" P. 380-384 by Max Hastings

Hastings, like Walter, simply over states what Portal was saying and
ignores the multiple factors tat drove down the loss rates from July
1944 onwards.

>Bomber Command was defeated over Germany in the spring of 1944. It was the
>Oil Campaign, largely pursued by the Americans that deprived the GAF of fuel
>and that allowed the RAF back over Germay with any chance of not being shot to
>pieces.

When flying to Germany the percentage of effort devoted to oil
strikes looks like this,

Table is date, 8th Air Force bombs on Germany, tons / % of those bombs
on oil targets // Bomber Command bombs on Germany, tons / % of those
bombs on oil targets.

May-44 19880 / 12.89 // 9479.8 / none
Jun-44 13120.5 / 34.01 // 5443.5 / 83.82
Jul-44 29838.3 / 22.33 // 14670.1 / 26.14
Aug-44 23597.4 / 26.07 // 16119.3 / 11.49
Sep-44 34818.4 / 21.12 // 22955.3 / 19.56
Oct-44 43552.2 / 11.74 // 57679.1 / 7.09
Nov-44 37798.8 / 42.39 // 58870.2 / 24.20
Dec-44 41092.1 / 7.23 // 51132.1 / 14.54
Jan-45 38551.3 / 7.40 // 33218.9 / 27.55
Feb-45 51187.2 / 11.93 // 50891.2 / 28.69
Mar-45 72951.1 / 13.06 // 74969.8 / 28.28
Apr-45 35646.1 / 4.61 // 38103.1 / 14.80

Bomber Command matched the 8th Air Forces percentage of efforts
in three of the first 4 months of the offensive when flying to Germany,
despite having to reserve a greater amount of the better weather for
strikes to support the invasion. The difference in August 1944 appears
to be from outside requests, a series of raids against German ports
including Konigsberg by Bomber Command, and SHAEF requests
to the 8th and Bomber Command for strikes on German vehicle
production.

Remember Spaatz declared oil the number one priority. If you add
up the tonnages from June 1944 to September 1944 then the result
is the percentage of effort on oil targets when flying to Germany, 8th
Air Force 24.3%, Bomber Command 24.9%. Note these figures are
for Germany only. In effect the air forces matched each other's
percentage efforts, which means any claims Harris diverted effort
need to be made about Spaatz as well. In terms of absolute effort
the 8th dropped 24,629.2 tons, Bomber Command 14,740.9 tons
on oil targets in Germany in this period.

You see folks, Walter does not actually look at the German reports
about what raids did what damage. This would mean having to
understand how wrong he is about how the Germans were deprived
of avgas.

Arthur Harris' despatch on war operations has a graph for heavy
bomber losses over Germany, the missing rate. Walter needs to
explain the dramatic drops in the missing rate in July 1944, after
the capture of a Luftwaffe night fighter with all the latest radar and
radar homing devices, and in September 1944, when the allied
armies in the west over ran much of the coastal radar network and
the night fighter airfields outside Germany.

>Bomber Command's Harris had to be ordered to bomb oil targets and
>sloughed that off whenever he could.

Walter simply ignores the reality of the amount of effort involved,
and the fact Harris' personal preferences were an effect at the
margins. Harris was not so stupid as to not put in the effort and
then be set up to take the blame when the plan failed as he
expected it to. See Harris and bombing Atlantic ports earlier
in the war and the help to the invasion forces, lots of protest,
orders were followed. See above for the effort against German
targets.

Walter likes to think the oil campaign was an end in itself, ignoring
the war would go on until Germany was occupied. Strikes to help
the invasion and oil were a means to that end, it was not a
competition.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>I wrote:
>
>>>I read your review on the WSJ of "A Long Way to Bombs Away".
>>>
>>>It's true as far as it goes to say that, for a time, 63% of B-17 crew failed
>>to
>>>complete their tours. It's true that the USAAF largely joined the RAF in
>>terror
>>>bombing in 1945.
>>
>>Incorrect, once the USAAF adopted radar as a method for dropping
>>bombs their accuracy became comparable with the night bombers
>>on those raids.
>
>I didn't say anything about that (at least in my post that you quote). What are
>you talking about?

Walter, one of the preconditions for a definition of terror bombing is
bombing population centres, not targets within the population centre.
Once the USAAF decided to bomb through cloud its accuracy was
dropped to the point where it was bombing cities, not specific targets.

>This review in the WSJ was a serious over-simplification of what really
>happened.

I am severely tempted to repeat the "i didn't say anything" line here.


>As you show below, you have little of substance to add.

Translation Walter cannot answer the facts.

>>The USAAF started using radar in late 1943, initially
>>with less accuracy than the Butt reports figures for night bombers in
>>1941, the sort of expected result as the new idea was tried.
>>
>>As for terror raids the answer is up to the individual, the bombers
>>hit things and people.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said.

This is the usual fun stuff, Walter likes to pretend the USAAF did not
effectively do area bombing until 1945, I pointed out it was 1943,
Walter then claims I agree with him.

>>>It is also true:
>>>
>>>That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far
>>>worse than the RAF did.
>>
>>Walter has a careful selection of quotes from a few Germans to "prove"
>>this.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said.

No Walter, note the quotes around prove and the way you are
noted as having a careful selection of quotes show I disagree.

>>>That during 1944 over 1/3 of 8th AF bombs hit within 1,000 feet of the
>>aiming
>>>point using visual means.
>>
>>Walter likes to highlight what he perceives as the best USAAF results,
>>if this means ignoring the problems or using non typical raids so be it.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said.

Translation, Walter will simply keep presenting the best of the USAAF
against the worst of the RAF and wonder why the people who like
the USAAF complain about the way it makes the USAAF look bad,
if only the best raids can be counted.


>>Percentage of bombs dropped by the 8th Air force using visual sighting,
>>
>>1943 56.5
>>1944 41.2
>>1945 41.5
>>overall 42.1
>>
>So you don't disagree with what I said.

Translation, Walter will ignore visual bombing was a minority of the
8ths efforts.

By the way the RAF visual bombing figures were quite good as well,
and we can always use 617 squadron as the night standard, if we
want to be as silly as Walter.

>100% of the bombs dropped by visual means were dropped by visual means.
>
>And over 1/3 of those bombs landed within 1,000 feet of the aiming point during
>1944. The USAAF was capable of some pretty fair accuracy for the time. Again,
>this review in the WSJ gave a poor and false impression of what happened.

In other words folks, the article has the temerity to point out the USAAF
was not as good as Walter dreams.

Walter will now provide a source of his figures and how many of
the targets attacked were bigger than a circle of 1,000 feet radius.

>>In good visibility according to the USSBS, 8.5% of bombs dropped over
>>3 miles from the target in the period September to December 1944.
>
>And for the year 1944, over 1/3 did land within 1,000 feet of the aiming point.

Walter simply ignores the reality of the fact the majority of USAAF
bombs missed the target, apparently the 1,000 feet marker is some
sort of great point when the bombs had a blast radius in the order of
tens of feet.

By the way Walter can now give his proof of this, as opposed to his
last attempt, where he took the monthly percentages, added them up
and divided by 12, assuming the 8th dropped exactly the same amount
of bombs in each month in 1944.

>So you don't disagree with what I said.

What I am pointing out is that using the best results on a minority of
the raids done is not the way to record the campaign.

>>>That B-17's made made up a very important part of a "strike package" to
>>which
>>>the Germans could find no answer.
>>
>>In 1943 the Germans found the answer, the USAAF response in 1944
>>inflicted a defeat on the Luftwaffe day fighters, in 1945 the Luftwaffe
>>response was really beginning to worry the USAAF, the Me262.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said.

Note by the way folks, I point out the Me262 was considered a
threat, the answer, in 1945, but Walter will ignore that. All USAAF
victories are absolute in his eyes.

>>>That the Germans denuded other fronts of day fighters to combat the
>>unescorted
>>>B-17's, when the 8th AF was only sending a few dozen on any given raid.
>>
>>Walter likes to run this line, last time he tried to do this he simply
>>counted the Luftwaffe training units in Germany as proof of the
>>concentration of fighters.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said.

Translation Walter is going to continually delude himself, counting
the training units should show quite well how his figures are wrong.

>>The first 8th Air force raid on Germany sent 72 bombers, apparently
>>6 is "few", the next was 91 bombers sent, both in January 1943, so
>>the claim is the Luftwaffe "denuded" the "other fronts" around January
>>1943.
>
>Ninety-one bombers are a few dozen, last I checked.

Yes folks, few is now being defined as 8, why not 15?

>The March 18, 1943 raid to Vegesack included IIRC, 73 B-17's and 24 B-24s.

Walter will now show the German fighter units pulled back in
March 1943. You see on 14 May 1943 the 8th despatched
over 200 bombers for the first time, the USAAF was growing
steadily throughout 1943, at a faster rate than Bomber Command.

>I'd say that's a few dozen. The fact is that the Germans began returning their
>day fighters to Germany when USAAF raids consisted of just a few dozen heavy
>bombers.


Walter will now show the German fighter units pulled back in
March 1943.

>"In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense shifted more
>and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even though numerically the
>British were still stronger than the Americans and were undoubtedly a great
>trial for for the civilian population, the American precision raids were of
>greater consequence to the war industry. They received priority attention
>over the British raids on our towns."
>
>"The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland

Note folks, Galland talks about in the course of the year 1943, Walter
defines this as March 1943 or earlier. The Galland quote is one of
his favourites, the fact the chief of the day fighters decided the day
campaign was more important, with Walter ignoring the fact the
number of day and night fighters deployed in the west went up more
or less together. After all look at JG300, 301 and 302, day fighters
used at night starting in the second half of 1943.

>So you don't disagree with what I said.


Translation Walter is not going to deal with all the problems he has
with his claims.

>>>That on three days during May 1944, the USAAF reduced German synthetic oil
>>>production by 50%.
>>
>>Walter does not like to actually look at the Speer reports that
>>shows the first group of USAAF synthetic oil raids cut avgas
>>production from around 5,850 tons/day to around 4,850 tons/day.
>
>I don't see a source for that.

Walter the source is the Speer reports to Hitler, as quoted many
times and ignored many times.

>My source says the -Americans- knocked out 90% of German aviation fuel
>production, and produced a 50% reduction in --three days--.

Note below Walter's quote says the 50% reduction was including
Ploesti strikes, and the 90% was after the raids in June.

>"But now in May 1944 all that changed. Eighth Air Force's attacks against the
>synthetic oil industry in the Reich complemented raids by the Fifteenth Air
>Force out of Foggia in Italy against Romanian refineries and production
>facilities. The first strike from Britain came on 12 May; 935 bombers sortied
>against the synthetic oil plants at Zwickau, Merseburg-Leuna, Brux,
>Lutzkendorg, Bohlen, Zeitz, and Chemnitz.
>Allied bombers and escorting
>fighters encountered severe resistance. The results, while encouraging, were
>not decisive. The great Leuna plant, though damaged, lost only 18 percent of
>its capacity. Speer was, nevertheless enormously worried.
>
>...After feverish
>efforts, production had come close to regaining preattack levels by the end of
>May. On the 28th, Eighth returned to attack oil targets throughout Germany.
>Over a two day period, it lost 84 bombers, but this time it badly damaged the
>petroleum industry. Combined with fifteenth Air Force's raids on Ploesti,
>American attacks cut petroleum production in half.
>
>[exactly as I said]

Walter says the cut oil production was done in three days, in other
words the attacks on Ploesti apparently only occurred on the same
days as the 8th attacked German oil targets. Not a series of raids
starting in April, plus the effects of mining the Danube. The crude
oil could still be shipped from Romania if the refineries there were
damaged, Germany had spare refining capacity. The Romanians
normally exported only a minority of their oil to Germany.

Walter has a basic definition of exact, fiction.

>The impact of the raids was apparent almost immediately...May's attacks were a
>prelude to punishing raids over the succeeding months. After a two-week pause,
>during which Allied bombers supported the invasion, the Americans staged a
>series of new attacks that knocked out 90 percent of aviation fuel production,
>so that by the end of the month total production had sunk to a miniscule 632
>tons."
>
>-"A War to be Won" p. 328-29 by Murray and Millett

Note above the claim is this reduction to 90% of avgas production
occurred in 3 days of raiding, some of which was in late June. So
what happened on at least one of the May strike days to knock it
out of the wonder 3 days. Also note the quote says a series of
raids, presumably over less that 3 days, to allow the May results
to be included.

Walter will also ignore the RAF raids in June 1944, say for example
the 12 June raid on the hydrogenation plant at Gelsenkirchen, which
cost the Germans 1,000 tons of avgas per day for "several weeks".

In other words folks, Walter is going to ignore the fact he claims
the results of the combined USAAF and RAF raids over 2 to 3
months are the result of USAAF raids in 3 days, it would be
good for him to nominate the wonder 3 days.

Standard Walter really, turn months into days, turn combined raids
into USAAF raids.

> Even if what you said were true (instead of being a lot of blue smoke and
>mirrors) it shows that the USAAF was capable of very great accuracy. I mean
>--three days-- of raids for the reduction you suggest? That would be fabulous.

Next basic step apparently now I am claiming the USAAF did it
all in 3 days, and on the fourth day they presumably rested. People
can note why I use the "err staff" point, the way Walter simply
assigns words to other people.

> Especially when you consider what the various bombing surveys found after the
>war for the effects of five and half years British bombing -- that the
>British bombing of Germany was useless.

Translation Walter takes the results of the area bombing campaign,
ignores the methodology problems with the analysis and then
ignores the way the Germans were saying the RAF raids on oil
installations were the more damaging, that key campaign according
to Walter.

>In any case, this review in the WSJ gave a very skewed view of what was
>actually accomplished.

Translation Walter does not like the results.

>>The second group of strikes cut production from around 5,550
>>tons/day to around 2,800 tons/day.
>>
>>This is avgas, all not synthetic oil. Walter likes to simply ignore the
>>difference.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said.

Note folks apparently pointing out there is a big difference between
avgas production and total oil production is agreeing with Walter.
His claim is wrong.

Keep this in mind when he makes his standard "they agree with
me" claims.

>>>By September, largely due to raids by USAAF heavy bombers,
>>>the Luftwaffe was receiving 1/15th of its required fuel allocation.
>>
>>The Speer reports reproduced in the RAF history give the daily
>>avgas output for May, June, July and September 1944. They
>>show production drops after RAF and USAAF raids, for example
>>after the RAF attack of 12 June avgas production drops from
>>around 2,100 tons/day to 1,100 tons/day, the RAF raids of 22 June
>>dropped production from around 1,250 tons.day to 600 tons/day.
>>
>>And so on for the various raids, the drop in production to 120 tons/day
>>in late July 1944 was after a group of USAAF and RAF raids.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said.

Walter likes to simply ignore problems with his data, he will now
define largely and how he has calculated the USAAF's contribution
to avgas production. His list of what German plants were putting
out avgas, when they were hit, by whom and to what effect.

>>>That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber
>>>Command could not have operated over Germany at all.
>>
>>Walter ignores the reality RAF Bomber Command was operating
>>over Germany long before the USAAF appeared.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said.

Translation, Walter simply ignores the fact he is writing fiction.

>>He has a careful
>>selection of quotes that tries to "prove" his claim.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said.

Translation Walter is simply going to ignore facts.

>>Arthur Harris' despatch on operations has a graph of missing rate
>>for heavy bombers sorties against targets in Germany. The war peak
>>is in June 1944, there is a dramatic drop in mid July, after the capture
>>of a night fighter showing the latest Luftwaffe radar and radar homing
>>devices, and another dramatic drop as the coastal radar network
>>and associated western airfields were lost in September 1944.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said.

Translation Walter is simply going to hope no one is actually
following the thread, and noted his claim that the oil campaign
was the reason for the decline in night losses.

Not the army advances, not the better radar counter measures.

>>>That B-17's are offically credited with shooting down more German aircraft
>>than
>>>all other USAAF aircraft types COMBINED (including fighter types). Though
>>B-17
>>>gunner claims were wildly inflated, they were still very deadly and
>>dangerous.
>>
>>When I ran a basic back of the envelope calculation it looked
>>like in 1943 the Luftwaffe lost 2 fighters shot down by the bombers
>>per 3 B-17/24 it shot down. In early 1944 the ratio was 1 to 2.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said.

All bombers were deadly and dangerous if the carried defensive
armament, they all also on average lost air to air fights with fighters.
Drop the B-17 to 8 machine guns, leave two gunners behind, and
you can increase the bomb load, more chance of destroying the
target, fewer sorties to do the same damage.

>>>At least two high scoring German aces were killed in combat with B-17's. A
>>>high scoring night fighter ace, whose aircraft had not been touch in months
>>in
>>>combat with the RAF, was killed in his first combat with B-24's.
>>
>>Apparently this is all the justification to claim the USAAF bombers
>>were really heavy fighters in disguise.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said.

Walter likes to find his pet examples and pretend they are
general. Rather like someone noting say an RAF kill of a
successful German day fighter pilot in 1944 to say the
B-17/24s were not dangerous. Silly isn't it?

It will be interesting to see how he knows the relevant
Luftwaffe fighter pilot had suffered no damage at all to
his aircraft.

>>>Without a fleet of B-17's in place in England at the start of 1944, no
>>invasion
>>>of Europe would have been possible. This because the Germans showed
>>>they would only fight for the type of targets that could only be struck by
>>B-17's,
>>>and her stablemate, the B-24.
>>
>>Walter likes to have the B-17 in the spotlight alone if he can. He simply
>>ignores the reality that either the Luftwaffe fought for control of French
>>airspace in early 1944 or it would not be able to intervene effectively
>>against the invasion.
>
>The Germans did not generally fight over France in early 1944. They fought
>with, were engaged by, and were defeated over German targets by "strike
>packages" that included B-17's and B-24's.


Note folks Walter changes the subject, from what the allies
could have done to what they did. His claim the Luftwaffe
would ignore the allied attacks on France if Germany was
safe is quietly jettisoned.

By the way Walter the German bomber force in the west was
engaged and defeated over Britain and France at night in
the first half of 1944. The Heer fought hard in France.

> Unless it could keep the allied air forces away
>>from its airbases it could not conduct effective operations. So either
>>the Luftwaffe does not fight, and the result is basically as per history,
>>or it does fight, and therefore loses more quickly because more allied
>>fighters could make it to France than Germany.
>
>In the event British fighters played a limited role in this because they simply
>didn't have the range to get to areas the Germans were determined to defend.

Translation Walter will ignore the problems with his what if, and
just go on to note the shorter range of the Spitfire.

The Luftwaffe was determined to defend France, the 8th and 15th
made them defend Germany first.

>>>As Dr. Russell Weigley notes in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants", during the
>>spring
>>>and summer of 1944 the Allies held victory through air power in their grasp,
>>>but did not persevere for the kill.
>>
>>This gives an idea of Walter's search for quote, Weigley wrote a history
>>about the land campaign, but it is such a nice quote Walter will keep
>>repeating it.
>
>See, Sinclair, this is when your bias and lies are most easily exposed. Dr.
>Weigley (who recented passed away) didn't write an account of the "land
>campaign", he wote an account about Eisenhower's --lieuttenants--. This
>included Spaatz and Doolittle, and also Montgomery, Tedder, Leigh Mallory, and
>for a time Harris also.

I have no problem with the reality Weigley included the air commanders,
I have a real problem with his quote as misused by Walter and the reality
is Weigley was concentrating on the land campaign.

>Dr. Weigley may have meant to evoke with that title the mamouth work of Douglas
>Southall Freeman, "Lee's Lieutenants".

I like the way Walter decides what Weigley thought.

>But you are trying to denigrate Dr. Weigley's work as a history of the land
>campaign. Too bad that any fair minded person can see that the Allies -did-
>hold the key to victory to airpower in their hands. And a big part of that key
>squatted on hardstands in East Anglia while the crews slept in underheated
>Quonset huts in East Anglia. That was the B-17/B-24 force.

Translation Walter will not put the quote up, he will put the editorial
of the quote up. He will ignore the reality the Germans had oil reserves,
that if the oil campaign was such an obvious winner the question is
also why it remained a minority in the 8ths efforts, only in November
1944 was oil the number one target for the 8th and so on.

Walter wants to believe the war would be over in 1944 if the allies had
increased their efforts against the German oil sector. Simply ignoring
the size of the sector and the fact the German army had long since
learnt to live without great amounts of fuel and air cover. Then add the
supply problems as the allied armies advanced towards Germany.

>Max Hastings suggested much the same thing as Dr. Weigley.


Remember the Walter method of "they agree with me"?

>>>But that is no fault of the B-17/B-24's or their crews.
>>
>>However later on Walter will attempt to denigrate the crews by over
>>claiming their successes, rather than accurately recording what they
>>did or could do.
>
>I have shown what they can do.

Walter is good at selective examples.

>The Germans knew:
>
>"The Americans' attacks,
>which
>followed a definite system of assault on industrial targets, were by
>far the
>most dangerous.
>
>It was in fact these attacks which caused the
>breakdown of the
>German armaments industry. The attacks on the chemical industry would
>have
>sufficed, without the impact of purely military events to render
>Germany
>defenseless.--Albert Speer"
>
>--"Luftwaffe War Diaries" p. 355 by Cajus Bekker.

By the way how did the US strikes cause the breakdown of the
u-boat building, tanks, steel? Given the USAAF rarely went
near them. The reality was the transport plan was the way the
allies finally started to really hurt the German economy, and
the plan required and used all types of allied air power, from
all the allies.

Also note the USSBS says many of the oil plants were dual
chemical and oil plants, and that the bombs on chemical,
rubber, explosives and propellant targets in Greater Germany,
excluding the dual plants, May 1944 to the end of the war were
USAAF 13,208 tons, Bomber Command 11,005 tons, which
is around 10% of the "oil target" tonnage.

By the way folks remember the USAAF dropped 34,334 tons
of bombs on the oil/chemical industry in 1945 (the synthetic
plants were also major sources of important chemicals), the
RAF 53,067 tons in the same period. What I like is the way
Walter attacks Harris for not bombing the oil targets, quotes
Speer about what effect they could have had, then fails to
mention the way the USAAF moved onto other targets, in
1945 for every ton of bombs dropped by Bomber Command
the USAAF heavies dropped 1.4 tons. Maybe the problem
of targeting oil plants was a little more complex than Walter
wants to believe.

>>Back in December 2003
>>
>>a) Walter managed to write the words "Err Staff" instead of air staff.
>>b) accused me of writing them
>>c) decided someone who wrote such a word invalidated themselves
>>as a source on the air war in question.
>
>I don't recall ever using the term "err staff". I Thought you did. You don't
>much like what they said, since they were critical of the sainted Arthur
>Harris. If you didn't first use that tem, I wont make that point any more.

This is Walter in pretend retreat mode. You see it was not the
words that ultimately matter, it was the fact that Walter tried to
use them as an excuse to ignore problems, as a way of claiming
someone who wrote them could not validly comment on the air war.

Walter is faced with the problem he wrote the words but will not
uphold his standards, that is stop commenting about the air war.
Instead we have the generous offer Walter will drop the fact he
made a mistake while not admitting he did make the mistake
while he hopes no one is noting his preference for double standards.

And the reality is the Air Staff asked, in early 1944, for Bomber
Command area attacks to be better integrated with USAAF strikes,
Walter tries to claim they asked for "precision" attacks, plus try and
make the quote applicable to mid/late 1944.

Walter thinks he has a long range mental state detector, to tell people
what they like or dislike.

>>The fun thing about it is
>>
>>a) Walter is at best either completely confused about what he says or
>>at worst is into rewriting history, and too foolish enough to realise how
>>he keeps presenting the evidence against himself.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said. Or rather, you can't gainsay what I
>said.

Translation Walter is not going to look to hard here, the answer is
probably the wrong one. He trumped up the charge, declared the
penalty and now tries to avoid the penalty applying to him.

>>b) Unable to correct the record when shown to be wrong,
>>c) Is manufacturing the most trivial excuses to try and avoid coping
>>with the gap between reality and his preferred fiction. Think about it,
>>a totally trivial complaint, after all Err will pass through a spell
>>checker.
>
>So you don't disagree with what I said. Or rather, you can't gainsay what I
>said.

Translation Walter is not going to look to hard, the answer is
probably the wrong one.

>>"I don't know that these city strikes were launched on bad weather days.
>>You don't either. What I do know is that the Err Staff thought Harris was
>>not
>>properly applying his force, and they -did- know the weather day by day."
>>
>>By the way the Air Staff complaint was in January 1944, Walter was
>>trying to prove it related to the third quarter of 1944.
>
>I couldn't find the post that would show that you used this term first.

Note folks, Walter does not deny he used the term, instead he is
going to somehow pretend I used it first, with the usual level of
proof offered. Walter is going to ignore the fact he made claims
about a person's fitness to comment on the issue based on the
idea that they wrote "Err Staff"

> I do
>know that the moderator of the WWII group who is from Australia has a serious
>hard-on over me. He sent me a very nasty e-mail. Maybe he made that note of
>yours disappear, the way so many of the notes I sent just disappeared.

Walter is apparently into conspiracy theories. Apparently the WWII
moderators can purge the google archives, as oppose to stop people
like Walter posting because they break the charter.

There is a reason Walter has decided to waste bandwidth in
rec.aviation.military.

>Well, this is not the moderated WWII group.
>
>And as I suggest above, you can't gainsay anything I said. You've only made a
>fool of yourself.

Translation Walter is going to try and pretend his fiction is fact.
He will ignore the objections.


Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

On 18 Apr 2004 02:09:44 GMT, (WalterM140) wrote:

>Not according to Dan Ford.

Walt, you are a grumpy idiot. I *lived* in Frankfurt after the war.

Control K!

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

>>And over 1/3 of those bombs landed within 1,000 feet of the aiming point
>during
>>1944. The USAAF was capable of some pretty fair accuracy for the time
>
>Gosh, Walt, that's *terrible* accuracy! So two-thirds landed a mile or
>fifty miles away, or in another country altogether?
>

It's pretty good accracy when compared to some.

"A total of 377 aircraft returned with bombing photographs which showed either
ground detail or fires on the ground which could be plotted. It was estimated
that only ten of these aircraft bombed the built up area of Berlin and that
most bombs fell in a long spread up to thirty miles south of the city."

-- "The Berlin Raids" p. 82-83 by Martin Middlebrooks

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
>Date: 4/18/04 12:15 AM Pacific

>Percentage of bombs dropped by the 8th Air force using visual sighting,
>>>
>>>1943 56.5
>>>1944 41.2
>>>1945 41.5
>>>overall 42.1

>Translation, Walter will ignore visual bombing was a minority of the
>8ths efforts.

You miss the point. Instead of not flying at all during bad weather we flew
radar mission . These added to the visual missions dramatically increased our
destructiveness.. Your classifying radar missions as not effective fails to
recognise that we did double the damage by flying both radar and visual a
missions.Walter is right.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.

ArtKramr wrote in message >...
>>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
>>Date: 4/18/04 12:15 AM Pacific
>
>>Percentage of bombs dropped by the 8th Air force using visual sighting,
>>>>
>>>>1943 56.5
>>>>1944 41.2
>>>>1945 41.5
>>>>overall 42.1
>
>>Translation, Walter will ignore visual bombing was a minority of the
>>8ths efforts.
>
>You miss the point. Instead of not flying at all during bad weather we flew
>radar mission . These added to the visual missions dramatically increased our
>destructiveness.. Your classifying radar missions as not effective fails to
>recognise that we did double the damage by flying both radar and visual a
>missions.

Hello Art, my problem with the Walter presentation in this case is simple.

Would you like only the best results mentioned when it comes to recording
the history of what you did? That is the story your descendants will take
as an accurate idea of what you did and therefore an insight to the abilities
of military campaigns today?

I mean ignore the problems of take off, formatting, staying in formation,
navigating, finding the target and then bombing it on cloudy days?

I did not classify the missions done using non visual bombing as
"not effective", like all bombing raids the results could vary dramatically
but overall they were less effective because of the lower average accuracy.
In the 8ths case visual bombing was a minority of its effort, and visual
bombing in very clear weather less again.

The 8th had a hard time doing radar bombing, it had the biggest need
at the very time the USAAF had shortages of equipment and trained men.

If it is allowable to only mention the best results, then presumably it is
allowable to only mention the worst results.

>Walter is right.

Walter is rarely right about the heavy bomber campaign.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

>> Those who talk of the innacuracy of our bombing have never seen Germany in
>> 1945. We left damn little standing.
>
>Art, "leaving damn little standing" seems to me to be an
>indication of inaccuracy, not accuracy...

The USAAF started out with an obsession about "pinipoint:" bombing,
"putting the bomb in the pickle barrel from 20,000 feet." That was a
major reason why, despite horrendous losses, the Americans refused to
join the British in switching to night bombing. (Later, of course, the
day/night division of labor served other purposes: making more room
available in British airspace, keeping the Germans awake around the
clock.)

The American turn to bombing through the clouds and from very high
altitudes was forced on them by circumstances, bad weather over
Germany and hellish flak. I think it's fair to say that if the USAAF
hit the factory it was aiming at, that *that* was the accident, rather
than hitting the farm ten miles away or Switzerland a hundred miles
away.

As I said, I lived in Frankfurt after the war. It had been rebuilt
(more quickly than London!) but there were mural photographs in the
railroad station. Out front of the station for several blocks to left
and right and a couple blocks straight ahead, there were literally no
streets remaining, just acres and acres of stone and rubble.

Of course it was the Hauptbanhoff that the bombardiers were aiming at.
Yet they never hit it. The one I used for bopping about Germany,
covering courts martial at Kaiserslautern and Darmstadt, was the same
iron and glass structure that survived all those raids without any
damage but broken glass.

A thousand feet from the aiming point is a *long* way in a city the
size of Frankfurt.


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

I wondered about that myself. If it was a typo, Dan was consistant!

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
>Date: 4/18/04 10:47 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.
>
>ArtKramr wrote in message >...
>>>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>>>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
>>>Date: 4/18/04 12:15 AM Pacific
>>
>>>Percentage of bombs dropped by the 8th Air force using visual sighting,
>>>>>
>>>>>1943 56.5
>>>>>1944 41.2
>>>>>1945 41.5
>>>>>overall 42.1
>>
>>>Translation, Walter will ignore visual bombing was a minority of the
>>>8ths efforts.
>>
>>You miss the point. Instead of not flying at all during bad weather we flew
>>radar mission . These added to the visual missions dramatically increased
>our
>>destructiveness.. Your classifying radar missions as not effective fails to
>>recognise that we did double the damage by flying both radar and visual a
>>missions.
>
>Hello Art, my problem with the Walter presentation in this case is simple.
>
>Would you like only the best results mentioned when it comes to recording
>the history of what you did? That is the story your descendants will take
>as an accurate idea of what you did and therefore an insight to the abilities
>of military campaigns today?
>
>I mean ignore the problems of take off, formatting, staying in formation,
>navigating, finding the target and then bombing it on cloudy days?
>
>I did not classify the missions done using non visual bombing as
>"not effective", like all bombing raids the results could vary dramatically
>but overall they were less effective because of the lower average accuracy.
>In the 8ths case visual bombing was a minority of its effort, and visual
>bombing in very clear weather less again.
>
>The 8th had a hard time doing radar bombing, it had the biggest need
>at the very time the USAAF had shortages of equipment and trained men.
>
>If it is allowable to only mention the best results, then presumably it is
>allowable to only mention the worst results.


Bad results are almost always the result of bad conditions. When bad results
are quored in a sneering tone as though the AAC did not have the capability
oif accuracy. That is a false and ignorant point of view. We could put a bomb
in a pickle barrel form 10,000 feet and I have done it many times. See my
website for photogaphic evidence of just how high our accuracy could be given
reasonable conditions. But the goeal was to hit the enemy imnder ALL
conditions, day and night, good weather and bad. Never let him sleep or rest or
recover. Hit him again and again If the target was missed by 10 miles and the
bomb load hit a farm destroying farm machinery and animals and grain storage
that deprived the enemy of food, that was a good mission. Then we would come
back and finally hit the prime target destroying it. Any attack on the enemy
is better than no attack. That is what war is all about.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

On 19 Apr 2004 14:40:45 GMT, (ArtKramr) sed:

On one hand....

> That is a false and ignorant point of view. We could put a bomb
>in a pickle barrel form 10,000 feet and I have done it many times.

....then on the other.

> If the target was missed by 10 miles and the
>bomb load hit a farm destroying farm machinery and animals and grain storage
>that deprived the enemy of food, that was a good mission.

I suppose the Germans ran out of pickle barrels for targeting.


Enjoying digital hallucination

>> That is a false and ignorant point of view. We could put a bomb
>>in a pickle barrel form 10,000 feet and I have done it many times.

It was 20,000 feet in the boast. Some little difference there :)

In the event, of course, the B-17s found it unsafe to bomb from 20,000
feet and moved up much higher.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

Earlier in the posts:
>We could put a bomb
>>>in a pickle barrel form 10,000 feet and I have done it many times.

We could put a couple of 500 pounders or napalm into a suspected truck park in
a patch of three tiered jungle without a Norden sight. We did it numerous times
at night.
But of course it wasn't WWII, those suspected trucks were tough all the same.

Rick
MFE

>>
>> That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber Command
>could
>> not have operated over Germany at all.

Wow! That was an eye-opener of a sentence, as opposed to accurate. Do you
realize that during the BoB, Bomber Command lost more men attacking
continental targets, including Germany, than Fighter Command lost? From
1940-1945, Bomber Command struck the Reich, including Germany itself, almost
without interruption. They were not there because of anything the USAAC was
doing!

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

Its always better to lose AN engine, than THE engine.

I wrote:

>>> That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber Command
>>could
>>> not have operated over Germany at all.
>
>Wow! That was an eye-opener of a sentence, as opposed to accurate.

No, it's quite accurate given the correct context, which is after Bomber
Command was driven out of most of Germany in the wake of the Battle of Berlin
and the 3/31/44 strike on Nuremburg.

It's a paraphrase of what Sir Charles Portal said after the invasion.

Specifically, Portal said:

"But for the favorable air situation created by the Americans, said Portal, '
it is possible that the night blitzing of German cities would by now have been
too costly to sustain upon a heavy scale'. Here was a remarkable admission
from the British Chief of Air Staff -- that it was only the success of the
American air policy which had spared that
of Britain from visible and humiliating defeat."

--"Bomber Command" p. 387, by Max Hastings

>Do you
>realize that during the BoB, Bomber Command lost more men attacking
>continental targets, including Germany, than Fighter Command lost?

Not a very stirring testimony. The context of my note, which perhaps you just
skimmed, or maybe I wasn't clear enough, was in the period following the
invasion.

Walt

>In the event, of course, the B-17s found it unsafe to bomb from 20,000
>feet and moved up much higher.

And still, per the Germans, hurt them much worse than the RAF did.

Freeman relates in "Might Eighth War Diary" an anecdote where a B-17 box
climbed to almost 30,000 feet to get over the weather and still put 20% of its
bombs inside a circle of 1,000 foot radius.

Walt

>Yet even before that date the RAF were fully operational
>In April 1944 Bomber command flew 9700 sorties with
>a loss rate of 2.7%.

After losing almost 100 aircraft in the Nuremburg raid of 3/31/44.

It was only being put onto invasion related targets that saved Bomber Command
from the perception of visible and humiliating defeat, and only "the favorable
situation created by the Americans", that allowed Harris to make the rubble
jump in German cities later in the war.

Now, the Americans had a similar situation. After 10/14/43, it was
conclusively shown that the unescorted bomber boxes couldn't operate over
German targets without prohibitive loss. The Americans were able to interject
a technological antidote -- the Mustang.

Due to the nature of the British techniques and the unsuitability of their
aircraft to being escorted the way the Americans could, the Brits could only
get back over German targets after the Americans deprived the German air force
of fuel. And I remind you that Galland said that deliveries of aviation fuel
were inadequate before the RAF flew one sortie in the "Oil Campaign", and I
further remind you that Harris sloughed off boming Oil targets as much as he
dared.

Walt

>The USAAF started out with an obsession about "pinipoint:" bombing,
>"putting the bomb in the pickle barrel from 20,000 feet."

They ultimately made it work, too.

"From Spaatz's point of view, the results of the May attacks on oil
were outstanding. The Luftwaffe came up in strength, and Eisenhower soon got
feedback through ULTRA that the effects on tlie Germans were dramatic. The
military leaders of the Reich reacted immediately. They redeployed antiaircraft
defenses hurriedly from the aircraft factories to these synthetic plants that
had not yet been bombed. In addition, they changed the training programs of
some of the ground units to conserve fuel and modified additional vehicles to.
wood-burning propulsion systems. Though USSTAF could not at that moment be
relieved of its responsibilities in the preparatory phases of OVERLORD, the
combination of effects seems to have so impressed Eisenhower'that later in the
summer he permitted additional oil attacks."

--"Master of Airpower", David R. Mets.

"The USSTAF and Bomber Command at last combined their offensives, the Eighth
and Fifteenth Air Forces hitting synthetic oil plants while Bomber Command
hammered targets in the Ruhr, where benzol was derived as a by-product of the
coke ovens. In the process, an argument that had by now become academic was
settled: precision bombing using the Norden bombsight could do more damage
with 250 tons of bombs than could an attack using radar with 1,000 tons."

-- "Clash of Wings" p. 346, by Walter J. Boyne

"Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all the
hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and industrial
workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the front--it
was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital blow at
German survival.
This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the selective and
precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By careful
choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments production,
and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."

Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker

"After a survey of of Luftwaffe officers for "American Heritage", Carl
Sulzberger found agreement with one German flying officer that "There is no
doubt that the Americans harmed us most. The Russians were negligible as far
as the home front was concerned, and we could have stood the British attacks
on our cities. But the American devastation of our airfields, factories, and
oil depots made it impossible for us to keep going."

"A Wing and a Prayer", p. 384 by Harry Crosby.

"In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense shifted more
and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even though numerically the
British were still stronger than the Americans and were undoubtedly a great
trial for for the civilian population, the American precision raids were of
greater consequence to the war industry. They received priority attention
over the British raids on our towns."

"The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland

Walt

>
>>Do you
>>realize that during the BoB, Bomber Command lost more men attacking
>>continental targets, including Germany, than Fighter Command lost?
>
>Not a very stirring testimony.

But it explains that the RAF was committed to bombing the Reich years before
the US left its shores to join the party. Losses notwithstanding, Bomber
Command was never turning back. Harris made a great statement when it was
first suggested that they had "lost" the night battle - can't quote, but
essentially, he said, "What we are doing amounts to the ONLY Allied offensive
operation against Germany at this time." From June 1940 to June 1944, Bomber
Command was the only Allied force in constant combat over the Reich, drawing
resources away from Germany's countless other campaigns.

> The context of my note, which perhaps you
>just
>skimmed, or maybe I wasn't clear enough, was in the period following the
>invasion.

Before during and after the invasion, Bomber Command was striking Germany. No
heavy bomber raid was ever turned back, day or night, due to enemy action -
yes, that includes the RAF. As for the Commonwealthians being unable to
continue bombing, Portal never said that - he said it was *possible* that the
situation would have gotten to that point; even as he wrote that, British
bombers were in combat. And his statement ignores the mounting Mosquito raids
that were by then causing the German leadership to remove large chunks of hair
from their own heads... The Allied bombing campaign took on several facets and
Portal's perhaps out of context or otherwise incomplete comments don't
accurately reflect the reality that American air armadas required X amount of
German assets to combat, while the night campaign required X amount as well -
often it meant they could react to a daylight threat only by taking assets from
the night war, and vice versa. The RAF suffered greatly but didn't quit -
almost a mirror of the situation to when the Regensburg/Schweinfurt missions
made it tactically impractical for the US to continue with large scale daylight
penetrations without escorts. Allied bombing (not American, nor British)
accomplished the deed of forcing the Luftwaffe to its knees, by continually
rocking the old warrior with an indefensible combination of punches. No reason
to try to demean the accomplishments of one force to raise up the other - they
were fists wielded by the same boxer.

v/r
Gordon

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: (WalterM140)
>Date: 4/19/04 6:40 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>The USAAF started out with an obsession about "pinipoint:" bombing,
>>"putting the bomb in the pickle barrel from 20,000 feet."
>
>They ultimately made it work, too.
>
>"From Spaatz's point of view, the results of the May attacks on oil
>were outstanding. The Luftwaffe came up in strength, and Eisenhower soon got
>feedback through ULTRA that the effects on tlie Germans were dramatic. The
>military leaders of the Reich reacted immediately. They redeployed
>antiaircraft
>defenses hurriedly from the aircraft factories to these synthetic plants that
>had not yet been bombed. In addition, they changed the training programs of
>some of the ground units to conserve fuel and modified additional vehicles
>to.
>wood-burning propulsion systems. Though USSTAF could not at that moment be
>relieved of its responsibilities in the preparatory phases of OVERLORD, the
>combination of effects seems to have so impressed Eisenhower'that later in
>the
>summer he permitted additional oil attacks."
>
>--"Master of Airpower", David R. Mets.
>
>"The USSTAF and Bomber Command at last combined their offensives, the Eighth
>and Fifteenth Air Forces hitting synthetic oil plants while Bomber Command
>hammered targets in the Ruhr, where benzol was derived as a by-product of the
>coke ovens. In the process, an argument that had by now become academic was
>settled: precision bombing using the Norden bombsight could do more damage
>with 250 tons of bombs than could an attack using radar with 1,000 tons."
>
>-- "Clash of Wings" p. 346, by Walter J. Boyne
>
>"Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all the
>hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and industrial
>workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the front--it
>was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital blow at
>German survival.
> This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the selective and
>precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By careful
>choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments
>production,
>and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."
>
>Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker
>
>"After a survey of of Luftwaffe officers for "American Heritage", Carl
>Sulzberger found agreement with one German flying officer that "There is no
>doubt that the Americans harmed us most. The Russians were negligible as far
>as the home front was concerned, and we could have stood the British attacks
>on our cities. But the American devastation of our airfields, factories, and
>oil depots made it impossible for us to keep going."
>
>"A Wing and a Prayer", p. 384 by Harry Crosby.
>
>"In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense shifted more
>and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even though numerically the
>British were still stronger than the Americans and were undoubtedly a great
>trial for for the civilian population, the American precision raids were of
>greater consequence to the war industry. They received priority attention
>over the British raids on our towns."
>
>"The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland
>
>Walt

Those of us who flew missions with the Norden knew that all the time.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>But it explains that the RAF was committed to bombing the Reich years before
>the US left its shores to join the party.

Exactly.

And the Germans are clear that the Americans hurt them much worse than the
British did.

Walt

>"What we are doing amounts to the ONLY Allied offensive
>operation against Germany at this time."

Harris almost immolated his own force. He had a World War One mindset.

But he -was- a 'Butcher' alright -- of his own men.

Walt

>From June 1940 to June 1944, Bomber
>Command was the only Allied force in constant combat over the Reich, drawing
>resources away from Germany's countless other campaigns.

You're on a roll.

The effort the Germans had to expend to combat Bomber Command in no way
strained them the way it strained the British to support Bomber Command. The
Germans had boys, foreign soldiers, even women in their flak defenses. The
British had hundreds of very very expensive aircraft and their finest young men
involved. And the Germans defeated Bomber Command.

Walt

>> The context of my note, which perhaps you
>>just
>>skimmed, or maybe I wasn't clear enough, was in the period following the
>>invasion.
>
>Before during and after the invasion, Bomber Command was striking Germany.

After the Invasion, BC could only strike Germany because of the situation
brought on by the Americans.

No
>heavy bomber raid was ever turned back, day or night, due to enemy action -
>yes, that includes the RAF.

So what?

The British had to install cameras on their bombers to make sure the crews were
not dropping their heavier bombs into the North Sea.


As for the Commonwealthians being unable to
>continue bombing, Portal never said that - he said it was *possible* that the
>situation would have gotten to that point; even as he wrote that, British
>bombers were in combat. And his statement ignores the mounting Mosquito
>raids
>that were by then causing the German leadership to remove large chunks of
>hair
>from their own heads...

You can't gansay Portal.

Mosquito raids, right.


The Allied bombing campaign took on several facets
>and
>Portal's perhaps out of context or otherwise incomplete comments

You're welcome to show that.

don't
>accurately reflect the reality that American air armadas required X amount of
>German assets to combat, while the night campaign required X amount as well -
>often it meant they could react to a daylight threat only by taking assets
>from
>the night war, and vice versa.

You could argue that both the daylight and night raids expended much more in
the way of blood and treasure than they returned. But the Germans are clear
that the USAAF hurt them far worse than the RAF and they began redeploying the
day fighter force back to Germay at a time when the average USAAF raid was only
a few dozen heavy bombers and only striking in visual conditions.

The RAF suffered greatly but didn't quit -
>almost a mirror of the situation to when the Regensburg/Schweinfurt missions
>made it tactically impractical for the US to continue with large scale
>daylight
>penetrations without escorts.

The difference is that the Americans had a technological injection they could
make -- the Mustang. Due to the nature of its aircraft and techniques and
equipment, the RAF had no such fix.

Allied bombing (not American, nor British)
>accomplished the deed of forcing the Luftwaffe to its knees,

The effect on the Luftwaffe by the RAF during the run-up to the invasion was
negligible.


by continually
>rocking the old warrior with an indefensible combination of punches. No
>reason
>to try to demean the accomplishments of one force to raise up the other -
>they
>were fists wielded by the same boxer.

Arthur Harris kept one hand tied behind the back of Bomber Command. it could
have been much more effective under another leader.


Walt

>
>v/r
>Gordon
>
>
>
>
>

>The
>Germans had boys, foreign soldiers, even women in their flak defenses.

An 88mm set up to defend the Zeiss optics works is one that would not be
available to the invasion front. Multiply that by thousands of 88s and every
other caliber - these were being set up around various military targets in
1940-42, long before the stars and bars arrived overhead. The flakhelferrinnen
did indeed include boys and women - although women usually served in other
roles and boys were physically unable to lift and load an 88mm shell, so men
were used that would otherwise be employed in the war effort elsewhere.

>The
>British had hundreds of very very expensive aircraft and their finest young
>men
>involved. And the Germans defeated Bomber Command.

Just as the IJN defeated the USN at Pearl Harbor. Within a few months, the USN
carried the fight right back to the heart of the enemy - I think that is the
same situation at the RAF's costly, though short-term, loss against the
Luftwaffe over Germany's cities.

v/r
Gordon-
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

Its always better to lose AN engine, than THE engine.

>
>>"What we are doing amounts to the ONLY Allied offensive
>>operation against Germany at this time."
>
>Harris almost immolated his own force. He had a World War One mindset.

The 'chop rate' varied quite a bit throughout the night war, but Harris didn't
do anything any differently than Nimitz, Halsey, or dozens of other Allied
commanders: get in front of the enemy and prove you could outlast him.

>But he -was- a 'Butcher' alright -- of his own men.

He traded the lives of 50,000 of his own men in order to keep Britain on
offense, at a time when he was the only man in a position to do so. I'd agree
with the title "butcher", however, I would say he and his force kept hundreds
of thousands of flak, fighter, and support troops tied up before the first
Boeing arrived. He had a bloody, ugly job to do and was rightly dispised for
doing it his own way. Not a guy I'd ever want to work for - I think a
personality like Bennett or Embry could have rallied the force to greater
accomplishments.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

Its always better to lose AN engine, than THE engine.

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: (Krztalizer)
>Date: 4/19/04 9:23 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>The
>>Germans had boys, foreign soldiers, even women in their flak defenses.
>
>An 88mm set up to defend the Zeiss optics works is one that would not be
>available to the invasion front. Multiply that by thousands of 88s and every
>other caliber - these were being set up around various military targets in
>1940-42, long before the stars and bars arrived overhead. The
>flakhelferrinnen
>did indeed include boys and women - although women usually served in other
>roles and boys were physically unable to lift and load an 88mm shell, so men
>were used that would otherwise be employed in the war effort elsewhere.
>
>>The
>>British had hundreds of very very expensive aircraft and their finest young
>>men
>>involved. And the Germans defeated Bomber Command.
>
>Just as the IJN defeated the USN at Pearl Harbor. Within a few months, the
>USN
>carried the fight right back to the heart of the enemy - I think that is the
>same situation at the RAF's costly, though short-term, loss against the
>Luftwaffe over Germany's cities.
>
>v/r
>Gordon-
><====(A+C====>
> USN SAR

It is important that we don't play fast and loose with the term :defeated" For
example. In WW II we "defeated the enemy" because we destroyed their ability
to continue the war. But in the American war of the revolution we never
"defeated" the Brits since after the war they still had the largest army and
Navy in the word. They just chose not to fight on. We "won": the war but
Birtian was never "defeated" since they could still fight if they chose to. In
WW II the RAF was never defeated by the enemy since they coild always fly
any time they chose.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>The USAAF started out with an obsession about "pinipoint:" bombing,
>>"putting the bomb in the pickle barrel from 20,000 feet."
>
>They ultimately made it work, too.

They made the campaign work by adopting radar bombing aids.

>"From Spaatz's point of view, the results of the May attacks on oil
>were outstanding.

You would hope so since it appears the first raids were delayed
until near perfect weather could be expected. Spaatz was going
to give his plan the best chance to succeed.

>The Luftwaffe came up in strength, and Eisenhower soon got
>feedback through ULTRA that the effects on tlie Germans were dramatic. The
>military leaders of the Reich reacted immediately. They redeployed antiaircraft
>defenses hurriedly from the aircraft factories to these synthetic plants that
>had not yet been bombed. In addition, they changed the training programs of
>some of the ground units to conserve fuel and modified additional vehicles to.
>wood-burning propulsion systems. Though USSTAF could not at that moment be
>relieved of its responsibilities in the preparatory phases of OVERLORD, the
>combination of effects seems to have so impressed Eisenhower'that later in the
>summer he permitted additional oil attacks."
>
>--"Master of Airpower", David R. Mets.

For about the only time in the war, Ultra gave insight into the damage
being caused on the ground.

>"The USSTAF and Bomber Command at last combined their offensives, the >Eighth
>and Fifteenth Air Forces hitting synthetic oil plants while Bomber Command
>hammered targets in the Ruhr, where benzol was derived as a by-product of the
>coke ovens. In the process, an argument that had by now become academic was
>settled: precision bombing using the Norden bombsight could do more damage
>with 250 tons of bombs than could an attack using radar with 1,000 tons."
>
>-- "Clash of Wings" p. 346, by Walter J. Boyne

Walter likes to use this quote to "prove" the RAF raids were less
damaging The raid reports the Germans made and the USSBS
damage survey are ignored. Just pretend the 8th Air Force accuracy,
Norden versus radar, is he same as Bomber Command's and that
Bomber Command was always using radar, and Norden bomb sights.

>"Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all the
>hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and industrial
>workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the front--it
>was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital blow at
>German survival.
> This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the selective and
>precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By careful
>choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments production,
>and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."
>
>Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker

The Luftwaffe war diaries is one of Walter's favourite books, note
there is a quote on page 355 which says there was no systematic
attack before May 1944, with the first attacks on oil installations.
So apparently we have to ignore all 8th Air Force raids before this
as part of the "careful choice of target", in a book which ends its
effective coverage in June 1944.

Walter has posted this quote many times without noting the basic
objections, like why no mention of the 15th air force, why no mention of
the 9th and 2nd tactical air force, why no mention of Bomber Command
strikes on oil and transport? How can the heavy bombers be considered
to be doing precision bombing? The 8ths target list until the oil
and transport plans were mainly the finished product factories,
the aircraft assembly plants, strikes on rubber and ball bearings
could not or were not followed up. The 8th did not strike in a
sustained way at production bottlenecks, that is key raw and semi
raw products except the oil campaign, where it provided part of
the effort along with the 15th and Bomber Command. The 8th had
a key part in this campaign in 1944, less so in 1945. Walter should
tell us all what materials the German armaments production ran
out of thanks to the 8th air force, steel?, ball bearings? what?

Instead perhaps the way the allied air forces severely damaged
the transport system in western Germany might be mentioned
as the way industrial output was hurt and the attacks on oil
firstly hurt the Luftwaffe by reducing avgas supplies and then
later went after the fuel the army and navy used.

See the book The Collapse of the German War Economy 1944-45,
Allied Airpower and the German National Railway by Mierzejewski.
It documents the decline of the German Rail system in late 1944
and early 1945 to the point where it could not even supply its own
locomotives with coal, where special derail gangs were formed
with quotas of cars to derail each day to clear congestion. Where
the German economy was collapsing, mainly due to the transportation
strikes, the canals, the railways and the oil. How the stocks were
run down and weapons that were made were stuck at the factories.
Tables give an idea of the run down in coal production. The book
makes the case the marshalling yards were the key.

See also A Forgotten Offensive: RAF Coastal Command Anti
Shipping Campaign 1940-45 by Goulter. In particular the last
chapter on the economic effects of cutting off most of the
Scandinavian iron ore trade in late 1944, it helped but the
Germans had stocks to keep going for a while. The tables give
the decline in steel production. If ever there was a sustained
strike against a vital raw material it was the anti shipping
operations against the ore ships from Narvik.

I have another question, why does Walter never mention
Bekker makes it clear his Luftwaffe War Diaries ends in
June 1944? Which is clearly relevant to conclusions about
the bombing since most of the bombs dropped on Germany
happened after that date.

>"After a survey of of Luftwaffe officers for "American Heritage", Carl
>Sulzberger found agreement with one German flying officer that "There is no
>doubt that the Americans harmed us most. The Russians were negligible as far
>as the home front was concerned, and we could have stood the British attacks
>on our cities. But the American devastation of our airfields, factories, and
>oil depots made it impossible for us to keep going."
>
>"A Wing and a Prayer", p. 384 by Harry Crosby.

Remember when in trouble look for a junior officer who tells you
that you had the most effect. Push poll anyone?

Also note the USAAF attacks on
oil refineries apparently had no effect, only the depots were
hurt, and that campaign did not start until June 1944 according
to the USSBS, and by the end of September 1944 the USSBS
has the RAF, with 3,300 tons of bombs, ahead of the USAAF
with 1,600 tons. So if the depots were the key the RAF was
the one turning it, not the USAAF.

>"In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense shifted more
>and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even though numerically the
>British were still stronger than the Americans and were undoubtedly a great
>trial for for the civilian population, the American precision raids were of
>greater consequence to the war industry. They received priority attention
>over the British raids on our towns."
>
>"The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland


The chief of the day fighters worrying about the day battle. Just ignore
the large rise in the day and night fighter strengths which show's
Gallands words to be incorrect.

The formation of single engined nightfighter forces in mid/late 1943.


Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

ArtKramr wrote in message >...
>>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
>>Date: 4/18/04 10:47 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>>Message-id: >


(snip)

>>Hello Art, my problem with the Walter presentation in this case is simple.
>>
>>Would you like only the best results mentioned when it comes to recording
>>the history of what you did? That is the story your descendants will take
>>as an accurate idea of what you did and therefore an insight to the abilities
>>of military campaigns today?
>>
>>I mean ignore the problems of take off, formatting, staying in formation,
>>navigating, finding the target and then bombing it on cloudy days?
>>
>>I did not classify the missions done using non visual bombing as
>>"not effective", like all bombing raids the results could vary dramatically
>>but overall they were less effective because of the lower average accuracy.
>>In the 8ths case visual bombing was a minority of its effort, and visual
>>bombing in very clear weather less again.
>>
>>The 8th had a hard time doing radar bombing, it had the biggest need
>>at the very time the USAAF had shortages of equipment and trained men.
>>
>>If it is allowable to only mention the best results, then presumably it is
>>allowable to only mention the worst results.
>
>Bad results are almost always the result of bad conditions.

Agreed, both natural and man made.

>When bad results
>are quored in a sneering tone as though the AAC did not have the capability
>oif accuracy. That is a false and ignorant point of view.

All air forces were capable of accuracy, the problem becomes when
only the best or worst results are used as "typical".

>We could put a bomb
>in a pickle barrel form 10,000 feet and I have done it many times.

The heavies dropped from 20,000 feet or higher usually, the USSBS
says the expected error was 830 feet, at 10,000 feet the error was
570 feet.

You are doing yourself a disservice by repeating the pickle barrel claims,
that is not reality.

>See my
>website for photogaphic evidence of just how high our accuracy could be given
>reasonable conditions.

The USSBS makes it clear the mediums were more accurate than
the heavies. It also makes it clear reasonable conditions were just
met in under half the 8ths efforts

>But the goeal was to hit the enemy imnder ALL
>conditions, day and night, good weather and bad.

That was the goal, in trying to do this the air forces had to sacrifice
accuracy, and at some point the loss of accuracy and the cost of
the raid means it is costing you more.

>Never let him sleep or rest or
>recover. Hit him again and again If the target was missed by 10 miles and the
>bomb load hit a farm destroying farm machinery and animals and grain storage
>that deprived the enemy of food, that was a good mission. Then we would come
>back and finally hit the prime target destroying it. Any attack on the enemy
>is better than no attack. That is what war is all about.


Art, the reality is bad attacks hurt you. Fighting over enemy controlled
territory means most aircraft and aircrews are total losses, whereas
the enemy can rescue shot down aircrew and salvage crashed aircraft.

Your approach makes sense in the second half of 1944, as the allies
achieved saturation, so minor damage had to be left accumulate, rather
than be quickly repaired. It does not work before saturation is reached.
It is also the fact most land is open space or forest, not a building or
storage.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Welcome to a favourite Walter tactic, the multiple replies of around
one sentence at a time, rather than try a coherent single reply.

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>But it explains that the RAF was committed to bombing the Reich years before
>>the US left its shores to join the party.
>
>Exactly.
>
>And the Germans are clear that the Americans hurt them much worse than the
>British did.

Walter has a few carefully selected quotes to try and "prove" this.

The latest effort is apparently to drop the comparison to the US
versus Britain, not the Commonwealth, which hives off large
sections of the non US air and ground forces attacking the Germans
in the west.

The Kreigsmarine would disagree, the Luftwaffe would look at
the long and short term effects of the Battle of Britain, and the
costs of the continued campaign against Britain before making
a call, the Heer would probably agree that some time in the third
or fourth quarter of 1944 the US Army had now exceeded in
inflicting more losses.

This leaves the economy, which was not badly hurt before the
second half of 1944, and we have the extra weight of US bombs
dropped versus things like the USSBS oil report noting the RAF
raids were on average more destructive.

>>"What we are doing amounts to the ONLY Allied offensive
>>operation against Germany at this time."
>
>Harris almost immolated his own force. He had a World War One mindset.

Walter likes to announce this, rather than deal with the reality Harris
did care about his men and did keep changing tactics to minimise
losses.

>But he -was- a 'Butcher' alright -- of his own men.

Walter has little to like about Harris, Eaker, commander of 8th
Air Force when it was sending unescorted bombers to Germany
is not treated in the same way as Harris, for example.

>>From June 1940 to June 1944, Bomber
>>Command was the only Allied force in constant combat over the Reich, drawing
>>resources away from Germany's countless other campaigns.
>
>You're on a roll.
>
> The effort the Germans had to expend to combat Bomber Command in no way
>strained them the way it strained the British to support Bomber Command. The
>Germans had boys, foreign soldiers, even women in their flak defenses. The
>British had hundreds of very very expensive aircraft and their finest young men
>involved. And the Germans defeated Bomber Command.

This is the Walter standard, try this rewrite,

The effort the Germans had to expend to combat the 8th Air Force bombers
in no way strained them the way it strained the US to support the bombers.
The Germans had boys, foreign soldiers, even women in their flak defenses.
The US had hundreds of very very expensive aircraft and their finest young
men involved. And the Germans defeated the 8th Air Force.

After all it was not like the crack flak gunners only came out in the day, or
that the US bombers were less expensive or had lower quality crews or
that the 8th was not defeated at some stage. Silly isn't it?

Walter prefers though to believe his fiction.

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>> The context of my note, which perhaps you just
>>>skimmed, or maybe I wasn't clear enough, was in the period following the
>>>invasion.
>>
>>Before during and after the invasion, Bomber Command was striking Germany.
>
>After the Invasion, BC could only strike Germany because of the situation
>brought on by the Americans.

We are back to the Americans, the US Army, Navy and Air Force,
ignoring the contributions of non US forces to the improvements.

If the Americans did make it better after the invasion there is a need
to explain the fact Bomber Command loss rates over Germany hit
their wartime peak in the post D day June 1944 raids.

>> No
>>heavy bomber raid was ever turned back, day or night, due to enemy action -
>>yes, that includes the RAF.
>
>So what?
>
>The British had to install cameras on their bombers to make sure the crews were
>not dropping their heavier bombs into the North Sea.

No Walter, the British installed cameras to figure out bombing accuracy.
The fact some crews during a period of defeat dropped some of their
bombs in the North Sea to lighten the load, as opposed to aborting the
sortie is something Walter likes to highlight and try and pretend happened
for a long time in a large number of cases.

This was his favourite claim in an effort to "prove" Bomber Command
did not drop any 4,000 pound bombs on Germany before September
1944.

>> As for the Commonwealthians being unable to
>>continue bombing, Portal never said that - he said it was *possible* that the
>>situation would have gotten to that point; even as he wrote that, British
>>bombers were in combat. And his statement ignores the mounting Mosquito
>>raids that were by then causing the German leadership to remove large chunks
>>of hair from their own heads...
>
>You can't gansay Portal.

The fun thing here is Portal does not say what Walter claims, people
are contradicting Walter and he cannot cope.

>Mosquito raids, right.

The Germans hated them, largely because they seemed near unstoppable.

>>The Allied bombing campaign took on several facets
>>and Portal's perhaps out of context or otherwise incomplete comments
>
>You're welcome to show that.

I keep doing so and Walter ignores it.

>don't
>>accurately reflect the reality that American air armadas required X amount of
>>German assets to combat, while the night campaign required X amount as well -
>>often it meant they could react to a daylight threat only by taking assets
>>from the night war, and vice versa.
>
>You could argue that both the daylight and night raids expended much more in
>the way of blood and treasure than they returned. But the Germans are clear
>that the USAAF hurt them far worse than the RAF

Junk claim number one. Try for a start Coastal Command in the mix.

>and they began redeploying the
>day fighter force back to Germay at a time when the average USAAF raid was
>only a few dozen heavy bombers and only striking in visual conditions.

Junk claim number 2, Walter will now list the redeployments, if it is like
last time the training JG units, like JG102 will make the list and the
return of a gruppe will be made into the return of a Geschwader.

>>The RAF suffered greatly but didn't quit -
>>almost a mirror of the situation to when the Regensburg/Schweinfurt missions
>>made it tactically impractical for the US to continue with large scale
>>daylight penetrations without escorts.
>
>The difference is that the Americans had a technological injection they could
>make -- the Mustang. Due to the nature of its aircraft and techniques and
>equipment, the RAF had no such fix.

Walter just simply ignores the significant drop in RAF losses just after
the capture of a Ju88G nightfighter and examination of its electronics.
He also ignores the offensive operations of the Mosquito units. He
ignores things like in October 1944 the night fighter force claimed 56
kills but lost around 54 in combat related sorties and December 1944
66 kill claims but 117 nightfigters lost to all causes. Things did improve
in 1945.

Walter also ignores the basic fact in absolute terms the USAAF losses
to enemy aircraft did not change much.

In the first four months of 1945 the USAAF statistical digest reports the
Air Forces in the European Theatre lost some 440 aircraft to enemy
aircraft, in the period September to December 1943 the losses to
enemy aircraft are put at 424, July to October 1943 the total is 406.

Aders list of Luftwaffe night fighter kill claims has the November 1943
to March 1944 figures as 1,057, November 1944 to March 1945 as
668.

The big difference is the number of allied sorties, in the later periods,
which makes the percentage losses much less. So the day loss rates
went down even as the absolute numbers remained the same.

Walter might like to contemplate how come the USAAF was less
successful in reducing the absolute numbers lost versus the RAF.
If the Mustang was such a wonder answer and all the improvement
in RAF losses were due to the Americans.

> Allied bombing (not American, nor British)
>>accomplished the deed of forcing the Luftwaffe to its knees,
>
>The effect on the Luftwaffe by the RAF during the run-up to the invasion was
>negligible.

Just ignore the destruction of the Luftwaffe bomber force in the west.

>>by continually rocking the old warrior with an indefensible combination
>>of punches. No reason to try to demean the accomplishments of one
>>force to raise up the other - they were fists wielded by the same boxer.
>
>Arthur Harris kept one hand tied behind the back of Bomber Command. it could
>have been much more effective under another leader.

Walter likes to run this line, usually with a generous helping of hindsight
to the new, never named, commander.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>Yet even before that date the RAF were fully operational
>>In April 1944 Bomber command flew 9700 sorties with
>>a loss rate of 2.7%.
>
>After losing almost 100 aircraft in the Nuremburg raid of 3/31/44.

Walter have you noted the overall USAAF percentage losses in
key months like October 1943? The air commanders did know
when to pull back or try something else after a big loss, it kept
the overall loss rates down.

>It was only being put onto invasion related targets that saved Bomber Command
>from the perception of visible and humiliating defeat, and only "the favorable
>situation created by the Americans", that allowed Harris to make the rubble
>jump in German cities later in the war.

Firstly it was widely admitted Bomber Command had suffered a
defeat in early 1944, even at the time. Secondly the claim only the
US efforts reversed the situation is junk. Rather like someone
claiming the formation of JG300, 301, 302 took all the best pilots
and weakened the day fighter force to allow the 8th back into
Germany. A junk claim based on a minor truth, that the diversion
did help slightly.

Finally Walter ignores the reality there was plenty of the economy
to damage in late 1944, but prefers "rubble jump" without ever
bothering to figure out if it was rubble being bombed then the
earlier attacks must have been much more successful than he
wants to claim. The usual Walter standard of logic.

>Now, the Americans had a similar situation. After 10/14/43, it was
>conclusively shown that the unescorted bomber boxes couldn't operate over
>German targets without prohibitive loss. The Americans were able to interject
>a technological antidote -- the Mustang.

This no doubt explains why the Luftwaffe is credited with shooting
down more USAAF aircraft in the European theatre in 1945 than
during the famed 4 months of the 1943 battles.

Walter has Mustang = absolute solution and ignores thinks like
the improvement in electronic warfare and the increasing numbers
of Mosquito nightfighters sent over Germany to help the night
bombers.

>Due to the nature of the British techniques and the unsuitability of their
>aircraft to being escorted the way the Americans could, the Brits could only
>get back over German targets after the Americans deprived the German air force
>of fuel.

The reality is the day and night fighter forces did not have their
fuel cut until later than Walter wants to pretend. His claim is junk.

The night bombers were "escorted" by electronic warfare like the
day bombers and distant escorts, the intruders and patrols, just like
the day bombers distant cover. The night bombers did not have
the close fighter cover the day formations could have.

>And I remind you that Galland said that deliveries of aviation fuel
>were inadequate before the RAF flew one sortie in the "Oil Campaign", and I
>further remind you that Harris sloughed off boming Oil targets as much as he
>dared.

Walter will ignore the reality Galland wrote post war without access to
many documents and is clearly confusing the tactical situation in France,
where most of his western fighters ended up. In France the allied bombing
of communications and airfields caused fuel problems. This was a failure
of distribution, not manufacture.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >Yet even before that date the RAF were fully operational
> >In April 1944 Bomber command flew 9700 sorties with
> >a loss rate of 2.7%.
>
> After losing almost 100 aircraft in the Nuremburg raid of 3/31/44.
>

Indeed and in the month of march the loss rate was 3.6%
which was approx the same as the 8th AF was taking.

> It was only being put onto invasion related targets that saved Bomber
Command
> from the perception of visible and humiliating defeat, and only "the
favorable
> situation created by the Americans", that allowed Harris to make the
rubble
> jump in German cities later in the war.
>

Were the 8th AF also humiliated ?

They were switched to invasion targets too. The reality is that
the heavies were required to attack the transportation network
and defences in germany and France but continued to operate
over Germany, your fantasies notwithstanding

> Now, the Americans had a similar situation. After 10/14/43, it was
> conclusively shown that the unescorted bomber boxes couldn't operate over
> German targets without prohibitive loss. The Americans were able to
interject
> a technological antidote -- the Mustang.
>


As the British would do with windows, serrate , the Mosquito NF etc

> Due to the nature of the British techniques and the unsuitability of their
> aircraft to being escorted the way the Americans could, the Brits could
only
> get back over German targets after the Americans deprived the German air
force
> of fuel.

This has been shown to be untrue. The RAF operated over Germany every day
of the war. During most of spring and summer 1944 the Mosquito's of
the LNSF were delivering their 4000lb bomb loads to Berlin
almost on a nightly basis


> And I remind you that Galland said that deliveries of aviation fuel
> were inadequate before the RAF flew one sortie in the "Oil Campaign", and
I
> further remind you that Harris sloughed off boming Oil targets as much as
he
> dared.
>

All of which is of course irrelevant to your claim

>An 88mm set up to defend the Zeiss optics works is one that would not be
>available to the invasion front. Multiply that by thousands of 88s and every
>other caliber - these were being set up around various military targets in

A War To Be Won says there were more 88s defending the homeland air
than were holding off the Russians. If they had been moved east?

>1940-42, long before the stars and bars arrived overhead. The flakhelferrinnen
>did indeed include boys and women - although women usually served in other
>roles and boys were physically unable to lift and load an 88mm shell, so men
>were used that would otherwise be employed in the war effort elsewhere.

At the Overseas Weekly we had a motorcycle runner name Bodo who'd been
one of the flak gunners. He claimed that his sergeant? would tell
them: "If we don't shoot at them, they won't shoot at us." But then it
was impossible in Germany at that time to find anyone who'd shot at
the Americans. They'd all served on the eastern front, been PWs, or
looked the other way when the planes came over, like Bodo.


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

>>The
>>Germans had boys, foreign soldiers, even women in their flak defenses.
>
>An 88mm set up to defend the Zeiss optics works is one that would not be
>available to the invasion front.

An 88mm gun defending the Zeiss optic works is not the equivalent of a
Lancaster with its whole suite of electronic aids.

Gee this desn't sound like rocket science. And there is no comparison in the
human material either, as I indicated.

Walt

>>The
>>British had hundreds of very very expensive aircraft and their finest young
>>men
>>involved. And the Germans defeated Bomber Command.
>
>Just as the IJN defeated the USN at Pearl Harbor.

The German Air Force made a surprise attack on Bomber Command? In a time of
peace? I hadn't heard that before. Why not pick Custer's Last Stand? The
Indians defeated the soldiers, didn't they?

>Within a few months, the USN
>carried the fight right back to the heart of the enemy - I think that is the
>same situation at the RAF's costly, though short-term, loss against the
>Luftwaffe over Germany's cities.

Sorry, but it''s not.

Walt

>>Not according to Dan Ford.
>
>Walt, you are a grumpy idiot. I *lived* in Frankfurt after the war.
>
>Control K!
>

Maybe that's why you don't seem capable of objectivity.

Walt

>>Not according to Dan Ford.
>
>Walt, you are a grumpy idiot. I *lived* in Frankfurt after the war.
>
>Control K!

Address these points:

That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far worse than
the RAF did.

That during 1944 over 1/3 of 8th AF bombs hit within 1,000 feet of the aiming
point using visual means.

That B-17's made made up a very important part of a "strike package" to which
the Germans could find no answer.

That the Germans denuded other fronts of day fighters to combat the unescorted
B-17's, when the 8th AF was only sending a few dozen on any given raid.

That on three days during May 1944, the USAAF reduced German synthetic oil
production by 50%. By September, largely due to raids by USAAF heavy bombers,
the Luftwaffe was receiving 1/15th of its required fuel allocation.

That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber Command could
not have operated over Germany at all.

That B-17's are offically credited with shooting down more German aircraft than
all other USAAF aircraft types COMBINED (including fighter types). Though B-17
gunner claims were wildly inflated, they were still very deadly and dangerous.
At least two high scoring German aces were killed in combat with B-17's. A
high scoring night fighter ace, whose aircraft had not been touch in months in
combat with the RAF, was killed in his first combat with B-24's.

Without a fleet of B-17's in place in England at the start of 1944, no invasion
of Europe would have been possible. This because the Germans showed they would
only fight for the type of targets that could only be struck by B-17's, and her
stablemate, the B-24.

As Dr. Russell Weigley notes in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants", during the spring
and summer of 1944 the Allies held victory through air power in their grasp,
but did not persevere for the kill.

Walt

Greasy wrote:

> On 19 Apr 2004 14:40:45 GMT, (ArtKramr) sed:
>
> On one hand....
>
>>That is a false and ignorant point of view. We could put a bomb
>>in a pickle barrel form 10,000 feet and I have done it many times.
>
> ...then on the other.
>
>>If the target was missed by 10 miles and the
>>bomb load hit a farm destroying farm machinery and animals and grain storage
>>that deprived the enemy of food, that was a good mission.
>
> I suppose the Germans ran out of pickle barrels for targeting.

Or, as Art said, conditions for bombing varied, along with the
accuracy of the attempt.

Add to this the varying experience and capabilities of individual
groups, squadrons or bombardiers, I don't know why bombing in
WWII has to be labeled "inaccurate" in the context of the times
or judged no better than area bombing.

The variation in results due to such conditions is true to this
very day. The fact that a laser guided munition hits a mosque
instead of the missile battery set up next to it does not mean
"smart bombs" are no more effective than "dumb bombs", even
though at times, there really might not be much difference in
effect between the two!


SMH

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
>Date: 4/19/04 11:42 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id:

>You are doing yourself a disservice by repeating the pickle barrel claims,
>that is not reality.

My experience and all that I quote comes from flying missions over Germany
under all conditions of enemy action and weather. I don't think you can get
closer to reality than that.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: "Keith Willshaw"

>They were switched to invasion targets too. The reality is that
>the heavies were required to attack the transportation network
>and defences in germany and

The heavy lifitng on the transportation targets wwas handled by the 9th Air
Force using B-26's and P-47's to attack bridges, marshalling yards, rail lines,
crossroads, ordnance depots etc. It was called tactical bombing and the 9th
was a tactical air force. See strike photos of these missions on my website.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: (WalterM140)
>Date: 4/20/04 4:08 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>>Not according to Dan Ford.
>>
>>Walt, you are a grumpy idiot. I *lived* in Frankfurt after the war.
>>
>>Control K!
>
>Address these points:
>
>That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far worse
>than
>the RAF did.
>
>That during 1944 over 1/3 of 8th AF bombs hit within 1,000 feet of the aiming
>point using visual means.
>
>That B-17's made made up a very important part of a "strike package" to
>which
>the Germans could find no answer.
>
>That the Germans denuded other fronts of day fighters to combat the
>unescorted
>B-17's, when the 8th AF was only sending a few dozen on any given raid.
>
>That on three days during May 1944, the USAAF reduced German synthetic oil
>production by 50%. By September, largely due to raids by USAAF heavy bombers,
>the Luftwaffe was receiving 1/15th of its required fuel allocation.
>
>That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber Command
>could
>not have operated over Germany at all.
>
>That B-17's are offically credited with shooting down more German aircraft
>than
>all other USAAF aircraft types COMBINED (including fighter types). Though
>B-17
>gunner claims were wildly inflated, they were still very deadly and
>dangerous.
>At least two high scoring German aces were killed in combat with B-17's. A
>high scoring night fighter ace, whose aircraft had not been touch in months
>in
>combat with the RAF, was killed in his first combat with B-24's.
>
>Without a fleet of B-17's in place in England at the start of 1944, no
>invasion
>of Europe would have been possible. This because the Germans showed they
>would
>only fight for the type of targets that could only be struck by B-17's, and
>her
>stablemate, the B-24.
>
>As Dr. Russell Weigley notes in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants", during the spring
>and summer of 1944 the Allies held victory through air power in their grasp,
>but did not persevere for the kill.
>
>Walt
>


It's no use Walt. You will never get these guys to admit that we won the war.
(sheesh)


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: Stephen Harding
>Date: 4/20/04 5:18 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id:

>Add to this the varying experience and capabilities of individual
>groups, squadrons or bombardiers, I don't know why bombing in
>WWII has to be labeled "inaccurate" in the context of the times
>or judged no better than area bombing.

It is only labelled innacurate by ground forces who hate to give the USAAC
credit for anytting and wannabees who don't know any better. For accuracy see
the strike photos on my website.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Cub Driver > wrote:
> On 19 Apr 2004 17:35:16 GMT, (Chris Mark) wrote:
>
> >I doubt there is an error-free history published, and some of them seem
> >inexplicable. I remember reading David Halberstam's "The Reckoning,"
>
> In "A Bright and Shining Lie," there's a photograph of a B-26 Marauder
> of the type used in Vietnam :)
>
> That of course probably wasn't the author's fault, though he ought to
> have checked the photos as well as his text.
>
Heck, I occasionally get confused over the A-26/B-26 Invader and the
B-26 Marauder. They really should have just left the Invader as the
A-26.

--
Marc Reeve
actual email address after removal of 4s & spaces is
c4m4r4a4m4a4n a4t c4r4u4z4i4o d4o4t c4o4m

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
> >From: "Keith Willshaw"
>
> >They were switched to invasion targets too. The reality is that
> >the heavies were required to attack the transportation network
> >and defences in germany and
>
> The heavy lifitng on the transportation targets wwas handled by the 9th
Air
> Force using B-26's and P-47's to attack bridges, marshalling yards, rail
lines,
> crossroads, ordnance depots etc. It was called tactical bombing and the
9th
> was a tactical air force. See strike photos of these missions on my
website.
>

For much of the war that was true and I certainly have no intention
of denigrating the valiant efforts of the 9th AF

However in the run up to the invasion in 1944 RAF bomber command dropped
98,000 tons of bombs on transportation targets and a further 93,000 tons
on defences and troop concentrations. Between April and August 1944
such operations were the mainstay for the heavies.

Keith

WalterM140 wrote in message >...

>Address these points:

The question becomes why should anyone address the points given
Walter ignores the replies that hurt his fiction.

>That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far
>worse than the RAF did.

Incorrect, Walter has a small selected set of quotes from some Germans
he tries to pretend mean all Germans and that their quotes are supposed
to prove Walter's claims. For a start put Coastal Command's record into
the mix.

>That during 1944 over 1/3 of 8th AF bombs hit within 1,000 feet of the aiming
>point using visual means.

Last time Walter actually showed this he simply took the monthly accuracy
reports, summed and then divided by 12, assuming the 8th dropped exactly
the same amount of bombs in each month in 1944.

The USSBS bombing accuracy report notes in the last 4 months of 1944
the 8th managed 30% of bombs within 1,000 feet in good visibility and
9.4% in bad visibility when visual bombing was used. For every 5 tons
of bombs dropped in good visibility in this period 3 tons was dropped in
poor visibility, overall accuracy, within 1,000 feet for the 4 months was
actually 22.4%.

>That B-17's made made up a very important part of a "strike package" to which
>the Germans could find no answer.

The answer was the jets, mainly the Me262, backed up by improvements
in the standard Fw190 and Bf109 plus exotics like the Do335.

If the B-17 is that good agitate to bring it back into service as a bomber.

>That the Germans denuded other fronts of day fighters to combat the unescorted
>B-17's, when the 8th AF was only sending a few dozen on any given raid.

Basically a junk claim, overstating the number of fighters moved and when
they moved and downplaying the number of USAAF bombers raiding.

>That on three days during May 1944, the USAAF reduced German synthetic oil
>production by 50%.

Junk claim, the raids of 12 May 1944 cut avgas production from
5,845 tons/day to 4,821 tons/day, production had rebounded to
5,541 tons/day on 27 May. Two days of raids cut production back
to 2,775 tons/day, and there was little recovery before further raids
were done. This is avgas, not German synthetic oil, from the Speer
30 June 1944 oil report to Hitler.

To give you an idea about fluctuations in daily numbers 7 June was
1,823 tons, 8 June 3,718 tons, 9 June 2,756 tons, with no allied raids.

The avgas results are impressive enough, but they have to be
exaggerated it seems. Spaatz seems to have decided to ensure
his strikes would have the best chance to succeed by waiting until
very good weather was possible.

>By September, largely due to raids by USAAF heavy bombers,
>the Luftwaffe was receiving 1/15th of its required fuel allocation.

The Speer oil reports indicate Walter needs to quantify largely.
Since the oil reports note drops in avgas production after USAAF
and RAF raids. The USSBS credits the USAAF with 16,386 tons
of bombs on Hydrogenation plants May to August 1944, the RAF
with 4,538 tons.

It seems the average avgas production from hydrogenation plants
in late 1943/early 1944 was 172,300 tons/month, broken down
by plant the top 7 were Poelitz 45,000, Gelsenkirchen 29,000,
Leuna and Brux both 20,000, Sholven/Beur 16,000, Bohlen 15,000,
Wessling 10,000 tons/month, with the other plants making the rest.

The RAF attacked Gelsenkirchen, Sholven and Wessling to the
end of August 1944.

>That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber
>Command could not have operated over Germany at all.

Walter's usual junk claim, just ignore the drop in loss rates in mid July
1944 just after the capture of a Ju88G nightfighter for a start.

>That B-17's are offically credited with shooting down more German aircraft than
>all other USAAF aircraft types COMBINED (including fighter types). Though B-17
>gunner claims were wildly inflated, they were still very deadly and dangerous.

The B-17/24 versus German fighters in 1943 was still a losing
proposition for the bomber in terms of numbers shot down on
both sides and it became steadily worse for the bombers.

>At least two high scoring German aces were killed in combat with B-17's. A
>high scoring night fighter ace, whose aircraft had not been touch in months in
>combat with the RAF, was killed in his first combat with B-24's.

Walter will simply keep repeating this claim as if it is proof the B-17
was a heavy fighter in disguise, as opposed to removing machine guns
and gunners to carry more bombs and therefore do fewer sorties for
the same damage on the ground. The USSBS noted the more bombers
sent the lower the overall accuracy for example.

>Without a fleet of B-17's in place in England at the start of 1944, no invasion
>of Europe would have been possible. This because the Germans showed
>they would only fight for the type of targets that could only be struck by B-17's,
>and her stablemate, the B-24.

Another junk claim, the Luftwaffe fought for French airspace pre invasion
or lost the ability to intervene when the invasion began. It was not essential
to bomb Germany in early 1944, very nice though as it force the Luftwaffe
fighter force away from France making the pre invasion support easier.

It will come as a shock to those allied aircraft shot down over France
in the first half of 1944 that the Germans only fought over the "type of
targets that could only be struck by B-17s and her stablemate, the B-24".
I also wonder what target had a B-17 only allowed to bomb, with assist
from B-24s marker on it. The above junk claim is actually an improvement
over the usual claims, the B-24 is granted a mention.

>As Dr. Russell Weigley notes in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants", during the spring
>and summer of 1944 the Allies held victory through air power in their grasp,
>but did not persevere for the kill.

Ah yes, that great book on the air war in Europe 1944/45.

This is an 800 page book, including appendices etc. Looking up the index
one finds Harris is mentioned on 5 pages, Portal 4 pages, Arnold 4 pages,
Doolittle 5 pages, Coningham (2nd TAF commander) 2 pages, Quesada
(9th Air Force) 2 pages but he is mentioned under some of the 19 pages
for "IX tac". Leigh-Mallory has mentions on 15 pages, the most of any air
commander. Coming second is Spaatz with 12 pages, a biography over
2 pages, the original oil plan on 1 page, the original transport plan over 4
pages, D-day bombing 1 page, Crossbow commitments 2 pages, the
September 1944 version of the oil plan on 1 page and finally 2 pages over
his promotion to 4 star general.

As people can probably guess most of the above mentions occur on the
same pages, the sketch of the pre invasion bombing ideas and decision,
and a note on what the heavy bombers could/should have done in the post
SHAEF control period.

One of the mentions of Harris is over the attempts to bomb the Roer Dams.

The book's "home" is the US Army, it is a very bad move to use it as an
authority on the air war. For example Weigley seems to miss the fact
SHAEF "diverted" effort from oil strikes by asking for attacks on tank
and truck factories.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

"Geoffrey Sinclair" > wrote in message
...
> WalterM140 wrote in message
>...
>
> >Address these points:
>
> The question becomes why should anyone address the points given
> Walter ignores the replies that hurt his fiction.
>
> >That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far
> >worse than the RAF did.
>
> Incorrect, Walter has a small selected set of quotes from some Germans
> he tries to pretend mean all Germans and that their quotes are supposed
> to prove Walter's claims. For a start put Coastal Command's record into
> the mix.
>
> >That during 1944 over 1/3 of 8th AF bombs hit within 1,000 feet of the
aiming
> >point using visual means.
>
> Last time Walter actually showed this he simply took the monthly accuracy
> reports, summed and then divided by 12, assuming the 8th dropped exactly
> the same amount of bombs in each month in 1944.
>
> The USSBS bombing accuracy report notes in the last 4 months of 1944
> the 8th managed 30% of bombs within 1,000 feet in good visibility and
> 9.4% in bad visibility when visual bombing was used. For every 5 tons
> of bombs dropped in good visibility in this period 3 tons was dropped in
> poor visibility, overall accuracy, within 1,000 feet for the 4 months was
> actually 22.4%.
>
> >That B-17's made made up a very important part of a "strike package" to
which
> >the Germans could find no answer.
>
> The answer was the jets, mainly the Me262, backed up by improvements
> in the standard Fw190 and Bf109 plus exotics like the Do335.
>
> If the B-17 is that good agitate to bring it back into service as a
bomber.
>
> >That the Germans denuded other fronts of day fighters to combat the
unescorted
> >B-17's, when the 8th AF was only sending a few dozen on any given raid.
>
> Basically a junk claim, overstating the number of fighters moved and when
> they moved and downplaying the number of USAAF bombers raiding.
>
> >That on three days during May 1944, the USAAF reduced German synthetic
oil
> >production by 50%.
>
> Junk claim, the raids of 12 May 1944 cut avgas production from
> 5,845 tons/day to 4,821 tons/day, production had rebounded to
> 5,541 tons/day on 27 May. Two days of raids cut production back
> to 2,775 tons/day, and there was little recovery before further raids
> were done. This is avgas, not German synthetic oil, from the Speer
> 30 June 1944 oil report to Hitler.
>
> To give you an idea about fluctuations in daily numbers 7 June was
> 1,823 tons, 8 June 3,718 tons, 9 June 2,756 tons, with no allied raids.
>
> The avgas results are impressive enough, but they have to be
> exaggerated it seems. Spaatz seems to have decided to ensure
> his strikes would have the best chance to succeed by waiting until
> very good weather was possible.
>
> >By September, largely due to raids by USAAF heavy bombers,
> >the Luftwaffe was receiving 1/15th of its required fuel allocation.
>
> The Speer oil reports indicate Walter needs to quantify largely.
> Since the oil reports note drops in avgas production after USAAF
> and RAF raids. The USSBS credits the USAAF with 16,386 tons
> of bombs on Hydrogenation plants May to August 1944, the RAF
> with 4,538 tons.
>
> It seems the average avgas production from hydrogenation plants
> in late 1943/early 1944 was 172,300 tons/month, broken down
> by plant the top 7 were Poelitz 45,000, Gelsenkirchen 29,000,
> Leuna and Brux both 20,000, Sholven/Beur 16,000, Bohlen 15,000,
> Wessling 10,000 tons/month, with the other plants making the rest.
>
> The RAF attacked Gelsenkirchen, Sholven and Wessling to the
> end of August 1944.
>
> >That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber
> >Command could not have operated over Germany at all.
>
> Walter's usual junk claim, just ignore the drop in loss rates in mid July
> 1944 just after the capture of a Ju88G nightfighter for a start.
>
> >That B-17's are offically credited with shooting down more German
aircraft than
> >all other USAAF aircraft types COMBINED (including fighter types).
Though B-17
> >gunner claims were wildly inflated, they were still very deadly and
dangerous.
>
> The B-17/24 versus German fighters in 1943 was still a losing
> proposition for the bomber in terms of numbers shot down on
> both sides and it became steadily worse for the bombers.
>
> >At least two high scoring German aces were killed in combat with B-17's.
A
> >high scoring night fighter ace, whose aircraft had not been touch in
months in
> >combat with the RAF, was killed in his first combat with B-24's.
>
> Walter will simply keep repeating this claim as if it is proof the B-17
> was a heavy fighter in disguise, as opposed to removing machine guns
> and gunners to carry more bombs and therefore do fewer sorties for
> the same damage on the ground. The USSBS noted the more bombers
> sent the lower the overall accuracy for example.
>
> >Without a fleet of B-17's in place in England at the start of 1944, no
invasion
> >of Europe would have been possible. This because the Germans showed
> >they would only fight for the type of targets that could only be struck
by B-17's,
> >and her stablemate, the B-24.
>
> Another junk claim, the Luftwaffe fought for French airspace pre invasion
> or lost the ability to intervene when the invasion began. It was not
essential
> to bomb Germany in early 1944, very nice though as it force the Luftwaffe
> fighter force away from France making the pre invasion support easier.
>
> It will come as a shock to those allied aircraft shot down over France
> in the first half of 1944 that the Germans only fought over the "type of
> targets that could only be struck by B-17s and her stablemate, the B-24".
> I also wonder what target had a B-17 only allowed to bomb, with assist
> from B-24s marker on it. The above junk claim is actually an improvement
> over the usual claims, the B-24 is granted a mention.
>
> >As Dr. Russell Weigley notes in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants", during the
spring
> >and summer of 1944 the Allies held victory through air power in their
grasp,
> >but did not persevere for the kill.
>
> Ah yes, that great book on the air war in Europe 1944/45.
>
> This is an 800 page book, including appendices etc. Looking up the index
> one finds Harris is mentioned on 5 pages, Portal 4 pages, Arnold 4 pages,
> Doolittle 5 pages, Coningham (2nd TAF commander) 2 pages, Quesada
> (9th Air Force) 2 pages but he is mentioned under some of the 19 pages
> for "IX tac". Leigh-Mallory has mentions on 15 pages, the most of any air
> commander. Coming second is Spaatz with 12 pages, a biography over
> 2 pages, the original oil plan on 1 page, the original transport plan over
4
> pages, D-day bombing 1 page, Crossbow commitments 2 pages, the
> September 1944 version of the oil plan on 1 page and finally 2 pages over
> his promotion to 4 star general.
>
> As people can probably guess most of the above mentions occur on the
> same pages, the sketch of the pre invasion bombing ideas and decision,
> and a note on what the heavy bombers could/should have done in the post
> SHAEF control period.
>
> One of the mentions of Harris is over the attempts to bomb the Roer Dams.
>
> The book's "home" is the US Army, it is a very bad move to use it as an
> authority on the air war. For example Weigley seems to miss the fact
> SHAEF "diverted" effort from oil strikes by asking for attacks on tank
> and truck factories.
>
> Geoffrey Sinclair
> Remove the nb for email.
>
>

>>That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far
>>worse than the RAF did.
>
>Incorrect, Walter has a small selected set of quotes from some Germans
>he tries to pretend mean all
Germans and that their quotes are supposed
>to prove Walter's claims. For a start put Coastal Command's record into
>the mix.

Coastal Command? Give me a break.

Let's get the full efffect though:

'The
British
inflicted grievous and bloody injuries upon us' said Milch after the
war, 'but
the Americans stabbed us to the heart.'

--"Bomber Command" p. 408 by Max Hastings

"In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense
shifted more
and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even though
numerically the
British were still stronger than the Americans and were undoubtedly a
great
trial for for the civilian population, the American precision raids
were of
greater consequence to the war industry. They received priority
attention
over the British raids on our towns."

--"The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland

'The Americans' attacks,
which
followed a definite system of assault on industrial targets, were by
far the
most dangerous.

It was in fact these attacks which caused the
breakdown of the
German armaments industry. The attacks on the chemical industry would
have
sufficed, without the impact of purely military events to render
Germany
defenseless.--Albert Speer"

--"Luftwaffe War Diaries" p. 355 by Cajus Bekker.

" 'By the narrowest of margins, the strategic air offensive failed to
smash
Germany's economy by this one method of attack,' wrote the economist
Professor
Milward. 'The most successful operation of the entire Allied
strategic air
warfare was against Germany's fuel supply,' wrote Galland of the
Luiftwaffe.
'Looking back, it is difficult to understand why the Allies started
this
undertaking so late....' Thus the Allies threw away success when it
was
already in their hands,' wrote Speer, of the slackening of the oil
offensive as
far back as the summer of 1944. "Had they continued the attacks of
March and
April with the same energy, we would have quickly been at our last
gasp."

--"Bomber Command" p. 389 by Max Hastings.

'Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all
the
hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and
industrial
workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the
front--it
was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital
blow at
German survival.
This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the
selective and
precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By
careful
choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments
production,
and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."

--Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker


"After a survey of of Luftwaffe officers for "American Heritage", Carl
Sulzberger found agreement with one German flying officer that "There is no
doubt that the Americans harmed us most. The Russians were negligible as far
as the home front was concerned, and we could have stood the British attacks
on our cities. But the American devastation of our airfields, factories, and
oil depots made it impossible for us to keep going."

--"A Wing and a Prayer", p. 384 by Harry Crosby.


"The message was a statement from Hans Fay, a German test pilot who had landed
his twin-engine ME 262 jet at an American field. Fay was quoted as saying,
"The American Air Force has shortened the war by years as well as decided its
outcome...Only bomber attacks during daytime have crippled and destroyed our
industry....Bombing attacks on cities did not exert a profound influence on
German morale. This was true even on the devastating bomb carpets."

-- "Forged In Fire" p. 480 by De Witt S. Copp

"Over Kiel we run into heavy flak from our own guns. The shooting by the Navy
is unfortunately so good that we are considerably disorganized. I observe the
Yank bombing. They dump their load right on the German shipyards. I am
impressed by the precision with which those *******s bomb: it is fantastic."

--"I Flew for the Fuhrer" by Heinz Knoke

Now you quote some Germans to a different effect.

You've seen some of these quotes for 4 years, and now you say we should
consider the work of --Coastal Command--?



Walt

>It's no use Walt. You will never get these guys to admit that we won the
>war.
>(sheesh)
>
>
>Arthur Kramer

Art, Bomber Command did so poorly in the war and cost so much blood and
treasure to accomplish so little, that I suppose it is no wonder that some of
the non-US posters want everything thrown into this blanket "area bombing"
definition.

What they can't discount is that the Germans began re-deploying their fighter
force back to Germany to deal with the B-17s when the 8th AF was running raids
with only a few dozen bombers, with no escort, and only in visual conditions.

The Germans were having their night fighter aces engaging the 8th AF as early
as February, 1943.

And when did the RAF run its first 1,000 plane raid? Six months previously.

Here's the deal, although it's galling to some:

'Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all
the
hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and
industrial
workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the
front--it
was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital
blow at
German survival.
This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the
selective and
precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By
careful
choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments
production,
and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."

--Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker

And it wasn't done by area bombing either. Area bombing was ineffective, and
this was known well before the end of the war.

But Bomber Command was kept at its Sisyphean task by the almost criminally
incompetent Arthur Harris until the very end.

Walt

Walt

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> And it wasn't done by area bombing either. Area bombing was ineffective,
and
> this was known well before the end of the war.

Which, I presume, is why Curtis LeMay used it with such enthusiasm.

--
Paul J. Adam

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: (WalterM140)
>Date: 4/21/04 3:37 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>It's no use Walt. You will never get these guys to admit that we won the
>>war.
>>(sheesh)
>>
>>
>>Arthur Kramer
>
>Art, Bomber Command did so poorly in the war and cost so much blood and
>treasure to accomplish so little, that I suppose it is no wonder that some of
>the non-US posters want everything thrown into this blanket "area bombing"
>definition.
>
>What they can't discount is that the Germans began re-deploying their fighter
>force back to Germany to deal with the B-17s when the 8th AF was running
>raids
>with only a few dozen bombers, with no escort, and only in visual conditions.
>
>The Germans were having their night fighter aces engaging the 8th AF as early
>as February, 1943.
>
>And when did the RAF run its first 1,000 plane raid? Six months previously.
>
>Here's the deal, although it's galling to some:
>
>'Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all
>the
>hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and
>industrial
>workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the
>front--it
>was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital
>blow at
>German survival.
> This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the
>selective and
>precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By
>careful
>choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments
>production,
>and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."
>
>--Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker
>
>And it wasn't done by area bombing either. Area bombing was ineffective, and
>this was known well before the end of the war.
>
>But Bomber Command was kept at its Sisyphean task by the almost criminally
>incompetent Arthur Harris until the very end.
>
>Walt
>
>Walt

Walt you are right on most ponts. But in all fairness lets look at the spot the
Brits were in. We had limitless men and machines. we could afford to fly
daylight missions,take our losses, bury our dread, send in replacements and
keep on going. The Bruts had no such luxury. If they continued daylight bombing
the Luftwaffe would have blown them ou tof the sky and totally destroyed BC
with nothing left. Night flying with area bombing was all they could do and
still hurt the enemy and survnve. They were brave men in hard times practising
the art of the possible. Let's thank them for that.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

>From: "Paul J. Adam"

I wrote:

>> And it wasn't done by area bombing either. Area bombing was ineffective,
>and
>> this was known well before the end of the war.
>

Mr. Adams:

>Which, I presume, is why Curtis LeMay used it with such enthusiasm.

Not in Europe.

"I am a pilot, LeMay said, "but I am the only person in this room who is also a
trained navigator and trained bombardier. When I was a group commander in the
First Division, I flew a mission as lead pilot, a lead navigator and a lead
bombardier...."

One by one the colonels or lieutenant colonels who had flown right seat spoke.
Yes, my group assembled on time Yes, we made the wing rendezvous as briefed,
but the other groups weren't there. Yes, we flew good formation during the
whole mission. Yes, we were at the fighter rendezvous but the fighters
weren't. At the I.P., we tucked in tight, but the bombardier missed the
target.

After all the command pilots talked, LeMay said, "Do any of you lead navigators
or lead bombardiers want to add anything?"

Of course we didn't. We were all first and second lieutenants. Not one of the
command pilots had described a mission anything like the way it was really
flown. Even so, who wanted to contradict our own brass?

Silence. Uncomfortable silence.

"Lieutenant Shore, Group Navigator of the 390th. Who was the bombardier with
you in the nose on the mission of July 18th [1943]?" Marshall Shore pointed to
a bombardier.

LeMay turned to the bombardier. "Do you have anything to add?"

"No, sir."

"Were your bubbles level during the bomb run?"

When Colonel LeMay asked that question, I must have gasped. I knew exactly
what he had in mimd. Maybe because of the sound I made, Colonel LeMay looked
directly at me. He slowly winked. Something was wrong with the side of his
face, and it was a grotesque wink, but that is what it was.

I felt my heart speed up. I could hardly breathe. I looked around at the other
navigators and bombardiers. How many of them knew what LeMay's question meant?
What he was really asking was who was flying the plane. If the bubbles in the
bombsight were level, the Norden was flying. If the bubbles were off, a pilot
had overpowered the controls -- and was probably doing evasive action.

When I looked back at Colonel LeMay, he was still looking at me. I winked back
at him, and nodded. That funny smile again. He looked back at the bombardier.
"Did your equipment work all right?"

"No malfunctions, sir."

One by one LeMay addressed all the lead bombardiers and asked them several
irrelevant questions.-- and the one about the bubbles.

Then he turned to the navigators, me first.
"Lieutenant, give me your story."

"Sorry, sir, I wasn't leading any of those missions."

"What group are you in?"

"The 100th, sir."

Colonel LeMay turned to colonel Harding. "Why is he here, Chuck, if he isn't a
lead bombardier?"

"He was the lead on Trondheim and Warnemunde. Before he replaced the lead
navigator, he was on a wing."

Colonel LeMay looked back at me.
"Trondheim, good show."

"Thank you, sir."

He turned back to Lieutenant Marshall Shore of the 390th.

"Lieutenant, when you were on the run from the I.P. to the target, what was the
maximum deflection on your compass heading?"

"About twenty-five degrees, sir."

By now every lead navigator in the room knew what was going on. If the Norden
was in charge, the corrections wouldn't have been more than five or six
degrees. Only a pilot could jerk a plane around like that.

At the end of the debriefing Colonel LeMay knew what every bombardier and
navigator in the room knew, and I doubt if any of the pilots knew he knew.
I realized I was in the presence of a very bright man, and a very skilled
leader."

---"A Wing and a Prayer" pp. 75-78 by Harry Crosby.

Daylight precision bombing hurt the Germans very badly, much worse than area
bombing did. They began to redeploy their day fighters for home defense at a
time when the USAAF was striking only in visual conditions, and with only a
few dozen bombers. They had their night fighter pilots attacking the B-17's
and B-24's at a time when hundreds, not dozens, of British bombers were being
dispatched nightly.

Walt

WalterM140 wrote in message >...

> Bomber Command did so poorly in the war and cost so much blood and
>treasure to accomplish so little, that I suppose it is no wonder that some of
>the non-US posters want everything thrown into this blanket "area bombing"
>definition.

No actually. People note visual bombing of Germany was a minority
of the 8th's strikes even in 1943, visual bombing in good visibility
even less. People note the contradiction between claiming the oil
campaign was so good and the RAF was so bad when the German raid
reports make it clear the RAF raids were more effective. People note
the double standards used when Walter compares the RAF to USAAF.

>What they can't discount is that the Germans began re-deploying their fighter
>force back to Germany to deal with the B-17s when the 8th AF was running raids
>with only a few dozen bombers, with no escort, and only in visual conditions.

Let us see now, the claim is now all the redeployed to Germany only,
none to France or Holland, correct?

None of those fighters tried to intercept the escorted missions over
France, nor react to the significant increase in allied day bomber
raids on France and the low countries in 1943 correct? Day Bomber
sorties up from 1,794 in 1942 to over 14,600 in 1943.

Last time Walter ran this line his list included the training units as
proof of the concentration. Note he keeps telling us about these
moves but does not provide a list of units and dates. He will
eventually define few dozen as well, it seems to be at least 8,
or just under 100 bombers.

By the way when the 8th air force was running raids of hundreds
of aircraft the Luftwaffe was using day fighter assets, the JG300
series units, as night fighters. Under Walter's rules of logic it
shows bad things about the USAAF, as opposed to everyone
else's rules of logic which state it shows bad things about Walter.

To most people the night fighter use in daylight and day fighter use
at night show improvisation and a Luftwaffe high command largely
misusing its assets, for Walter night fighters in daylight is the only
part considered, it fits the fiction.

At the end of 1942 the night fighter force was 5 Geschwader controlling
15 gruppen, except some of the gruppen were still staffel size, by the
middle of 1942 there were 6 operational Geschwader plus 1 training
unit controlling 22 gruppen, 18 of which were in the Reich.

The Germans reacted to the increasing pressure by day and night,
by beefing up the defences then firstly defeating the unescorted day
raids and then defeating the night raids. The allies then struck back.
The way the air war fluctuated, no absolutes.

>The Germans were having their night fighter aces engaging the 8th AF as early
>as February, 1943.

After the early death of an expert pilot the rules were changed to have
the inexperienced crews used. The fact 20% of night fighters did not
have radar in mid 1943 was a factor in using them. So was the heavy
armament on the Do217 night fighter version.

>And when did the RAF run its first 1,000 plane raid? Six months previously.

As people can see Walter simply refuses to actually look at the history,
the fact the 1,000 plane raids were special one offs using training and
other command's aircraft to obtain the numbers. A proof of concept,
one the USAAF was happy to share in. Walter is now going to show us
all the Bomber Command 1,000 plane raids done before 1944, that is
using the aircraft assigned to the operational units only. Otherwise he
can start telling us how bad the USAAF was for having over 800 heavy
bombers in Britain in July 1943 but only using a maximum of around 300
at a time. (In October 1944 the heavy bombers on hand topped 1,100).
The rest of us understand the concept of reserves, training units and
serviceability levels. Harris used all three to put together his three 1,000
bomber raids in 1942, if this is to be considered normal then the 8th
stands condemned for not sending 1,000 bombers to Schweinfurt in
October 1943. Silly isn't it?

>Here's the deal, although it's galling to some:

Here's the quote, though it is not saying what Walter wants it to say.

>'Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all
>the
>hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and
>industrial
>workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the
>front--it
>was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital
>blow at
>German survival.
> This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the
>selective and
>precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By
>careful
>choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments
>production,
>and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."
>
>--Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker

The Luftwaffe war diaries is one of Walter's favourite books, note
there is a quote on page 355 which says there was no systematic
attack before May 1944, with the first attacks on oil installations.
So apparently we have to ignore all 8th Air Force raids before this
as part of the "careful choice of target", in a book which ends its
effective coverage in June 1944.

Walter has posted this quote many times without noting the basic
objections, like why no mention of the 15th air force, why no mention of
the 9th and 2nd tactical air force, why no mention of Bomber Command
strikes on oil and transport? How can the heavy bombers be considered
to be doing precision bombing? The 8ths target list until the oil
and transport plans were mainly the finished product factories,
the aircraft assembly plants, strikes on rubber and ball bearings
could not or were not followed up. The 8th did not strike in a
sustained way at production bottlenecks, that is key raw and semi
raw products except the oil campaign, where it provided part of
the effort along with the 15th and Bomber Command. The 8th had
a key part in this campaign in 1944, less so in 1945. Walter should
tell us all what materials the German armaments production ran
out of thanks to the 8th air force, steel?, ball bearings? what?

Instead perhaps the way the allied air forces severely damaged
the transport system in western Germany might be mentioned
as the way industrial output was hurt and the attacks on oil
firstly hurt the Luftwaffe by reducing avgas supplies and then
later went after the fuel the army and navy used.

See the book The Collapse of the German War Economy 1944-45,
Allied Airpower and the German National Railway by Mierzejewski.
It documents the decline of the German Rail system in late 1944
and early 1945 to the point where it could not even supply its own
locomotives with coal, where special derail gangs were formed
with quotas of cars to derail each day to clear congestion. Where
the German economy was collapsing, mainly due to the transportation
strikes, the canals, the railways and the oil. How the stocks were
run down and weapons that were made were stuck at the factories.
Tables give an idea of the run down in coal production. The book
makes the case the marshalling yards were the key.

See also A Forgotten Offensive: RAF Coastal Command Anti
Shipping Campaign 1940-45 by Goulter. In particular the last
chapter on the economic effects of cutting off most of the
Scandinavian iron ore trade in late 1944, it helped but the
Germans had stocks to keep going for a while. The tables give
the decline in steel production. If ever there was a sustained
strike against a vital raw material it was the anti shipping
operations against the ore ships from Narvik.

I have another question, why does Walter never mention
Bekker makes it clear his Luftwaffe War Diaries ends in
June 1944? Which is clearly relevant to conclusions about
the bombing since most of the bombs dropped on Germany
happened after that date.



>And it wasn't done by area bombing either. Area bombing was ineffective, and
>this was known well before the end of the war.

Which explains why the 8th air force kept doing it and, as expected
in winter weather, did most of such bombing in the 1944/45 winter.

>But Bomber Command was kept at its Sisyphean task by the almost criminally
>incompetent Arthur Harris until the very end.

Translation Walter has convicted Harris, the messy evidence side of
things is irrelevant.

In the last 4 months of 1944, according to the USSBS the 8th air force
dropped 50% of its bombs through 8/10 or thicker cloud (15% in 8 or
9/10, 35% in 10/10), in the same period Harris says 46% of Bomber
Command bombs went on "towns". Walter condemns Harris even
though he was doing (just) slightly less area bombing than the 8th.

In case you are wondering in 8 and 9/10 cloud the 8th managed 1% of
bombs within 1,000 feet, in 10/10 cloud 0.2% in these 4 months, the
within 0.5 mile figures are 7.3% and 1.2% respectively.

This was during the time period the USSBS found the RAF was more
accurate on average when dropping bombs on three large oil plants it
examined in detail.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.

We are at the "delete most of the text and pretend to answer a bit of it"
phase, no reply to the holes in the accuracy claims, the effect of the
jets on the 1944 "strike package", the over claiming of bomb damage,
data on avgas production by plant and what air force hit what plant,
the holes in the idea only the 8th going to Germany in early 1944 enabled
Overlord and the way the wonder reference on the air war gives the
air war passing mention.

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>>That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far
>>>worse than the RAF did.
>>
>>Incorrect, Walter has a small selected set of quotes from some Germans
>>he tries to pretend mean all
>>Germans and that their quotes are supposed
>>to prove Walter's claims. For a start put Coastal Command's record into
>>the mix.
>
>Coastal Command? Give me a break.

Lets See now, U-boats sunk by British shore based aircraft 195,
plus 2 shared with US shore based aircraft, plus a share in 1 with
ship borne aircraft plus another 23 shared with surface ships.

Most of the 573,000 GRT of merchant ships the Germans lost at
sea to air attack in Northern Europe. With first the reduction and
then the near cutting off of shipments from Scandinavia, that
precious iron ore.

Almost all the rest is my standard cut and paste reply to the standard
quotes Walter keeps pushing forward.

>Let's get the full efffect though:
>
>'The
>British
>inflicted grievous and bloody injuries upon us' said Milch after the
>war, 'but
>the Americans stabbed us to the heart.'
>
>--"Bomber Command" p. 408 by Max Hastings

This is one of Walter's favourite quotes, it is so non specific,
what is the heart of Germany, or is Milch talking about some
or all of the Luftwaffe for example.

Yes the poetic stab in the heart, it must mean the Luftwaffe since
the Red Army destroyed most of the German Army and the RN
most of the Kreigsmarine. Just narrow down the time being
discussed to a few months in 1944 and ignore the rest of the war
to make Milch's quote look good.

See also Milch, 23 February 1944

"Everyone should pay a visit to Berlin. It would then be realised that
experience such as we have undergone in the last few months cannot
be endured indefinitely. That is impossible. When the big cities have
been demolished it will be the turn of the smaller ones."

>"In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense
>shifted more
>and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even though
>numerically the
>British were still stronger than the Americans and were undoubtedly a
>great
>trial for for the civilian population, the American precision raids
>were of
>greater consequence to the war industry. They received priority
>attention
>over the British raids on our towns."
>
>--"The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland

The chief of the day fighters worrying about the day battle. Just ignore
the large rise in the day and night fighter strengths which show's
Gallands words to be incorrect.

The formation of single engined nightfighter forces in mid/late 1943.

>'The Americans' attacks,
>which
>followed a definite system of assault on industrial targets, were by
>far the
>most dangerous.
>
>It was in fact these attacks which caused the
>breakdown of the
>German armaments industry. The attacks on the chemical industry would
>have
>sufficed, without the impact of purely military events to render
>Germany
>defenseless.--Albert Speer"
>
>--"Luftwaffe War Diaries" p. 355 by Cajus Bekker.

The systematic attack the USAAF launched pre May 1944 was
against the aircraft industry and it failed to halt increases in
fighter production, a key target.

By the way how did the US strikes cause the breakdown of the
u-boat building, tanks, steel? Given the USAAF rarely went
near them. The reality was the transport plan was the way the
allies finally started to really hurt the German economy, and
the plan required and used all types of allied air power, from
all the allies.

Also note the USSBS says many of the oil plants were dual
chemical and oil plants, and that the bombs on chemical,
rubber, explosives and propellant targets in Greater Germany,
excluding the dual plants, May 1944 to the end of the war were
USAAF 13,208 tons, Bomber Command 11,005 tons, which
is around 10% of the "oil target" tonnage.

By the way folks remember the USAAF dropped 34,334 tons
of bombs on the oil/chemical industry in 1945 (the synthetic
plants were also major sources of important chemicals), the
RAF 53,067 tons in the same period. What I like is the way
Walter attacks Harris for not bombing the oil targets, quotes
Speer about what effect they could have had, then fails to
mention the way the USAAF moved onto other targets, in
1945 for every ton of bombs dropped by Bomber Command
the USAAF heavies dropped 1.4 tons. Maybe the problem
of targeting oil plants was a little more complex than Walter
wants to believe.

Actually the quotes above are from Speer's interrogation by the RAF
on 18 July 1945.

Other words he spoke include,

"the raids on the aircraft and tank engine factories early in 1944
caused a serious renewal of anxiety and doubt, though as it
became evident in this case also that our industry was more
elastic than had been first assumed, our anxieties in this
connection lessened.

In May and June 1944 the concentrated day and night attacks
on the Rhur transport and communications system first began
to cause most serious anxieties about future developments
..... That these effects did not immediately manifest themselves
was due only to the fact that industry throughout the Rhur was
in possession of considerable stocks..."

"The opponent in the air is able to choose his objectives and in
doing so he can plan to concentrate on any vital target such a
weight of attack as hitherto has never before been possible in
the whole history of war. There was consequently no means
of defence.

In spite of this the Allied air attacks remained without decisive success until early
1944. This failure, which is reflected in the armament figures for 1943 and
1944, is to be attributed principally to the tenacious efforts of the German
workers and factory managers and also to the haphazard and too scattered
form of attacks of the enemy who, until the attacks on the synthetic oil plants,
based his raids on no clearly recognizable economic planning."

"As regards industrial production, concern was first felt following
attacks on communications in the Rhur in May 1944; this threat
grew from month to month and gave rise to a most serious
crisis from the autumn of 1944 onwards and to the final
catastrophe from January 1945 onwards."

Speer goes on to note the Electricity industry was a good target,
claiming it was the most effective method of bringing industry to
a standstill.

>" 'By the narrowest of margins, the strategic air offensive failed to
>smash
>Germany's economy by this one method of attack,' wrote the economist
>Professor Milward.

Except the German economy was not oil based, one of the reasons
the German army was largely horse drawn.

Note by the way Professor Milward talks economy, but Walter will not
defend the quote, or explain to us how depriving a non oil based economy
of oil would smash it.

>'The most successful operation of the entire Allied
>strategic air
>warfare was against Germany's fuel supply,' wrote Galland of the
>Luiftwaffe.
>'Looking back, it is difficult to understand why the Allies started
>this
>undertaking so late....' Thus the Allies threw away success when it
>was
>already in their hands,' wrote Speer, of the slackening of the oil
>offensive as
>far back as the summer of 1944. "Had they continued the attacks of
>March and
>April with the same energy, we would have quickly been at our last
>gasp."
>
>--"Bomber Command" p. 389 by Max Hastings.

Does everyone else have the same problem as me with this quote,
there were no oil strikes in March 1944, and only the unofficial 15th
Air Force operations against Ploesti marshalling yards with big
bombing errors. Then comes the claim of slackening of effort in the
summer of 1944, yet the bomb tonnage devoted to oil targets went
up, April, May, June, and July 1944. There was a drop in August but
that was because Ploesti was captured. It also ignores the disruption
of oil supplies from Romania because of the mining of the Danube.

>'Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all
>the
>hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and
>industrial
>workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the
>front--it
>was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital
>blow at
>German survival.
> This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the
>selective and
>precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By
>careful
>choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments
>production,
>and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."
>
>--Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker

The Luftwaffe war diaries is one of Walter's favourite books, note
there is a quote on page 355 which says there was no systematic
attack before May 1944, with the first attacks on oil installations.
So apparently we have to ignore all 8th Air Force raids before this
as part of the "careful choice of target", in a book which ends its
effective coverage in June 1944.

Walter has posted this quote many times without noting the basic
objections, like why no mention of the 15th air force, why no mention of
the 9th and 2nd tactical air force, why no mention of Bomber Command
strikes on oil and transport? How can the heavy bombers be considered
to be doing precision bombing? The 8ths target list until the oil
and transport plans were mainly the finished product factories,
the aircraft assembly plants, strikes on rubber and ball bearings
could not or were not followed up. The 8th did not strike in a
sustained way at production bottlenecks, that is key raw and semi
raw products except the oil campaign, where it provided part of
the effort along with the 15th and Bomber Command. The 8th had
a key part in this campaign in 1944, less so in 1945. Walter should
tell us all what materials the German armaments production ran
out of thanks to the 8th air force, steel?, ball bearings? what?

Instead perhaps the way the allied air forces severely damaged
the transport system in western Germany might be mentioned
as the way industrial output was hurt and the attacks on oil
firstly hurt the Luftwaffe by reducing avgas supplies and then
later went after the fuel the army and navy used.

See the book The Collapse of the German War Economy 1944-45,
Allied Airpower and the German National Railway by Mierzejewski.
It documents the decline of the German Rail system in late 1944
and early 1945 to the point where it could not even supply its own
locomotives with coal, where special derail gangs were formed
with quotas of cars to derail each day to clear congestion. Where
the German economy was collapsing, mainly due to the transportation
strikes, the canals, the railways and the oil. How the stocks were
run down and weapons that were made were stuck at the factories.
Tables give an idea of the run down in coal production. The book
makes the case the marshalling yards were the key.

See also A Forgotten Offensive: RAF Coastal Command Anti
Shipping Campaign 1940-45 by Goulter. In particular the last
chapter on the economic effects of cutting off most of the
Scandinavian iron ore trade in late 1944, it helped but the
Germans had stocks to keep going for a while. The tables give
the decline in steel production. If ever there was a sustained
strike against a vital raw material it was the anti shipping
operations against the ore ships from Narvik.

I have another question, why does Walter never mention
Bekker makes it clear his Luftwaffe War Diaries ends in
June 1944? Which is clearly relevant to conclusions about
the bombing since most of the bombs dropped on Germany
happened after that date.

>"After a survey of of Luftwaffe officers for "American Heritage", Carl
>Sulzberger found agreement with one German flying officer that "There is no
>doubt that the Americans harmed us most. The Russians were negligible as far
>as the home front was concerned, and we could have stood the British attacks
>on our cities. But the American devastation of our airfields, factories, and
>oil depots made it impossible for us to keep going."
>
>--"A Wing and a Prayer", p. 384 by Harry Crosby.

Remember when in trouble look for a junior officer who tells you
that you had the most effect. Push poll anyone?

Also note the USAAF attacks on
oil refineries apparently had no effect, only the depots were
hurt, and that campaign did not start until June 1944 according
to the USSBS, and by the end of September 1944 the USSBS
has the RAF, with 3,300 tons of bombs, ahead of the USAAF
with 1,600 tons. So if the depots were the key the RAF was
the one turning it, not the USAAF.

>"The message was a statement from Hans Fay, a German test pilot who had landed
>his twin-engine ME 262 jet at an American field. Fay was quoted as saying,
>"The American Air Force has shortened the war by years as well as decided its
>outcome...Only bomber attacks during daytime have crippled and destroyed our
>industry....Bombing attacks on cities did not exert a profound influence on
>German morale. This was true even on the devastating bomb carpets."
>
>-- "Forged In Fire" p. 480 by De Witt S. Copp

Yes a test pilot would be an economic expert, not to mention have
a major strategic insight and accurate knowledge of Luftwaffe losses.

>"Over Kiel we run into heavy flak from our own guns. The shooting by the Navy
>is unfortunately so good that we are considerably disorganized. I observe the
>Yank bombing. They dump their load right on the German shipyards. I am
>impressed by the precision with which those *******s bomb: it is fantastic."
>
>--"I Flew for the Fuhrer" by Heinz Knoke

Knoke was looking from the air while dodging flak and trying to
line up for an attack on the bombers, and seeing the dust and
smoke come up, not going and looking at the bomb patterns.
Or was he was sent up to observe USAAF bomb patterns and
then look at the damage later to confirm his impressions?

Why, one German observer called the RAF accuracy "extraordinary."

"It must also be stated that the now frequent night attacks are more
effective than the day raids as heavier bombs are being used and
extraordinary accuracy achieved"

Speer to Hitler 19 January 1945.

Speer was receiving reports of the bombs that hit.

Hunt for that one quote, silly isn't it?

>Now you quote some Germans to a different effect.

What is funny is the way Walter ignores the problems with the quotes
and seems to think another quote is the answer.

>You've seen some of these quotes for 4 years,

And I have been refuting the silly claims they are supposed to be supporting
for 4 years, hence the way Walter deletes most of my post.

>and now you say we should
>consider the work of --Coastal Command--?

No, I have been mentioning it for quite a while, when the claim becomes
the USAAF versus the RAF, as opposed to the 8th versus Bomber
Command, or the US versus Bomber Command, or the US versus the
RAF, or the USAAF versus Bomber Command.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >From: "Paul J. Adam"
> I wrote:
>
> >> And it wasn't done by area bombing either. Area bombing was
ineffective,
> >and
> >> this was known well before the end of the war.
>
> Mr. Adams:

At least try to get my name right, Mr M140.

> >Which, I presume, is why Curtis LeMay used it with such enthusiasm.
>
> Not in Europe.

Why did he choose such an apparently ineffectual technique for Japan, if
precision bombing was so efficacious and reliable? Did the RAF blackmail him
or something?

--
Paul J. Adam

Mr. Adam writes:

>Why did he choose such an apparently ineffectual technique for Japan, if
>precision bombing was so efficacious and reliable? Did the RAF blackmail him
>or something?

The Japanese and German industrial systems were different. They were treated
differently.

Walt

>People note visual bombing of Germany was a minority
>of the 8th's strikes even in 1943, visual bombing in good visibility
>even less.

The first radar assisted bombing by the 8th AF was in November, 1943. The
Germans started returning the day fighters to Germany to deal with the U.S.
bombers in April of that year.

>Let us see now, the claim is now all the redeployed to Germany only,
>none to France or Holland, correct?

By the end of 1943, one fighter wing was stationed in Eupen, in the
Netherlands. The Germans generally did not oppose strikes in France in this
time frame. As much as they could, they concentrated the day fighter force in
Germany, significantly reducing force levels in the Mediteranean and Russia to
do so.

>None of those fighters tried to intercept the escorted missions over
>France, nor react to the significant increase in allied day bomber
>raids on France and the low countries in 1943 correct?

I never said that. It was shown, however, that the Germans did not generally
defend French targets after 1/1/44.

>Last time Walter ran this line his list included the training units as
>proof of the concentration.

"All told, the strength of the fighter force in North West Germany, France and
the Low Countries rose from 270 in April, 1943 to 630 by August."

-- "The Mighty Eighth", p. 54 by Roger Freeman.


"American bombing in the summer of 1943 had limited the planned
expansion of the Luftwaffe's forces. This expansion had begun in
mid-1941 when Goring ordered Milch to increase aircraft production
sufficiently to quadruple front-line strength. Hitler accelerated the
effort with additional demands for greater aircraft production in
1942. Milch merged existing factories into larger complexes in order
to increase production. Though efficiency of scale helped raise
output, it also made the American bombing effort easier by
concentrating production in a few large complexes. Eighth's bombing
efforts in the first half of 1943 were small by later standards, but
they forced the Air Ministry to request the dispersal of Germany's
aircraft manufacturing industry in May 1943.

Little was done until Hitler gave Minister for War Production Albert
Speer power to order plant dispersal in August 1943. This dispersal
and American bombing caused output to lag in the fall of 1943.

Speer and Milch planned to reach a production level of 2000 fighters
per month by the summer of 1944, but the intensity of the Blitz Week
attacks of late July 1943 convinced Milch to try to reach a production
level of 2,000 per month by the end of 1943. Continued bombing
frustrated Milch's venture and he reduced his production goals to
1,000 Bf 1O9s per month by December 1943 and 1,000 FW 190s per month
by March or April 1944."

-- "To Command the Sky" pp. 121-22 by Stephen McFarland and Wesley
Newton

> Note he keeps telling us about these
>moves but does not provide a list of units and dates. He will
>eventually define few dozen as well, it seems to be at least 8,
>or just under 100 bombers.

How about several dozen, instead of a few?

"Perhaps the best measure of the Eighth's success through the early summer
[1943] was its impact on the Luftwaffe. Eighth Air Force had forced the German
high command both to withdraw fighter units from other theaters to defend the
Reich and to form larger formations with more heavily armed fighters, thus
reducing their efficiency against U.S. fighters...On July 28, 1943, during a
meeting to evaluate the damage Germay had suffered Goring ordered Milch to give
the defence of the Reich the "main emphasis" in Luftwaffe planning. This order
was less significant than at frst apparent because in actual experience, if not
policy the defense of the Reich had been receiving priority since the Spring."

-- Ibid, pp. 100-109.

So daylight precison bombing -- and only by visual means -- caused the Germans
both to disperse their factories and also to concentrate the German day
fighters against them.


Amd I remind you again that in this time frame, the 8th was only sending
several dozen B-17's out on its raids, usually less than 100. The 8th
activated 5 new groups in Mid-May, 1943, pretty much doubling its strength. By
by May, the Germans had, as Galland says, begun putting more emphasis on
opposing the B-17's than they were against the night bombers.

The claim, by another poster, that it was all "area bombing" is just false.
Daylight precision bombing had a definite affect on the Germans, and they
preceived it as a greater threat than the night bombing. And this was well
before the first bomb was dropped by the USAAF using radar or other non-visual
targeting.

Checking Freeman, "Mighty Eighth War Dairy", I see the following numbers of
bombers dispatched:

3/18/43: 103

3/22/43: 102

3/31/43: 102

4/4/43: 97

4/17/43: 115

5/13/43: 97

So when the Germans were deploying their fighter units to fight the 8th AF and
deciding to disperse their aircraft industry, the Americans were penetrating
occupied Europe with several dozen bombers, on average.

Checking "The Hardest Victory" p. 126, shows that Bomber Command had @ 600
aircraft available, with @ 350 available on any given night, by the summer of
--1942--.

So even though the RAF had 3 times the striking power, the Germans were giving
the lion's share of the effort to defending against the USAAF. This coinfirms
what Galland said.

More later.

Walt

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>People note visual bombing of Germany was a minority
>>of the 8th's strikes even in 1943, visual bombing in good visibility
>>even less.

Deleted text,

"People note the contradiction between claiming the oil
campaign was so good and the RAF was so bad when the German raid
reports make it clear the RAF raids were more effective. People note
the double standards used when Walter compares the RAF to USAAF."

>The first radar assisted bombing by the 8th AF was in November, 1943. The
>Germans started returning the day fighters to Germany to deal with the U.S.
>bombers in April of that year.

Ah the change of subject, the deletion of area bombing and now onto
return of Luftwaffe fighters.

Firstly when the USAAF started using radar bombing,

Walter will now go look up Mighty 8th War Diary for 27 September 1943,
"Remarks First Pathfinder (PFF) mission lead by H2S equipped B-17s
of 482 BG". Or two months earlier than claimed.

In percentage terms the amount of visual bombing of Germany by the
8th for the last 4 months of 1943 went like

September 47.1, October 72.1, November 27.6 and December 30.4.

The reason the amount of radar bombing is so high in the overall figure
for 1943 is that for the year the 8th dropped some 27,185 tons of bombs
on Germany, 19,554 of these in the last 4 months of the year.

>>Let us see now, the claim is now all the redeployed to Germany only,
>>none to France or Holland, correct?
>
>By the end of 1943, one fighter wing was stationed in Eupen, in the
>Netherlands.

People might remember the claim that the Luftwaffe concentrated in
Germany when the 8th was flying missions of a "few" dozen bombers,
apparently the USAAF was still using a few dozen bombers on a raid
at the end of 1943.

>The Germans generally did not oppose strikes in France in this
>time frame.

So we are in December 1943, not April or May 1943, but December.

>As much as they could, they concentrated the day fighter force in
>Germany, significantly reducing force levels in the Mediteranean and Russia to
>do so.

Yes we are at the end of 1943, ignoring a reason the Luftwaffe
shut down the air war over the Mediterranean, extra aircraft sent
upped the loss rates rather than changing the situation.

>>None of those fighters tried to intercept the escorted missions over
>>France, nor react to the significant increase in allied day bomber
>>raids on France and the low countries in 1943 correct?
>
>I never said that. It was shown, however, that the Germans did not generally
>defend French targets after 1/1/44.

Now we are in January 1944, when the USAAF was running raids
of a "few" dozen bombers it seems.

Also note Walter is crediting the changes in Luftwaffe deployment
to raids of a "few" dozen 8th air force bombers to Germany, ignoring
the other USAAF raids and the RAF raids.

>>Last time Walter ran this line his list included the training units as
>>proof of the concentration.
>
>"All told, the strength of the fighter force in North West Germany, France and
>the Low Countries rose from 270 in April, 1943 to 630 by August."
>
>-- "The Mighty Eighth", p. 54 by Roger Freeman.

Ok now we are in August 1943 when the USAAF was running raids of
a "few" dozen bombers, 15 is being defined as few it seems.

>"American bombing in the summer of 1943 had limited the planned
>expansion of the Luftwaffe's forces. This expansion had begun in
>mid-1941 when Goring ordered Milch to increase aircraft production
>sufficiently to quadruple front-line strength. Hitler accelerated the
>effort with additional demands for greater aircraft production in
>1942. Milch merged existing factories into larger complexes in order
>to increase production.

By the way, merging plants has a habit of temporarily lowering
production as people adjust to the new way of working.

In June 1941 German aircraft acceptances were 880, down from
1,078 in March, and stayed below 1,000 for the rest of the year.

In June 1942 1,235. In June 1943 2,258. In June 1944 3,597.

USSBS figures.

>Though efficiency of scale helped raise
>output, it also made the American bombing effort easier by
>concentrating production in a few large complexes. Eighth's bombing
>efforts in the first half of 1943 were small by later standards, but
>they forced the Air Ministry to request the dispersal of Germany's
>aircraft manufacturing industry in May 1943.

Forced is an interesting word given there had been one raid on
German production facilities by the end of May 1943, which had
16 bombers lost and 2 written off out of 116 sent. The other raids
the 8th launched were against French and Belgian aircraft industry
and repair facilities.

>Little was done until Hitler gave Minister for War Production Albert
>Speer power to order plant dispersal in August 1943. This dispersal
>and American bombing caused output to lag in the fall of 1943.

This is not surpassing little was done as it was not until July and August
the 8th returned to aircraft industry targets in Germany.

The trouble is with production figures is what is being counted,
rolled out of the factory or being accepted by the Luftwaffe?
Acceptance flights drop off in Winter.

The USSBS figures are acceptances and go like this
9/43 2,214, 10/43 2,372, 11/43 2,077, 12/43 1,702, 1/44 2,410,
2/44 1,988, 3/44 2,640.

So assuming the 10/43 and 1/44 figures are the "correct" level of
production the production loss is around 1,000 aircraft in November
and December 1943.

The other point is Bomber Command's two strikes on Kassel
in October 1943, the first started large fires at both the Henschel
and Fieseler works, the second started a firestorm, with all 3
Henschel plants badly damaged, they were making V-1s at
the time, the Fieseler works were making Fw190. So another
reason to disperse in November and December 1943. The
Fieseler works Fw190 acceptances were 62 in August, 58 in
September, 40 in October and 26 in both November and
December, back up to 64 in January.

Looking at the USSBS Fw190 acceptances by plant, the 1943 peak
in July was 325 , production was between 263 and 325 January to
October 1943 inclusive, then 242 in November, 203 in December,
then 383 in January.

It would be nice to say there was only one reason for a given
effect but there rarely is.

>Speer and Milch planned to reach a production level of 2000 fighters
>per month by the summer of 1944, but the intensity of the Blitz Week
>attacks of late July 1943 convinced Milch to try to reach a production
>level of 2,000 per month by the end of 1943. Continued bombing
>frustrated Milch's venture and he reduced his production goals to
>1,000 Bf 1O9s per month by December 1943 and 1,000 FW 190s per month
>by March or April 1944."
>
>-- "To Command the Sky" pp. 121-22 by Stephen McFarland and Wesley
>Newton

The USSBS notes 932 Bf109 acceptances in January 1943,
it had peaked at 725 in July 1943 and then went down, Fw190
acceptances made it to 944 in June 1944.

May 1944 single engined fighters 1,907, so the program did
make it in summer of 1944, despite the increased weight of
attack. March 1944 single engined fighters 1,377, April 1,696.

In 1942 the FW190 production was 150 per month
on average, Bf109 230 per month.

In 1943 FW190 average monthly production for the year
was 250 per month, so Milch wanted this quadrupled, and
up 7 fold on 1942. Bf109 production in 1943 averaged 530
per month in 1943, so this had to be doubled from 1943
levels, or quadrupled from 1942 levels.

So the problem is Milch wanted to change the fighter mix,
as well as accelerate production. So I suspect the "good
result" being claimed has more to do with Milch overestimating
what could be done. The use of the above quote has the initial
problem, how realistic were Milch's targets? How many aircraft
production plans of any country were met?

Simply put the "continued bombing" of aircraft plants by the 8th
stopped on 9 October 1943, resuming on 11 January 1944, so a
gap of 3 months. So it is more the industrial and weather problems
that stopped the Milch program in November and December 1943.

It is not a bad result for 1943, the air threat forced a downgrade
of production. It meant the industry was able to withstand the
direct attacks of early 1944 better, even as it continued to
disperse, but not the loss of transport links in late 1944 and
early 1945.

>> Note he keeps telling us about these
>>moves but does not provide a list of units and dates. He will
>>eventually define few dozen as well, it seems to be at least 8,
>>or just under 100 bombers.
>
>How about several dozen, instead of a few?

Still no mention of the units withdrawn and when, nor a definition
of several or few.

>"Perhaps the best measure of the Eighth's success through the early summer
>[1943] was its impact on the Luftwaffe. Eighth Air Force had forced the German
>high command both to withdraw fighter units from other theaters to defend the
>Reich and to form larger formations with more heavily armed fighters, thus
>reducing their efficiency against U.S. fighters...On July 28, 1943, during a
>meeting to evaluate the damage Germay had suffered Goring ordered Milch to >give
>the defence of the Reich the "main emphasis" in Luftwaffe planning. This order
>was less significant than at frst apparent because in actual experience, if not
>policy the defense of the Reich had been receiving priority since the Spring."
>
>-- Ibid, pp. 100-109.
>
>So daylight precison bombing -- and only by visual means -- caused the Germans
>both to disperse their factories and also to concentrate the German day
>fighters against them.

Note the little dots between "U.S. fighters...On July 28, 1943, " the
truncation of the quote.

On the night of July 27/28 the RAF created the firestorm in Hamburg.

Walter will now fill in the missing text, the bits he does not like to mention.
It is a simple situation to obtain the books Walter uses and see how he
truncates quotes and ignores anything he does not like.

It was the firestorm at Hamburg that caused Goering to have the
conversation that produced the quote mentioned above. Defense
of the Reich day and night was on the table.

And MacFarlane and Newton appear incorrect when they claim the
priority in the early spring was home defence, when the priority was
stopping the allies taking North Africa and the build up for the summer
offensive in the east.

Finally the USAAF heavy bomber forces were flying 200 sorties in
a day in June 1943, the start of summer and 300 a day in late July.

>Amd I remind you again that in this time frame, the 8th was only sending
>several dozen B-17's out on its raids, usually less than 100.

On 28 July 1943 the 8th despatched 302 bombers, on 26 July 303
bombers, on 25 July 323, on 24 July 305 and so on. It had been
despatching 200 at a time since May.

Walter is into relativity, "this time frame" is being defined as much earlier
than July 1943 now, but the quote above is used as proof of the effects
of the earlier date.

>The 8th
>activated 5 new groups in Mid-May, 1943, pretty much doubling its strength. By
>by May, the Germans had, as Galland says, begun putting more emphasis on
>opposing the B-17's than they were against the night bombers.

So far Walter has not mentioned a single thing about what the
night bombers were doing, or the strength of the nightfighter
defences and how that changed in 1943.

Simply Walter has taken quotes applying to July and August 1943
and used them to "prove" his claims for April and May 1943.

>The claim, by another poster, that it was all "area bombing" is just false.

The majority was non visual, the majority of non visual strikes were
around as accurate as the night strikes the RAF called area attacks.

>Daylight precision bombing had a definite affect on the Germans, and they
>preceived it as a greater threat than the night bombing. And this was well
>before the first bomb was dropped by the USAAF using radar or other non-visual
>targeting.

As can be seen from above Walter will simply erase the RAF if
he has to and give all the "good" effects to the USAAF.

And, yes we are now back in May 1943.

Walter has supplied fighter figures for August 1943, fighter locations for
December 1943, the note the Luftwaffe stopped heavily contesting
French airspace in 1944, all to show how the Luftwaffe deployed against
USAAF bombers in early to mid 1943. Anyone else see the disconnect?

E R Hooton, Eagle in Flames, reports the following day fighter dispositions,
(Based on the figures in K Gunderlach Die Deutsche Luftwaffe in Mittelmeer
1940-45. Band I 1940-1942. Band 2 1943-1945, page 716).

All for the year 1943, table is date, Luftflotte Mitte (Reich) / Luftflotte 3 /
total Mitte + Reich / total fighters / % in west.

20 Jan / 163 / 241 / 404 / 1,090 / 37.1
20 Apr / 188 / 232 / 420 / 1,328 / 31.6
20 Jun / 343 / 353 / 696 / 1,704 / 40.1
20 Sep / 677 / 222 / 899 / 1,500 / 59.9
20 Dec / 572 / 312 / 884 / 1,588 / 55.7.

Alfred Price in his survey says Mitte had 309 and Luftflotte three 250
day fighters on 17 May 1943.

Galland is on record as stating in February 1943 the defences had
solved the problem of the 4 engined day bomber, he later changed
his mind.

So looking at the above we can see the Luftwaffe increased the fighter
force in the west throughout 1943. The increase was slow at first and
was slower than the increases on other fronts, that is until June/July 1943,
the other fronts had not suffered any "denuding" of fighters. This is not
surprising given the attempts to support the Kursk offensive and also
resist the invasion of Sicily.

According to the Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe by the British Air
Ministry the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean received over 40%
of new fighter production in the period 1 May to 15 July 1943,
plus additional units.

It can also be seen above the Luftwaffe tried to defend non German
airspace with the way the number of fighters in Luftflotte 3 increased
by June 1943. There was more going on than raids by a "few" dozen
USAAF bombers on Germany.

In July, after the battles over Sicily and Kursk, you can really see the
shift in fighter deployments. In July 1943 the first USAAF light and
medium bomber sorties were flown, as opposed to some flown with
RAF units. In day operations in July 1943 the allies managed 10,412
fighter, 451 light and medium bomber and 777 heavy bomber sorties
over France and the low countries, plus another 839 heavy bomber
sorties over Germany.

For the whole of the year 1942 the figures were 44,727 fighter, 1,794
light and medium bomber and 1,394 heavy bomber sorties over France
and the low countries. So you can see the increase, and the tempo
kept going up,

In September 1943 the USAAF mediums and lights alone flew 2,009 sorties.

Under this sort of pressure the results are clear, in terms of both numbers
and percentage allocations, the Luftwaffe was forced into redeploying
in the west. But this happened when the USAAF was flying 300 aircraft
missions to Germany, as well as many more missions to France and
the low countries, not when "a few dozen" bombers were flying during
the first few months of 1943.

It is a strong achievement, mainly by the USAAF, to force the Luftwaffe
to make such a change, the cheap shot here is trying to claim the
change occurred much earlier.

G Aders in The History of the German night fighter force gives the night
fighter strength as

10 December 1942, 375, 10 February 1943 477, 26 August 1943 627.

Note this is all nightfighters on all fronts, the majority were in the west.
Again not surprising given the effects of raids like Hamburg. The
Germans reacted to the allied challenges by strengthening the day
and night defences, holding off as long as possible as usual.

>Checking Freeman, "Mighty Eighth War Dairy", I see the following numbers of
>bombers dispatched:
>
>3/18/43: 103
>3/22/43: 102
>3/31/43: 102
>4/4/43: 97
>4/17/43: 115
>5/13/43: 97
>
>So when the Germans were deploying their fighter units to fight the 8th AF and
>deciding to disperse their aircraft industry, the Americans were penetrating
>occupied Europe with several dozen bombers, on average.

So several dozen is being defined as 8 to 9.

People can go back and note the quotes used say things like,

"in the summer of 1943"

People can then note the list of missions kindly provided by Walter
for the spring of 1943.

Not for him to note the second strike on 13 May 1943, another 72
bombers, or 14 May with 217 bombers sent, or 15 May with 193
bombers sent, 17 May with 239 bombers sent. Perhaps to slide
forward to the first raid in June 1943, the 11th, with 252 bombers sent.
Now we are in summer.

It is quite simple, take the USAAF strength from spring, the results
from the summer, the Luftwaffe reaction from the summer and then
claim it all happened in spring so the USAAF looks like a bunch of
super airmen.

>Checking "The Hardest Victory" p. 126, shows that Bomber Command had @ 600
>aircraft available, with @ 350 available on any given night, by the summer of
>--1942--.

Now we are in 1942 for some reason. In the summer of 1942 Bomber
Command managed to drop 18,208 tons of bombs, in the summer of
1943 the 8th managed 9,860 tons of bombs.

>So even though the RAF had 3 times the striking power, the Germans were giving
>the lion's share of the effort to defending against the USAAF. This coinfirms
>what Galland said.

Actually the ratio Bomber Command to the 8th, using the figures above
is 1.85 to 1, throw in the 950 or so tons of bombs by the USAAF
mediums and heavies and it becomes 1.68 to 1.

On 30 June 1942, according to Aders there were 255 nightfighters.

Note by the way Walter has not bothered to give nightfighter numbers
and deployments.

>More later.

This rarely happens.

The rest of my post is most of the stuff in my last post Walter decided
to ignore,

By the way when the 8th air force was running raids of hundreds
of aircraft the Luftwaffe was using day fighter assets, the JG300
series units, as night fighters. Under Walter's rules of logic it
shows bad things about the USAAF, as opposed to everyone
else's rules of logic which state it shows bad things about Walter.

To most people the night fighter use in daylight and day fighter use
at night show improvisation and a Luftwaffe high command largely
misusing its assets, for Walter night fighters in daylight is the only
part considered, it fits the fiction.

At the end of 1942 the night fighter force was 5 Geschwader controlling
15 gruppen, except some of the gruppen were still staffel size, by the
middle of 1942 there were 6 operational Geschwader plus 1 training
unit controlling 22 gruppen, 18 of which were in the Reich.

The Germans reacted to the increasing pressure by day and night,
by beefing up the defences then firstly defeating the unescorted day
raids and then defeating the night raids. The allies then struck back.
The way the air war fluctuated, no absolutes.


After the early death of an expert pilot the rules were changed to have
the inexperienced crews used. The fact 20% of night fighters did not
have radar in mid 1943 was a factor in using them. So was the heavy
armament on the Do217 night fighter version.

As people can see Walter simply refuses to actually look at the history,
the fact the 1,000 plane raids were special one offs using training and
other command's aircraft to obtain the numbers. A proof of concept,
one the USAAF was happy to share in. Walter is now going to show us
all the Bomber Command 1,000 plane raids done before 1944, that is
using the aircraft assigned to the operational units only. Otherwise he
can start telling us how bad the USAAF was for having over 800 heavy
bombers in Britain in July 1943 but only using a maximum of around 300
at a time. (In October 1944 the heavy bombers on hand topped 1,100).
The rest of us understand the concept of reserves, training units and
serviceability levels. Harris used all three to put together his three 1,000
bomber raids in 1942, if this is to be considered normal then the 8th
stands condemned for not sending 1,000 bombers to Schweinfurt in
October 1943. Silly isn't it?


Translation Walter has convicted Harris, the messy evidence side of
things is irrelevant.

In the last 4 months of 1944, according to the USSBS the 8th air force
dropped 50% of its bombs through 8/10 or thicker cloud (15% in 8 or
9/10, 35% in 10/10), in the same period Harris says 46% of Bomber
Command bombs went on "towns". Walter condemns Harris even
though he was doing (just) slightly less area bombing than the 8th.

In case you are wondering in 8 and 9/10 cloud the 8th managed 1% of
bombs within 1,000 feet, in 10/10 cloud 0.2% in these 4 months, the
within 0.5 mile figures are 7.3% and 1.2% respectively.

This was during the time period the USSBS found the RAF was more
accurate on average when dropping bombs on three large oil plants it
examined in detail.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Mr. Sinclair:

>Walter will now go look up Mighty 8th War Diary for 27 September 1943,
>"Remarks First Pathfinder (PFF) mission lead by H2S equipped B-17s
>of 482 BG". Or two months earlier than claimed.

Well, from 27 Sept. to November 1 is @ 35 days, but I appreciate the
correction.

The point is that the Germans began redeploying the day fighters for home
defense in April and decided to disperse the fighter production factories in
May, 1943. This was well before even the 9/27/43 date, and it belies the point
the other poster made, that it was all "area bombing".

And it really is amazing that the 8th AF was able to do this when you remember
how many raids were run on U-boat pens and airfields in France and the like.
And also when you recall that the 8th never had more than @ 100 heavy bombers
on any given raid before mid-May, 1943.

<snip the same old crap>

>>"All told, the strength of the fighter force in North West Germany, France
>and
>>the Low Countries rose from 270 in April, 1943 to 630 by August."
>>
>>-- "The Mighty Eighth", p. 54 by Roger Freeman.
>
>Ok now we are in August 1943 when the USAAF was running raids of
>a "few" dozen bombers, 15 is being defined as few it seems.

The 8ith AF activated 5 new groups in May, 1943. The number of available
heavies rose from @ 100 to @ 250. But as noted, the Germans had begun
redeploying the day fighters in April and plant dispersion in May.

>>"American bombing in the summer of 1943 had limited the planned
>>expansion of the Luftwaffe's forces. This expansion had begun in
>>mid-1941 when Goring ordered Milch to increase aircraft production
>>sufficiently to quadruple front-line strength. Hitler accelerated the
>>effort with additional demands for greater aircraft production in
>>1942. Milch merged existing factories into larger complexes in order
>>to increase production.
>
>By the way, merging plants has a habit of temporarily lowering
>production as people adjust to the new way of working.

That too, would be a result of daylight precison bombing.

>
>In June 1941 German aircraft acceptances were 880, down from
>1,078 in March, and stayed below 1,000 for the rest of the year.
>
>In June 1942 1,235. In June 1943 2,258. In June 1944 3,597.
>
>USSBS figures.

Pedantry.

>
>>Though efficiency of scale helped raise
>>output, it also made the American bombing effort easier by
>>concentrating production in a few large complexes. Eighth's bombing
>>efforts in the first half of 1943 were small by later standards, but
>>they forced the Air Ministry to request the dispersal of Germany's
>>aircraft manufacturing industry in May 1943.

>Forced is an interesting word given there had been one raid on
>German production facilities by the end of May 1943, which had
>16 bombers lost and 2 written off out of 116 sent. The other raids
>the 8th launched were against French and Belgian aircraft industry
>and repair facilities.

The Germans perhaps could see the writing on the wall. It was in this time
frame I believe that Knoke called the Yank bombing accuracy "fantastic".

<snip>


>The USSBS figures are acceptances and go like this
>9/43 2,214, 10/43 2,372, 11/43 2,077, 12/43 1,702, 1/44 2,410,
>2/44 1,988, 3/44 2,640.

Who cares?

The point is that daylight precision bombing was effective. The Germans were
very alarmed and took dramatic steps to combat it. It wasn't, as one poster
said all "area bombing."

>So assuming the 10/43 and 1/44 figures are the "correct" level of
>production the production loss is around 1,000 aircraft in November
>and December 1943.

Try and stay on point. I know you love your statistics, but the point here is
that it wasn't, as one poster said all "area bombing."

>The other point is Bomber Command's two strikes on Kassel
>in October 1943, the first started large fires at both the Henschel
>and Fieseler works, the second started a firestorm, with all 3
>Henschel plants badly damaged, they were making V-1s at
>the time, the Fieseler works were making Fw190.

That doesn't have much to do with the 8th AF, and certainly sheds little light
on the effects of daylight precision bombing.

> So another
>reason to disperse in November and December 1943.

The decision to disperse was taken in May, 1943. At that time, what the
Germans had seen was that the USAAF had @ 100 heavy bombers available on a
daily basis.

>Looking at the USSBS Fw190 acceptances by plant, the 1943 peak
>in July was 325 , production was between 263 and 325 January to
>October 1943 inclusive, then 242 in November, 203 in December,
>then 383 in January.

Try and stay on point.

<snip of more pointless pedantry>

>And MacFarlane and Newton appear incorrect when they claim the
>priority in the early spring was home defence, when the priority was
>stopping the allies taking North Africa and the build up for the summer
>offensive in the east.
>

It's seconded by Freeman.

>Finally the USAAF heavy bomber forces were flying 200 sorties in
>a day in June 1943, the start of summer and 300 a day in late July.

The force expanded. Prior to about mid-May, the 8th AF had @100 heavy bombers
available on any given day. And the Germans were so concerned about this
relatively small force that the needs of the Eastern Front and Mediteranean
were slighted.

>>Amd I remind you again that in this time frame, the 8th was only sending
>>several dozen B-17's out on its raids, usually less than 100.
>
>On 28 July 1943 the 8th despatched 302 bombers, on 26 July 303
>bombers, on 25 July 323, on 24 July 305 and so on. It had been
>despatching 200 at a time since May.

The decision to redeploy the day fighters and disperse the aircraft production
date from April and May, respectively.

>>The 8th
>>activated 5 new groups in Mid-May, 1943, pretty much doubling its strength.
>By
>>by May, the Germans had, as Galland says, begun putting more emphasis on
>>opposing the B-17's than they were against the night bombers.

>So far Walter has not mentioned a single thing about what the
>night bombers were doing, or the strength of the nightfighter
>defences and how that changed in 1943.

As Galland notes, the Germans were putting more emphasis on opposing the
numerically smaller day raiders. And as we know, the night fighters were sent
to attack the day bombers as early as February, 1943.

>Simply Walter has taken quotes applying to July and August 1943
>and used them to "prove" his claims for April and May 1943.

Both MeFarland et al and Freeman confirm German decisions from April and May to
support what Galland said.

>>The claim, by another poster, that it was all "area bombing" is just false.
>
>The majority was non visual, the majority of non visual strikes were
>around as accurate as the night strikes the RAF called area attacks.

Not in April and May, 1943.

>>Daylight precision bombing had a definite affect on the Germans, and they
>>preceived it as a greater threat than the night bombing. And this was well
>>before the first bomb was dropped by the USAAF using radar or other
>non-visual
>>targeting.

>As can be seen from above Walter will simply erase the RAF if
>he has to and give all the "good" effects to the USAAF.

The RAF was not doing daylight precision bombing in April and May, 1943. The
USAAF was.

>nd, yes we are now back in May 1943.
>
>Walter has supplied fighter figures for August 1943, fighter locations for
>December 1943, the note the Luftwaffe stopped heavily contesting
>French airspace in 1944, all to show
how the Luftwaffe deployed against
>USAAF bombers in early to mid 1943. Anyone else see the disconnect?
>

The day fighters began to redeploy in April, per Freeman. McFarland et al
refers to the "Spring"; and the decision to disperse the aircraft production
was taken in May, and gathered impetus later. What the Germans had seen, what
information they had to go on to make these decisions, was the operations of @
100 unescorted heavy bombers.

<snip>

>It can also be seen above the Luftwaffe tried to defend non German
>airspace with the way the number of fighters in Luftflotte 3 increased
>by June 1943. There was more going on than raids by a "few" dozen
>USAAF bombers on Germany.

You're forgetting the 7/28/43 meeting of Goring and Milch:

"Perhaps the best measure of the Eighth's success through the early summer
[1943] was its impact on the Luftwaffe. Eighth Air Force had forced the German
high command both to withdraw fighter units from other theaters to defend the
Reich and to form larger formations with more heavily armed fighters, thus
reducing their efficiency against U.S. fighters...On July 28, 1943, during a
meeting to evaluate the damage Germay had suffered Goring ordered Milch to give
the defence of the Reich the "main emphasis" in Luftwaffe planning. This order
was less significant than at frst apparent because in actual experience, if not
policy the defense of the Reich had been receiving priority since the Spring."

-- To Command the Sky, pp. 100-109.

>In July, after the battles over Sicily and Kursk, you can really see the
>shift in fighter deployments.

That began in the Spring.

>Under this sort of pressure the results are clear, in terms of both numbers
>and percentage allocations, the Luftwaffe was forced into redeploying
>in the west. But this happened when the USAAF was flying 300 aircraft
>missions to Germany, as well as many more missions to France and
>the low countries, not when "a few dozen" bombers were flying during
>the first few months of 1943.

Acting on decisions made when only @ 100 B-17/B-24's's were available on a day
to day basis and well before any non-visual targetting had been attempted.

>It is a strong achievement, mainly by the USAAF, to force the Luftwaffe
>to make such a change, the cheap shot here is trying to claim the
>change occurred much earlier.

The decisions were made by the Germans when the USAAF had @100 heavy bombers
available for day to day operations and well before any non-visual targetting
was used.

<snip>

>>Checking Freeman, "Mighty Eighth War Dairy", I see the following numbers of
>>bombers dispatched:
>>
>>3/18/43: 103
>>3/22/43: 102
>>3/31/43: 102
>>4/4/43: 97
>>4/17/43: 115
>>5/13/43: 97
>>
>>So when the Germans were deploying their fighter units to fight the 8th AF
>and
>>deciding to disperse their aircraft industry, the Americans were penetrating
>>occupied Europe with several dozen bombers, on average.
>
>So several dozen is being defined as 8 to 9.
>

Yes, I'd say 8 or 9 is several. I'd also say again that RAF strength was at
least 3 times higher, and note again that in late July, 1943, Goring is telling
Milch to give day fighter production the "main emphasis".


>People can go back and note the quotes used say things like,
>
>"in the summer of 1943"
>
>People can then note the list of missions kindly provided by Walter
>for the spring of 1943.
>

They can certainly see that the Germans took decisions in April and May
respectively that repositioned the day fighters to oppose the USAAF and
disperse the aircraft factories.

>Not for him to note the second strike on 13 May 1943, another 72
>bombers, or 14 May with 217 bombers sent, or 15 May with 193
>bombers sent, 17 May with 239 bombers sent. Perhaps to slide
>forward to the first raid in June 1943, the 11th, with 252 bombers sent.
>Now we are in summer.

But the Germans took in hand decisions based on a sortie rate of @100 bombers a
day through mid-May. If they were acting on what a larger force --might-- do,
then you have to give them credit. But they were certainly reacting to a force
that was carrying out --precision daylight bombing--.

>
>It is quite simple, take the USAAF strength from spring, the results
>from the summer, the Luftwaffe reaction from the summer and then
>claim it all happened in spring so the USAAF looks like a bunch of
>super airmen.

Pretty much, yeah. When you think that they were only going out in good weather
conditions, only striking by visual means, and usually without escort fighters
in the target areas, they do look like super airmen. Especially when you
consider that the RAF had about three times the frontline strength.

I didn't do what you suggest, any way. The German decisions were taken in April
and May, at a time when the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy bombers available.

>
>>Checking "The Hardest Victory" p. 126, shows that Bomber Command had @ 600
>>aircraft available, with @ 350 available on any given night, by the summer
>of
>>--1942--.
>
>Now we are in 1942 for some reason.

I was in a hurry.

<snip>

>By the way when the 8th air force was running raids of hundreds
>of aircraft the Luftwaffe was using day fighter assets, the JG300
>series units, as night fighters.

We've done this before. JG 300 was not a day fighter unit. It used singel
engine aircraft, but it was not a day fighter unit.

Hastings says:

"When the former bomber pilot Major Hajo Hermann formed his first "Wild Boar"
squadrons in July that year [1943], he found himself obliged to recruit among
failed bomber pilots and disgraced aircrew rejected by other units."

--"Bomber Command" p. 270 by Max Hastings.

On the other hand, the Germans did sent out their best night fighter pilots to
oppose the 8th AF.

The time is early February, 1943:

"In fact, though, Jabs, Grimm and Naumann each claimed the destruction of a
B-17 from their first stiff daylight combat with the Fortresses, all eight of
IV/NJG 1's aircraft that had been engaged emerged from it in a damaged state.
Consequently for the succeeding night patrols the Gruppe had to draw on
machines that were less operationally serviceable.

[As Galland said, opposing the day bombers took priority over opposing the
night bombers, even though the latter were much more numerous.]

Eight aircraft, with all
their sensitive special equipmenmt so essential for night fighting in darkness,
had been put out of action. And it was the same story with most of the other
night-fighter Gruppen, now also thrown into the daylight battle.

But if machines were utimately replaceable, men were not--and such combats
always ended in the loss of highly qualified crews. These were individualistic
warriors, whose metier, after being put on the track of a mighty Lancaster
bomber, was to stalk it in the darkness with their own radar sets and shoot it
down by surprise. Of this technique they had become masters, but in daylight
it was unthinkable and their skill was wasted.

Yet they continued to be used in this way. On February 26, 1943, Captain Jabs
took off with three duty flights to intercept a formation of B-24 Liberators
returning from a raid on Emden. With them for the first time on a daylight
operation was the squadron was the squadron commander of 12/NJG 1, Captain
Lugwig Becker, the night fighter arm's leading expert in technique. What was
such technique against all the guns of the Liberators? His companions lost
sight of him at the outset of the attack and neither he nor his radio-operator,
Staub, were seen again, though all available aircraft searched the sea until
dark. Missing from his first daylight mission was the man who by his skill at
night had not been hit for months, and who after forty-four victories had that
very day been informed of his award of the Oak Leaves of the Knigt's Cross.
To the night fighters his death brought disquiet. Was the Luftwaffe in such a
bad way that specialists like Becker had to be squandered on missions
completely foreign to their training?"

Luftwaffe War Diaries, p. 303 by Cajus Bekker

This at a time (February, 1943) when the USAAF was attacking solely by visual
means and never with more than several dozen bombers.

Under Walter's rules of logic it
>shows bad things about the USAAF, as opposed to everyone
>else's rules of logic which state it shows bad things about Walter.

People can judge for themselves.

>
>To most people the night fighter use in daylight and day fighter use
>at night show improvisation and a Luftwaffe high command largely
>misusing its assets, for Walter night fighters in daylight is the only
>part considered, it fits the fiction.

It's not fiction to say that the Germans began returning day fighter units to
Germany in April and began dispersing their aircraft production in May. It's
not fiction to say that opposing the day bombers was officially given the
highest priority in July.


>
>At the end of 1942 the night fighter force was 5 Geschwader controlling
>15 gruppen, except some of the gruppen were still staffel size, by the
>middle of 1942 there were 6 operational Geschwader plus 1 training
>unit controlling 22 gruppen, 18 of which were in the Reich.

Off point. The Germans began returning day fighter units to Germany in April
and began dispersing their aircraft production in May. It's not fiction to say
that opposing the day bombers was officially given the highest priority in
July.


>
>The Germans reacted to the increasing pressure by day and night,
>by beefing up the defences then firstly defeating the unescorted day
>raids and then defeating the night raids. The allies then struck back.
>The way the air war fluctuated, no absolutes.
>

We came out on top.

<snip>

>Translation Walter has convicted Harris, the messy evidence side of
>things is irrelevant.
>

I haven't mentioned Harris in this thread.

What -is- clear is that the Germans reacted very strongly to the application of
daylight precision bombing, did so when the number of aircraft actually over
Europe was pretty small and when those aircraft were only bombing by visual
means.

It wasn't all "area bombing."

Walt

>Subject: Re: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
>From: (WalterM140)
>Date: 4/25/04 3:08 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id:

>>USSBS figures.

The USSBS figures have been largely discredited over the years.>>Looking at the
USSBS Fw190 acceptances by plant, the 1943 peak
>>in July was 325 , production was between 263 and 325 January to
>>October 1943 inclusive, then 242 in November, 203 in December,
>>then 383 in January.

They failed to take into account that fighter production increased because we
switched to oil targets and allowed fighter productio to increase. Without oil
it makes no difference how many fighters they made. They wil never fly. The
USSBS was written by economists, not military men.>The RAF was not doing
daylight precision bombing in April and May, 1943. The
>USAAF was.

We could afford to. The Brits couldn't Any mission aginst Germany was better
than no mission .


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>Mr. Sinclair:
>
>>Walter will now go look up Mighty 8th War Diary for 27 September 1943,
>>"Remarks First Pathfinder (PFF) mission lead by H2S equipped B-17s
>>of 482 BG". Or two months earlier than claimed.
>
>Well, from 27 Sept. to November 1 is @ 35 days, but I appreciate the
>correction.

Walter wrote "The first radar assisted bombing by the 8th AF was in
November, 1943", missing all the strikes in September and October,
so I wrote 2 months since I did not know how many strikes were
missed in November as well. Like the above choice of 1 November
as the cut off date, there were no 8th Air Force strikes on the 1st or
the 2nd, it was the 3rd where Freeman notes "First use of H2X PFF"

>The point is that the Germans began redeploying the day fighters for home
>defense in April and decided to disperse the fighter production factories in
>May, 1943. This was well before even the 9/27/43 date, and it belies the point
>the other poster made, that it was all "area bombing".

Can people see the disconnect here? Walter is trying to run the line
the Luftwaffe had a major reaction to small USAAF raids, and
somehow linking that to area bombing.

>And it really is amazing that the 8th AF was able to do this when you remember
>how many raids were run on U-boat pens and airfields in France and the like.
>And also when you recall that the 8th never had more than @ 100 heavy bombers
>on any given raid before mid-May, 1943.

What is really amazing is the way Walter is simply assuming his readers
have zero memories,

><snip the same old crap>

The snipped stuff includes the "evidence" Walter produced to support
his claims about the USAAF effects on the Germans in the April and
May 1943 period. Things like the fighter deployment in December
1943 and the reduction in the attempts to contest French airspace in
1944.

The evidence has to be deleted, and the editorial put back in, with a
change, Walter now admits a jump in USAAF raid size in mid May 1943.

The list of the redeployed fighter units is still missing, last time it included
training units.

In percentage terms the amount of visual bombing of Germany by the
8th for the last 4 months of 1943 went like

September 47.1, October 72.1, November 27.6 and December 30.4.

The reason the amount of radar bombing is so high in the overall figure
for 1943 is that for the year the 8th dropped some 27,185 tons of bombs
on Germany, 19,554 of these in the last 4 months of the year.

>>>"All told, the strength of the fighter force in North West Germany, France
>>and
>>>the Low Countries rose from 270 in April, 1943 to 630 by August."
>>>
>>>-- "The Mighty Eighth", p. 54 by Roger Freeman.
>>
>>Ok now we are in August 1943 when the USAAF was running raids of
>>a "few" dozen bombers, 15 is being defined as few it seems.
>
>The 8ith AF activated 5 new groups in May, 1943. The number of available
>heavies rose from @ 100 to @ 250. But as noted, the Germans had begun
>redeploying the day fighters in April and plant dispersion in May.

Note the deletion of things like the claim "As much as they could", it is
time for the motherhood statements, ignore the overclaiming about the
size and timing of the Luftwaffe fighter deployments. They were not
as early nor as large as Walter wants to claim.

>>>"American bombing in the summer of 1943 had limited the planned
>>>expansion of the Luftwaffe's forces. This expansion had begun in
>>>mid-1941 when Goring ordered Milch to increase aircraft production
>>>sufficiently to quadruple front-line strength. Hitler accelerated the
>>>effort with additional demands for greater aircraft production in
>>>1942. Milch merged existing factories into larger complexes in order
>>>to increase production.
>>
>>By the way, merging plants has a habit of temporarily lowering
>>production as people adjust to the new way of working.
>
>That too, would be a result of daylight precison bombing.

If Hitler stubbed his toe in 1943 Walter would claim it was the result
of the USAAF strikes.

In the 1942/43 period Milch drove an increase in the efficiency of
the German aircraft industry, it started before the USAAF entered
the war, but Walter will claim it as a USAAF success.

>>In June 1941 German aircraft acceptances were 880, down from
>>1,078 in March, and stayed below 1,000 for the rest of the year.
>>
>>In June 1942 1,235. In June 1943 2,258. In June 1944 3,597.
>>
>>USSBS figures.
>
>Pedantry.

Translation, the numbers do not fit the fiction so they need to
be ignored.

>>>Though efficiency of scale helped raise
>>>output, it also made the American bombing effort easier by
>>>concentrating production in a few large complexes. Eighth's bombing
>>>efforts in the first half of 1943 were small by later standards, but
>>>they forced the Air Ministry to request the dispersal of Germany's
>>>aircraft manufacturing industry in May 1943.
>
>>Forced is an interesting word given there had been one raid on
>>German production facilities by the end of May 1943, which had
>>16 bombers lost and 2 written off out of 116 sent. The other raids
>>the 8th launched were against French and Belgian aircraft industry
>>and repair facilities.

First the data, the first raid on German aircraft factories was 17 April,
the next raid was 28 July 1943.

>The Germans perhaps could see the writing on the wall. It was in this time
>frame I believe that Knoke called the Yank bombing accuracy "fantastic".

So in other words it was not what the USAAF did in May 1943
but rather what the USAAF might be able to do in a later period,
but Walter will claim it as an April/May 1943 victory and ignore
the fact dispersal did not happen until well after May 1943.
Walter turns the contingency plan into reality long before it was
implemented.

Walter likes the Knocke quote, the fighter pilot was busy assessing
USAAF bombing patterns while under fire from his own flak and
lining up for an attack.

><snip>

Of the quote which notes little was done about dispersing the aircraft
industry for another 2 to 3 months.

>>The USSBS figures are acceptances and go like this
>>9/43 2,214, 10/43 2,372, 11/43 2,077, 12/43 1,702, 1/44 2,410,
>>2/44 1,988, 3/44 2,640.
>
>Who cares?

Walter prefers to avoid facts, like try and figure out what the bombing
raids actually did.

>The point is that daylight precision bombing was effective. The Germans were
>very alarmed and took dramatic steps to combat it. It wasn't, as one poster
>said all "area bombing."

Let us see now, "very alarmed and took dramatic steps", is the air ministry
actually saying it looks like our factories will be bombed, we had best think
about dispersal, and then doing nothing for months.

>>So assuming the 10/43 and 1/44 figures are the "correct" level of
>>production the production loss is around 1,000 aircraft in November
>>and December 1943.
>
>Try and stay on point. I know you love your statistics, but the point here is
>that it wasn't, as one poster said all "area bombing."

The point is quite clear, Walter is massively overclaiming the early
effects of the USAAF bombing. And then dismissing the probable
direct and indirect effects on aircraft production by the day and night
bombing, since they happen too late in the year for his current claims.

>>The other point is Bomber Command's two strikes on Kassel
>>in October 1943, the first started large fires at both the Henschel
>>and Fieseler works, the second started a firestorm, with all 3
>>Henschel plants badly damaged, they were making V-1s at
>>the time, the Fieseler works were making Fw190.
>
>That doesn't have much to do with the 8th AF, and certainly sheds little light
>on the effects of daylight precision bombing.

Walter is claiming only the USAAF bombing forced the changes.

>> So another
>>reason to disperse in November and December 1943.
>
>The decision to disperse was taken in May, 1943.

No Walter, the quote says a request was made in May 1943 to disperse,
not a decision was taken, the decision would need to be taken at a higher
level than the air ministry. The actual work was much later in the year.

>At that time, what the
>Germans had seen was that the USAAF had @ 100 heavy bombers
>available on a daily basis.

The German decision to increase day fighter production was taken
before the USAAF entered the war, and long before any USAAF
bombers flew over France. Walter likes to simply connect facts
with the "USAAF did this" link.

Walter is simply mixing up the potential threat with the actual
strength. The potential was hundreds of bombers, the actual
strength was not doing any lasting damage.

>>Looking at the USSBS Fw190 acceptances by plant, the 1943 peak
>>in July was 325 , production was between 263 and 325 January to
>>October 1943 inclusive, then 242 in November, 203 in December,
>>then 383 in January.
>
>Try and stay on point.

Walter ignores what the actual production was, he prefers a quote
that he tries to imply gives the credit for any production loss to the
USAAF, preferably in early 1943 at the moment.

It would be nice to say there was only one reason for a given
effect but there rarely is.

><snip of more pointless pedantry>

Translation. a critique that showed the Milch plan for fighter expansion
was probably not achievable even without the bombing has to be
deleted, since that means the effects Walter is claiming have to be
reduced.

Above all what has to be deleted is another standard Walter method.
Cutting a quote to fit. So when Goering makes his remarks about
priority for Reich defense Walter is not going to admit he simply
cut out the fact it was made the day after the Hamburg firestorm, and
tried to give the credit to the USAAF alone.

I will put the text back in

">"Perhaps the best measure of the Eighth's success through the early summer
>[1943] was its impact on the Luftwaffe. Eighth Air Force had forced the German
>high command both to withdraw fighter units from other theaters to defend the
>Reich and to form larger formations with more heavily armed fighters, thus
>reducing their efficiency against U.S. fighters...On July 28, 1943, during a
>meeting to evaluate the damage Germay had suffered Goring ordered Milch to >give
>the defence of the Reich the "main emphasis" in Luftwaffe planning. This order
>was less significant than at frst apparent because in actual experience, if not
>policy the defense of the Reich had been receiving priority since the Spring."
>
>-- Ibid, pp. 100-109.
>
>So daylight precison bombing -- and only by visual means -- caused the Germans
>both to disperse their factories and also to concentrate the German day
>fighters against them.

Note the little dots between "U.S. fighters...On July 28, 1943, " the
truncation of the quote.

On the night of July 27/28 the RAF created the firestorm in Hamburg.

Walter will now fill in the missing text, the bits he does not like to mention.
It is a simple situation to obtain the books Walter uses and see how he
truncates quotes and ignores anything he does not like.

It was the firestorm at Hamburg that caused Goering to have the
conversation that produced the quote mentioned above. Defense
of the Reich day and night was on the table."

>>And MacFarlane and Newton appear incorrect when they claim the
>>priority in the early spring was home defence, when the priority was
>>stopping the allies taking North Africa and the build up for the summer
>>offensive in the east.
>
>It's seconded by Freeman.

No Walter, Freeman notes an increase by/in August 1943, that is
not April and May 1943.

>>Finally the USAAF heavy bomber forces were flying 200 sorties in
>>a day in June 1943, the start of summer and 300 a day in late July.
>
>The force expanded. Prior to about mid-May, the 8th AF had @100 heavy >bombers
>available on any given day. And the Germans were so concerned about this
>relatively small force that the needs of the Eastern Front and Mediteranean
>were slighted.

All people have to do is note Walter's proof is deployments in August
1943, and how he claims the effects are May 1943.

>>>Amd I remind you again that in this time frame, the 8th was only sending
>>>several dozen B-17's out on its raids, usually less than 100.
>>
>>On 28 July 1943 the 8th despatched 302 bombers, on 26 July 303
>>bombers, on 25 July 323, on 24 July 305 and so on. It had been
>>despatching 200 at a time since May.
>
>The decision to redeploy the day fighters and disperse the aircraft production
>date from April and May, respectively.

The reality is Walter's proof of the above claims is missing, and ignores
what the Germans actually did.

>>>The 8th
>>>activated 5 new groups in Mid-May, 1943, pretty much doubling its strength.
>>By
>>>by May, the Germans had, as Galland says, begun putting more emphasis on
>>>opposing the B-17's than they were against the night bombers.
>
>>So far Walter has not mentioned a single thing about what the
>>night bombers were doing, or the strength of the nightfighter
>>defences and how that changed in 1943.
>
>As Galland notes, the Germans were putting more emphasis on opposing the
>numerically smaller day raiders. And as we know, the night fighters were sent
>to attack the day bombers as early as February, 1943.

In February 1943 Galland said they had solved the problem of the 4 engined
bomber by day.

When it comes to priorities Galland is simply wrong, especially in early
to mid 1943. Check out when he was in the Mediterranean for example
and the increase in day and night fighter strength. The Germans could
not ignore the Hamburg firestorm.

The sending of nightfighters out in daylight is really a basic point in
favour of the Germans doing nothing, double timing the existing
units, not sending new units.

>>Simply Walter has taken quotes applying to July and August 1943
>>and used them to "prove" his claims for April and May 1943.
>
>Both MeFarland et al and Freeman confirm German decisions from April and
>May to support what Galland said.

Walter has basically assembled a whole lot of quotes that show German
activity from around August 1943 onwards, and is busy claiming they
were really done in April and May 1943.

>>>The claim, by another poster, that it was all "area bombing" is just false.
>>
>>The majority was non visual, the majority of non visual strikes were
>>around as accurate as the night strikes the RAF called area attacks.
>
>Not in April and May, 1943.

The majority of the 8th's campaign was non visual.

>>>Daylight precision bombing had a definite affect on the Germans, and they
>>>preceived it as a greater threat than the night bombing. And this was well
>>>before the first bomb was dropped by the USAAF using radar or other
>>>non-visual targeting.
>
>>As can be seen from above Walter will simply erase the RAF if
>>he has to and give all the "good" effects to the USAAF.
>
>The RAF was not doing daylight precision bombing in April and May,
>1943. The USAAF was.

Just ignore the reason why Goering was so concerned on 28 July 1943.
Walter needs to erase the RAF for a while.

>>nd, yes we are now back in May 1943.
>>Walter has supplied fighter figures for August 1943, fighter locations for
>>December 1943, the note the Luftwaffe stopped heavily contesting
>>French airspace in 1944, all to show how the Luftwaffe deployed against
>>USAAF bombers in early to mid 1943. Anyone else see the disconnect?
>
>The day fighters began to redeploy in April, per Freeman.

Freeman notes the fighter strengths in April and August 1943,
Walter announces this means extra fighters were sent in April.
Why not May, June or July?

Walter the overall Luftwaffe fighter strength rose in the first few
months of 1943 and the number of fighters in the west actually
dropped as a percentage of the total force between January
and April 1944, it then recovered to slightly more than the
January percentage of total force by June. It looks like the
majority of the reinforcements arrived in May around the same
time as the new USAAF bomb groups, of which the Luftwaffe
would have been aware, they had a good handle on allied
aircraft strengths from prisoner interrogations and radio watches.

Walter wants to claim major redeployments "denuding" other
fronts and so on.

>McFarland et al
>refers to the "Spring"; and the decision to disperse the aircraft production
>was taken in May, and gathered impetus later. What the Germans had
>seen, what information they had to go on to make these decisions, was
>the operations of @ 100 unescorted heavy bombers.

So the aircraft industry making contingency plans but not carrying them
out until attacks actually happened in the second half of is proof of
USAAF lasting damage in April and May 1943 correct? Interesting
disconnect.

So show us the fighter redeployments, not the before and after
figures from Freeman.

><snip>

This is what has been snipped, to the next ">>" the actual numbers,

E R Hooton, Eagle in Flames, reports the following day fighter dispositions,
(Based on the figures in K Gunderlach Die Deutsche Luftwaffe in Mittelmeer
1940-45. Band I 1940-1942. Band 2 1943-1945, page 716).

All for the year 1943, table is date, Luftflotte Mitte (Reich) / Luftflotte 3 /
total Mitte + Reich / total fighters / % in west.

20 Jan / 163 / 241 / 404 / 1,090 / 37.1
20 Apr / 188 / 232 / 420 / 1,328 / 31.6
20 Jun / 343 / 353 / 696 / 1,704 / 40.1
20 Sep / 677 / 222 / 899 / 1,500 / 59.9
20 Dec / 572 / 312 / 884 / 1,588 / 55.7.

Alfred Price in his survey says Mitte had 309 and Luftflotte three 250
day fighters on 17 May 1943.

Galland is on record as stating in February 1943 the defences had
solved the problem of the 4 engined day bomber, he later changed
his mind.

So looking at the above we can see the Luftwaffe increased the fighter
force in the west throughout 1943. The increase was slow at first and
was slower than the increases on other fronts, that is until June/July 1943,
the other fronts had not suffered any "denuding" of fighters. This is not
surprising given the attempts to support the Kursk offensive and also
resist the invasion of Sicily.

According to the Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe by the British Air
Ministry the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean received over 40%
of new fighter production in the period 1 May to 15 July 1943,
plus additional units.

>>It can also be seen above the Luftwaffe tried to defend non German
>>airspace with the way the number of fighters in Luftflotte 3 increased
>>by June 1943. There was more going on than raids by a "few" dozen
>>USAAF bombers on Germany.
>
>You're forgetting the 7/28/43 meeting of Goring and Milch:
>
>"Perhaps the best measure of the Eighth's success through the early summer
>[1943] was its impact on the Luftwaffe. Eighth Air Force had forced the German
>high command both to withdraw fighter units from other theaters to defend the
>Reich and to form larger formations with more heavily armed fighters, thus
>reducing their efficiency against U.S. fighters...On July 28, 1943, during a
>meeting to evaluate the damage Germay had suffered Goring ordered Milch to give
>the defence of the Reich the "main emphasis" in Luftwaffe planning. This order
>was less significant than at frst apparent because in actual experience, if not
>policy the defense of the Reich had been receiving priority since the Spring."
>
>-- To Command the Sky, pp. 100-109.

I have covered this quote above, Walter chose to delete my reply to it
when he first used it, the reply is above.

Simply Walter is deleting the events of the 27/28 July in Hamburg.
There was a reason Goering was so worried on 28 July.

Note by the way the running together of quotes 10 pages apart.

>>In July, after the battles over Sicily and Kursk, you can really see the
>>shift in fighter deployments.
>
>That began in the Spring.

Walter the trouble you have is quote simple, you are significantly
overclaiming the German reaction, and deleting the evidence that
contradicts the fiction.

>>Under this sort of pressure the results are clear, in terms of both numbers
>>and percentage allocations, the Luftwaffe was forced into redeploying
>>in the west. But this happened when the USAAF was flying 300 aircraft
>>missions to Germany, as well as many more missions to France and
>>the low countries, not when "a few dozen" bombers were flying during
>>the first few months of 1943.
>
>Acting on decisions made when only @ 100 B-17/B-24's's were available
>on a day to day basis and well before any non-visual targetting had been
>attempted.

No Walter, the Luftwaffe redeployments in 1943 occurred later than what
you are trying to claim. The priorities until around the middle of the year
were the east and south, when those operations failed as well as the
increase in pressure from the west the west became the priority.

>>It is a strong achievement, mainly by the USAAF, to force the Luftwaffe
>>to make such a change, the cheap shot here is trying to claim the
>>change occurred much earlier.
>
>The decisions were made by the Germans when the USAAF had @100
>heavy bombers available for day to day operations and well before any
>non-visual targetting was used.

Yes folks, repeat the fiction in the hope it becomes "truth", just ignore
the actual size of the missions in May for a start. By the way the USAAF
had more than 100 bombers available for day to day operations in April
and May 1943, they flew missions of around 100 aircraft, which is not
the same thing.

><snip>

The deleted text,

"G Aders in The History of the German night fighter force gives the night
fighter strength as

10 December 1942, 375, 10 February 1943 477, 26 August 1943 627.

Note this is all nightfighters on all fronts, the majority were in the west.
Again not surprising given the effects of raids like Hamburg. The
Germans reacted to the allied challenges by strengthening the day
and night defences, holding off as long as possible as usual."

>>>Checking Freeman, "Mighty Eighth War Dairy", I see the following numbers of
>>>bombers dispatched:
>>>
>>>3/18/43: 103
>>>3/22/43: 102
>>>3/31/43: 102
>>>4/4/43: 97
>>>4/17/43: 115
>>>5/13/43: 97
>>>
>>>So when the Germans were deploying their fighter units to fight the 8th AF
>>and
>>>deciding to disperse their aircraft industry, the Americans were penetrating
>>>occupied Europe with several dozen bombers, on average.
>>
>>So several dozen is being defined as 8 to 9.
>
>Yes, I'd say 8 or 9 is several. I'd also say again that RAF strength was at
>least 3 times higher, and note again that in late July, 1943, Goring is telling
>Milch to give day fighter production the "main emphasis".

Thanks Walters, you always manage to give a good example of how
you simply twist words and invent meanings,

"Goring ordered Milch to give the defence of the Reich the "main emphasis"
in Luftwaffe planning" is the quote, see above, and this was the day after the
Hamburg firestorm. Now it is turned into "day fighter production".

The reality is Walter simply deletes bits he does not want and then
changes the meanings of the text he does like.

>>People can go back and note the quotes used say things like,
>>
>>"in the summer of 1943"
>>
>>People can then note the list of missions kindly provided by Walter
>>for the spring of 1943.
>
>They can certainly see that the Germans took decisions in April and May
>respectively that repositioned the day fighters to oppose the USAAF and
>disperse the aircraft factories.

Walter will simply ignore the fact he is overclaiming the extent
of the German reactions.

>>Not for him to note the second strike on 13 May 1943, another 72
>>bombers, or 14 May with 217 bombers sent, or 15 May with 193
>>bombers sent, 17 May with 239 bombers sent. Perhaps to slide
>>forward to the first raid in June 1943, the 11th, with 252 bombers sent.
>>Now we are in summer.
>
>But the Germans took in hand decisions based on a sortie rate of @100
>bombers a day through mid-May.

Note Walter does not bother to tell us why the decision to drop the
extra strike on 13 May and subsequent strikes was taken. After all the
production dispersal decision was supposed to happen in May, when
the USAAF was flying 200 bombers at a time, not the 100. So simply
delete any day that had more than around 100 bombers flying.

Walter will now tell us what day in May the dispersal decision was
taken and also what the Luftwaffe expected the USAAF strength to
grow to, in say May 1943

> If they were acting on what a larger force --might-- do,
>then you have to give them credit. But they were certainly reacting to a force
>that was carrying out --precision daylight bombing--.

The Luftwaffe was reacting to a probable increase in the threat from
the west, and did so later than Walter is trying to claim, Kursk and
Sicily had priorities.

Also if the heavies were doing precision bombing then the mediums
were doing very precise bombing and the fighter bombers ultra
precise bombing.

The Luftwaffe was reacting either to future threats (dispersal plans) or
the threats of the day (deployments). Walter is simply exaggerating
when the reactions occurred and how big they were. You can see
that by the way the fighter deployment numbers were deleted.

>>It is quite simple, take the USAAF strength from spring, the results
>>from the summer, the Luftwaffe reaction from the summer and then
>>claim it all happened in spring so the USAAF looks like a bunch of
>>super airmen.
>
>Pretty much, yeah. When you think that they were only going out in good weather
>conditions, only striking by visual means, and usually without escort fighters
>in the target areas, they do look like super airmen. Especially when you
>consider that the RAF had about three times the frontline strength.

Yes folks,

It is quite simple, take the USAAF strength from spring, the results
from the summer, the Luftwaffe reaction from the summer and then
claim it all happened in spring so the USAAF looks like a bunch of
super airmen.

Oh yes, the majority of the 8ths strikes in the first half of the year
were over France, and they had fighter cover.

>I didn't do what you suggest, any way. The German decisions were taken in April
>and May, at a time when the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy bombers available.

Walter simply deleted the 200+ USAAF raids in May 1943 and refuses
to provide figures for the claimed fighter deployments.

>>>Checking "The Hardest Victory" p. 126, shows that Bomber Command
>>>had @ 600 aircraft available, with @ 350 available on any given night, by
>>>the summer of --1942--.
>>
>>Now we are in 1942 for some reason.
>
>I was in a hurry.
>
><snip>

More figures deleted,

In the summer of 1942 Bomber
Command managed to drop 18,208 tons of bombs, in the summer of
1943 the 8th managed 9,860 tons of bombs.

Actually the ratio Bomber Command to the 8th, using the figures above
is 1.85 to 1, throw in the 950 or so tons of bombs by the USAAF
mediums and heavies and it becomes 1.68 to 1. (Walter tried for 3 to 1)

On 30 June 1942, according to Aders there were 255 nightfighters.

Note by the way Walter has not bothered to give nightfighter numbers
and deployments.

>>By the way when the 8th air force was running raids of hundreds
>>of aircraft the Luftwaffe was using day fighter assets, the JG300
>>series units, as night fighters.
>
>We've done this before. JG 300 was not a day fighter unit. It used singel
>engine aircraft, but it was not a day fighter unit.

Walter you are going to have to try harder, the Luftwaffe diverted
airmen and day fighters into night fighter units in the second half
of 1943. Under your logic this shows the USAAF was not effective
in the 1943/44 period, the logic is junk of course.

You also might note the JG300 etc units scored in the region of
1,000 day kill claims in 1944, to 350 night kill claims. The day
claims started in January 1944 and in the first 3 months of the
year were 45 day to 66 night claims.

JG300 was created in June 1943, JG301 and 302 in October,
between them they managed around 180 night and 1 day kill
claims in 1943.

>Hastings says:
>
>"When the former bomber pilot Major Hajo Hermann formed his first "Wild Boar"
>squadrons in July that year [1943], he found himself obliged to recruit among
>failed bomber pilots and disgraced aircrew rejected by other units."
>
>--"Bomber Command" p. 270 by Max Hastings.

This ignores the fact JG Hermann was the first unit raised and after
it had been proved the expansion began, Aders notes the instructor
level pilots used. It is fun to see the attempt to make instrument trained
pilots, a relative rarity in the Luftwaffe, turned into the dregs.

>On the other hand, the Germans did sent out their best night fighter pilots to
>oppose the 8th AF.
>
>The time is early February, 1943:
>
>"In fact, though, Jabs, Grimm and Naumann each claimed the destruction of a
>B-17 from their first stiff daylight combat with the Fortresses, all eight of
>IV/NJG 1's aircraft that had been engaged emerged from it in a damaged state.
>Consequently for the succeeding night patrols the Gruppe had to draw on
>machines that were less operationally serviceable.
>
>[As Galland said, opposing the day bombers took priority over opposing the
>night bombers, even though the latter were much more numerous.]

Want to know something folks, the western nightfighter units
claimed 18 day kills January to July 1943 inclusive, according to
Tony Wood's list, they claimed 852 night kills according to Tony
and 902 according to Aders.

So priority is 2% of kills. Note the experiment above showed the
problems with non formation attacks on USAAF formations, not
a priority to day defence.

IV/NJG 1 sent up 8 out of a nominal 30 aircraft.

You see the technique is simple, try and discredit the night fighter
pilots sent against the RAF and play up the pilots sent against the
USAAF.

> Eight aircraft, with all
>their sensitive special equipmenmt so essential for night fighting in darkness,
>had been put out of action. And it was the same story with most of the other
>night-fighter Gruppen, now also thrown into the daylight battle.
>
>But if machines were utimately replaceable, men were not--and such combats
>always ended in the loss of highly qualified crews.

Always ended, so every time a nightfighter squadron attacked at
day they always lost at least a crew killed?

>These were individualistic
>warriors, whose metier, after being put on the track of a mighty Lancaster
>bomber, was to stalk it in the darkness with their own radar sets and shoot it
>down by surprise. Of this technique they had become masters, but in daylight
>it was unthinkable and their skill was wasted.
>
>Yet they continued to be used in this way. On February 26, 1943, Captain Jabs
>took off with three duty flights to intercept a formation of B-24 Liberators
>returning from a raid on Emden. With them for the first time on a daylight
>operation was the squadron was the squadron commander of 12/NJG 1, Captain
>Lugwig Becker, the night fighter arm's leading expert in technique. What was
>such technique against all the guns of the Liberators? His companions lost
>sight of him at the outset of the attack and neither he nor his radio-operator,
>Staub, were seen again, though all available aircraft searched the sea until
>dark. Missing from his first daylight mission was the man who by his skill at
>night had not been hit for months, and who after forty-four victories had that
>very day been informed of his award of the Oak Leaves of the Knigt's Cross.
>To the night fighters his death brought disquiet. Was the Luftwaffe in such a
>bad way that specialists like Becker had to be squandered on missions
>completely foreign to their training?"
>
>Luftwaffe War Diaries, p. 303 by Cajus Bekker
>
>This at a time (February, 1943) when the USAAF was attacking solely by visual
>means and never with more than several dozen bombers.

Congratulations Walter in discovering the fact the experiment by
the nightfighters was a loser. Going to mention the result was
a continuation of the attacks on a lower level but with the experienced
crews excluded from day operations?

>> Under Walter's rules of logic it
>>shows bad things about the USAAF, as opposed to everyone
>>else's rules of logic which state it shows bad things about Walter.
>
>People can judge for themselves.

Under Walter's rules of logic it
shows bad things about the USAAF, as opposed to everyone
else's rules of logic which state it shows bad things about Walter.

>>To most people the night fighter use in daylight and day fighter use
>>at night show improvisation and a Luftwaffe high command largely
>>misusing its assets, for Walter night fighters in daylight is the only
>>part considered, it fits the fiction.
>
>It's not fiction to say that the Germans began returning day fighter units to
>Germany in April and began dispersing their aircraft production in May. It's
>not fiction to say that opposing the day bombers was officially given the
>highest priority in July.

Fiction 1, the overstatement in the rise of Luftwaffe fighter strength in
the west, in terms of numbers and timing.

Fiction 2, the dispersal of German aircraft production starting in May 1943

(in both cases supposed to happen while the USAAF was flying 100
aircraft missions as well)

Fiction 3, the idea the day bombers were given the highest priority
in July 1943, the day after the Hamburg firestorm. Go look at the
quote above and see how Walter simply changes the meaning
and refuses to put in the missing parts.

>>At the end of 1942 the night fighter force was 5 Geschwader controlling
>>15 gruppen, except some of the gruppen were still staffel size, by the
>>middle of 1942 there were 6 operational Geschwader plus 1 training
>>unit controlling 22 gruppen, 18 of which were in the Reich.
>
>Off point.

You see folks, Walter does not want to see a rise in Luftwaffe nightfighter
forces, that destroys the fiction of the day bombers being given the
priorities he claims for them.

Interestingly enough Alfred Prices' Luftwaffe OOB for 27 July 1942
and 17 May 1943, give the following. In the west in 1942 388 day
and 282 night fighters, in 1943 559 day and 407 night fighters,
increases of 44.1 and 44.3% respectively.

The 8th had gone from 0 to 200 aircraft missions. Harris says
bomber command had gone from 388 to 790 average daily
availability, aircraft and crews, including the day bombers.
It looks like the day bomber strength was around 90 in July 1942
and 110 in May 1943.

>The Germans began returning day fighter units to Germany in April
>and began dispersing their aircraft production in May. It's not fiction to say
>that opposing the day bombers was officially given the highest priority in
>July

Fiction 1, the overstatement in the rise of Luftwaffe fighter strength in
the west, in terms of numbers and timing.

Fiction 2, the dispersal of German aircraft production starting in May 1943.

(in both cases supposed to happen while the USAAF was flying 100
aircraft missions as well)

Fiction 3, the idea the day bombers were given the highest priority
in July 1943, the day after the Hamburg firestorm. Go look at the
quote above and see how Walter simply changes the meaning
and refuses to put in the missing parts.

>>The Germans reacted to the increasing pressure by day and night,
>>by beefing up the defences then firstly defeating the unescorted day
>>raids and then defeating the night raids. The allies then struck back.
>>The way the air war fluctuated, no absolutes.
>
>We came out on top.

The army put tanks on the Luftwaffe runways, it made a big difference.

><snip>
>
>>Translation Walter has convicted Harris, the messy evidence side of
>>things is irrelevant.
>>
>
>I haven't mentioned Harris in this thread.

Walter's words,

"But Bomber Command was kept at its Sisyphean task by the almost criminally
incompetent Arthur Harris until the very end."

You see Walter hopes no one has a memory, since he contradicts
himself within hours or days, showing just how much fiction he writes.

>What -is- clear is that the Germans reacted very strongly to the application of
>daylight precision bombing, did so when the number of aircraft actually over
>Europe was pretty small and when those aircraft were only bombing by visual
>means.

Walter will take the results of the second half of 1943, apply it to
the first half of 1943 and thereby "prove" his claim.

>It wasn't all "area bombing."

By the looks of it non visual bombing was over 50%, the USSBS says
around 2/3 of this was blind, so just over 1/3 of the 8th efforts.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Mr. Sinclair wrote a bunch of stuff.

I don't see anything he posted that refutes Galland.

During the course of 1943, the day bombers received more attention than the
night bombers, even though the night bombers were more numerous.

This is backed up by what McFarland et al and Roger Freeman said. The Germans
began redeploying the day fighters back to Germany in April per Freeman and in
the "Spring" per McFarland. The Germans decided also per McFarland to begin
dispersing the aircraft production from May.

All of this was well before the first use of non-visual targeting by the 8th AF
and at a time when only @ 100 bombers were available day to day.

Walt

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> Mr. Sinclair wrote a bunch of stuff.
>
> I don't see anything he posted that refutes Galland.
>

Translation:

I propose to ignore any and all evidence that disagrees with
my pre-conceived notions.

Keith

I wrote:

>> I don't see anything he posted that refutes Galland.
>>

Mr. Willshaw writes:

>
>Translation:
>
>I propose to ignore any and all evidence that disagrees with
>my pre-conceived notions.

I am sure glad you posted that. Sometimes it feels like it's just me and
Sinclair.

My pre-conceived notions don't show me that the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy
bombers available for day to day operations prior to mid-May, 1943.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that these aircraft bombed using only
the "mark I eyeball."

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans began bringing the day
fighters home in April, 1943.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans felt the need to
disperse the aircraft production in May, 1943.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that this reinforces what Galland said
-- the day bombers received more attention than the night bombers as 1943 wore
on, even though the night bombers were more numerous.

My pre-conceived notions don't show me, but the data above does -- that it was
not all "area bombing" as one RAF apologist -- maybe it was you -- suggested.

Walt

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>I wrote:
>>> I don't see anything he posted that refutes Galland.
>
>Mr. Willshaw writes:
>>Translation:
>>
>>I propose to ignore any and all evidence that disagrees with
>>my pre-conceived notions.
>
>I am sure glad you posted that. Sometimes it feels like it's just me and
>Sinclair.

Hmm, I receive nice emails including contacts who have helped me
find much useful information, apart from other people's public postings
refuting the silly claims Walter tries to run.

>My pre-conceived notions don't show me that the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy
>bombers available for day to day operations prior to mid-May, 1943.
>
>My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that these aircraft bombed using only
>the "mark I eyeball."

So far we are back in the motherhood area, the exaggerations are
simply deleted for the moment.

>My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans began bringing the day
>fighters home in April, 1943.


Now the first attempt to slip in misleading information, please supply
the units and dates of their arrival, and note the increase in the overall
numbers of Luftwaffe fighters during the first half of 1943. We want
the April transfers, not the final total in August. As a hint, ignore JG 11,
it was formed in April 1943, and be aware of the rotation of fighter
units to the Reich for refitting, and note JG1 on 17 May 1943 was
around half strength compared with 27 July 1943, since it was used
to form JG11. Then the key point, tell us how this means the Luftwaffe
was "denuding" the other fronts of fighters which was the original claim.

>My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans felt the need to
>disperse the aircraft production in May, 1943.

Now the a bigger attempt at fiction, a "request" is turned into action,
ignoring the lack of dispersal work actually done.

>My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that this reinforces what Galland said
>-- the day bombers received more attention than the night bombers as 1943 wore
>on, even though the night bombers were more numerous.

The largest 8th Air Force raid on Germany in December 1943 was
722 bombers on 24 December, the largest Bomber Command raid
was 712 bombers on the 29th (there were larger night raids in November)

Using the figures in E R Hooton Eagle in Flames,

December 1943 bomber sorties to Germany night 3,389, day 3,692
(140 from the 15th Air Force). The day bombers had fighter escorts,
some 4,926 sorties, the night bombers an extra 35 nightfighter and
electronic warfare sorties.

There were an additional 1,137 day heavy bomber and 288 night
bomber sorties to non German targets in western Europe.

However now we have "day bomber" as the criteria, which means
the sorties of the lights and mediums. In this case the number
of day bomber sorties exceeded the night sorties in November
1943, 4,790 to 4,607 and in December 1943 the numbers were
7,733 to 3,677. These ignore the thousands of day fighter sorties,
12,263 to be precise.

It is clear the day defence in the west became the priority over the
day defences in the south and east in the July/August 1943 period.

There does not seem to have been any time when the night defence
was deprived of resources in favour of the day defences, as late
as 31 May 1944, using Alfred Price's figures, there were 1,091 day
and 742 night fighters in the west, plus 142 single engined fighters in
the JG300 series units which were used day and night. It was things
like the bomber force that were sacrificed to build up the fighter force.
Galland may claim there was some sort of priority day versus night
but the numbers say it was day over the west versus day over the
other fronts.

>My pre-conceived notions don't show me, but the data above does -- that it was
>not all "area bombing" as one RAF apologist -- maybe it was you -- suggested.

When stuck answer another question, not the one being asked, and
throw an accusation without any supporting evidence.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

>>I wrote:
>>>> I don't see anything he posted that refutes Galland.

>>Mr. Willshaw writes:
>>>Translation:
>>>
>>>I propose to ignore any and all evidence that disagrees with
>>>my pre-conceived notions.
>>

>>I am sure glad you posted that. Sometimes it feels like it's just me and
>>Sinclair.
>

>>My pre-conceived notions don't show me that the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy
>>bombers available for day to day operations prior to mid-May, 1943.
>>
>>My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that these aircraft bombed using only
the "mark I eyeball."
>

>So far we are back in the motherhood area, the exaggerations are
>simply deleted for the moment.

It's not a motherhood statement to say that all the bombing in this period was
visual. It's what happened.

>>My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans began bringing the
>day
>>fighters home in April, 1943.
>

>Now the first attempt to slip in misleading information...

I've certainly said it before. I guess you mean that stating that the bombing
was all visual wasn't false, it was just a "motherhood statement." It's still
true.

>please supply
>the units and dates of their arrival,

"Thus, despite the mounting production, the number of serviceable dayfighters
available for the defence of Germany rose only slowly: from 120 in March and
April to 162 in early May, 255 in early June and 300 in July.

By the end of August, under pressure of the American daylight offensive, the
home defence force reached its all-time "high" in first-line aircraft: 405 Me
109s and Fw 190s, plus one twin-engined Geschwaderwith about eighty Me 1l0s and
Me 410s.
Though some were newly formed units, most of them had had to be withdrawn from
other fronts. From southern Italy Il/JG 27 under Captain Schroer moved to
Wiesbaden-Erbenheim, II/JG 51 under Captain Rammelt to Neubiberg near Munich,
while. a single Gruppe of the renowned "Greenheart" Geschwader, IIl/JG 54 under
Major Reinhard Seiler, was posted from northern Russia to Oldenburg and
Nordholtz on HeIigoland Bight. .
Two complete Geschwader were also brought home: JG 3 ("Udet") under
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilcke from the southern sector of the eastern front;
JG 26 ("Schlageter") under Major Priller from the English Channel, where its
experience of combat with the British and Americans was perhaps un.rivalled.
Both now were stationed on the lower Rhine and in Holland, right on the enemy
approach routes.

Even the Me 1 I Os, long obsolete in daylight and lately relegated to a host of
inconsequential tasks, were given a new lease of life. Provided they could
evade combat with enemy fighters, their firepower could still make dents in the
heavy bombers."

-- "Luftwaffe War Diaries, p. 319

So the day defense force rose from April to May by 1/3, at a time when the
USAAF had no more than 100 heavy bombers available day to day, and was only
bombing by visual means.

> As a hint, ignore JG 11,
>it was formed in April 1943, and be aware of the rotation of fighter
>units to the Reich for refitting, and note JG1 on 17 May 1943 was
>around half strength compared with 27 July 1943, since it was used
>to form JG11.

Thanks for making my points for me.

But let's look at something else, the effect of the first year of Harris in
charge of BC, also from the LWD:

"The success of Bomber Command's offensive was however, questionable. Although
many German cities lay in ruins, had the objective been acheived? Had German
industry been destroyed, or the morale of the population undermined? Nothing
of the sort had taken place."

LWD, p. 309

So we see that the first year of bombing by Bomber Command under Harris had no
apreciable effect.

But the first year of USAAF operations -- 8/17/42 -- 8/17/43, we see the Reich
day fighter force brought to it's 'all time 'high'", to fight against the Day
Bombers. This is pretty much what Galland said -- the USAAF received higher
priority even though still numerically inferior.

>Then the key point, tell us how this means the Luftwaffe
>was "denuding" the other fronts of fighters which was the original claim.

LWD does indicate that at Hitler's insistence, and against the advice of Milch,
Jeschonek and Goring, that many aircraft were sent both to the Med and the
Eastern Front in this time frame:

"But the most striking evidence of Jeschonek's failure emerges from the last
months of his life. The Luftwaffe staff was fully informed about the American
aircraft construction programme, and at last Jeschonek recognized the mortal
danger that such swarms of four-engined bombers represented for Germany. "A
danger of such magnitude, that by comparision the disaster of Stalingrad was
trifling.

His volte-face in favor of defense put him on the side of Generals Galland and
Kammhuber who, while the Luftwaffe was bled to death on the eastern and
southern fronts, had for long tried to draw attention to the threat from the
west."

-- LWD p. 316

This at a time, when the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy bombers available, and was
bombing only by visual means.

It wasn't all "area bombing", as one poster suggested.

>>My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans felt the need to
>>disperse the aircraft production in May, 1943.
>
>Now the a bigger attempt at fiction, a "request" is turned into action

That's pathetic.

A request that was brought on by operations of the the 8th AF with @ 100 heavy
bombers on any given raid, bombing exclusively by visual means.

>>My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that this reinforces what Galland
>said
>>-- the day bombers received more attention than the night bombers as 1943
>wore
>>on, even though the night bombers were more numerous.

>The largest 8th Air Force raid on Germany in December 1943 was
>722 bombers on 24 December, the largest Bomber Command raid
>was 712 bombers on the 29th (there were larger night raids in November)

Hello? Anyone home?

We're talking about the operation of @ 100 B-17's and B-24's and their
operations through mid-May, 1943.

<snip a lot of really strange and pedantic stuff>

>It is clear the day defence in the west became the priority over the
>day defences in the south and east in the July/August 1943 period.
>

It's also clear per Freeman and LWD that this build-up started in April, and
per LWD increased the Day fighters by 1/3 between "April and early May". This
at a time when the USAAF had @ 100 bombers available on any given day and was
bombing entirely by visual means.

>Galland may claim there was some sort of priority day versus night
>but the numbers say it was day over the west versus day over the
>other fronts.

After 1 year of BC operations under Harris, the RAF failed to achieve its
objectives.

After 1 year of USAAF operations, the day fighters were quadrupled. And all the
US raids were done solely by visual means.

It wasn't all "area bombing."

As of 1 April:

100 US heavies

120 German day fighters.

As of 17 August:

300 US heavies

500 German day fighters.

Did the night fighters quadruple in strength?

After the raid on Hamburg which produced the firestorm, things changed. But
that was over three years after the war began.

After 1 year of RAF operations against Germany, the effect was negligible. Not
even you can say -- honestly-- that the effect of the first year of USAAF
operations was negligible. In fact, the first year of USAAF operations scared
the Germans very badly, and defnitely impacted the number of aircraft they
planned to produce.

>>My pre-conceived notions don't show me, but the data above does -- that it
>was
>>not all "area bombing" as one RAF apologist -- maybe it was you --
>suggested.
>

Somebody with "uk" in their e-mail address indicated it was all "area bombing."
But that is not true. That's how this particular iteration started.

>When stuck answer another question, not the one being asked, and
>throw an accusation without any supporting evidence.

You have no answer. But then, you never do.

Walt